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Abstract 
Engineering Linkages with the Coal Chain 
Carl Grundy-~Jarr 
"Industrial restructuring without parallel in recent British 
industrial history" is how the current Chairman of British Coal, Sir 
Robert Haslamg has described events in that industry. Since 1960 
upwards of three quarters of a million jobs have gone in the deep coal 
mining industry a 1 one. Numerous studies have analysed the underlying 
mechanisms behind the rapid decline of the nationalised coal industry, 
but hitherto little attention has been paid to the national linkage 
effects of that decline. This thesis is an attempt to analyse the 
consequences of industrial restructuring in coal mining on its UK 
engineering suppliers. In so doing, the thesis develops into much more 
than an empirical case study of industrial linkage and becomes a 
critical analysis of state capital-private capital relations. In 
particularg it focusses on the shifting boundaries of state ownership 
in the energy sector of the •eighties. It considers what are the main 
processes involved and some of the consequences for those people and 
places most dependent on mining related jobs for their livelihoods. 
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INTRODUCTION 
•Far from being a wholly academic matter, the 
question of method is of crucial political 
importance in generating information that can be 
socially useful• (Sayer, A. and Morgan, K., 1985, 
in Massey, D. and Meegan, R. Politics and Method, 
Methuen, London, p. 167). 
1.1 Background to the Research Proposal 
Before describing some of the initial steps taken in the early 
stages of my thesis it is useful to mention an earlier research project 
I was involved in. Early in 1983 I was employed as a temporary 
research assistant at Coventry (Lanchester) Polytechnic after a 
frustrating period of unemployment. I worked in the Polytechnic • s 
Department of Politics and History on a project examining the history 
of the city•s motor vehicle industry. Although I did not realize it at 
the time, the problems facing Coventry where similar to those of 
numerous coalfield communities in a number of ways. Firstly, Coventry 
was over-reliant on one major industry like many mining areas. 
Secondly, the city had experienced rapid decline in that industry -
motor vehicle manufacture - since the early 1960s. Thirdly, an 
employment gap had opened up due to a lack of provision of alternative 
sources of employment. Fourthly, the rapid decline in motor vehicle 
manufacture had hit supplier industries, including several components 
and machine tool firms. Consequently a large part of my research 
schedule involved interviews with numerous people who had lost their 
jobs in the city•s engineering industries, many of whom had had long 
experience in motor vehicle plants and had no work experience outside 
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that industry. For many of the young people just entering the local 
job market there were few opportunities to enter the city•s 
manufacturing sector~ or indeed few opportunities at that time apart 
from low paid or part time service sector jobs. 
My experiences in Coventry influenced my decision to examine some 
of the consequences of manufacturing decline in the UK on employment 
and jobs in selected mechanical engineering industries. My initial 
proposal to the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) was very 
broad and poorly defined because I had not considered carefully which 
industry(ies) I should study. During the first five months of my 
research period I considered various options ranging from motor vehicle 
components; metalworking machine tools; textile machinery to 
agricultural equipment. In fact it was not until the spring of 1985 
that I eventually decided to focus on the UK mining machinery industry. 
Why was this? 
Whilst I was engaged in my academic deliberations one of the major 
industrial stoppages in modern British history was unfolding - the 
miners• strike of 1984-5. Very often on my way into the University in 
the mornings I witnessed many police vans, including some from other 
counties, on their way to local pit villages. At the time I was deeply 
aware that the country was undergoing a period of fundamental 
industrial and political conflict which was going to have repercussions 
well beyond the coal industry. It was only after the miners had 
returned to work, in April 1985~ that I considered examining the 
implications of the coal crisis for engineering suppliers. 
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Initially I cons ide red carrying out some comparative research 
between the mining machinery industry and other UK mechanical 
engineering industries. I also considered a study of both the UK and 
West German mining machinery industries. Both these forms of 
comparison would have had their merits~ but in terms of research design 
they would have produced a very different methodological approach. 
Furthermore9 owing to the problems of clear industrial classification 
this study of the UK mining machinery industry has necessitated 
considerable research into other engineering industries within the UK. 
Whilst some form of comparison with what is happening to the mining and 
mining machinery industries in West Germany would be very useful 9 it 
was not a realistic proposition because I do not speak German. This is 
not to say I have neglected the major competitors to Britain•s mining 
manufacturers in global markets. An important part of the thesis is an 
understanding of the interaction between international and national 
fuel and machinery markets. But the main focus of the thesis is on how 
the British 11 coal crisis 11 has affected employment in linked industries. 
The study examines the broader dimensions of the coal crisis~ which has 
adversely affected thousands of people•s livelihoods in areas within 
and beyond traditional coalfield communities (1). 
1.2 Objectives 
Initially I had not fully appreciated the implications of my 
choice of case study. It soon became apparent that to begin to explain 
changes in the mining machinery industry I would need an understanding 
of the underlying mechanisms and social processes that produced and 
shaped Britain•s coal crisis. Furthermore, I would need to understand 
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much more than I did about the character and shape of Britain's 'mixed 
economy' and relations between state capital and private capital. As 
the thesis progressed I began to question the issue of state ownership 9 
and particularly since the election of a third Thatcher government in 
1987~ the whole issue of privatisation became a dominant theme in the 
thesis. Indeed9 the proposed privatisation of the electricity supply 
industry (ESI)9 and after that9 the coal industry itself9 and the 
retreats in the Labour Party from the concept of nationalisation 9 led 
to a complete revision of the thesis from mid-1987 onwards. 
The thesis has raised many more questions than it has answered. 
Some of the ones I have tried to answer are: 
How are the restructuring processes in the coal industry related 
to employment change in the mining machinery industry? 
How has state intervention in the nationalised coal industry 
affected the mining machinery industry? 
Why was the nationalised coal industry dependent on private firms 
for its capital goods requirements? 
How and why have the capital goods supplied to the coal industry 
been implemented in particular ways? What part has private 
capital played in the changes in the mining labour process? 
How has restructuring in the mining machinery industry affected 
particular localities dependent on mining and manufacturing 
employment for a high proportion of local jobs? 
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How will the privatisation of the ESI affect state capital-private 
capital relations in the coal industry? 
Who will be the main winners and losers if the coal industry is 
privati sed? 
How can an understanding of engineering linkages help in the 
formulation of alternative coal policies~ and more importantly~ in 
the formulation of a national energy policy? 
Whilst there are numerous studies of the history of coal mining in 
Britain; the history of capital-labour relations in the industry; the 
place of the miners• union in the labour movement; and of changes to 
the mining labour process, hitherto few other studies have focussed on 
the linkages between coal mining and engineering, and none have 
examined the coal crisis from the perspective of state capital-private 
capital relations. For these reasons I believe that this thesis is a 
necessary contribution to debates about the current and future shape of 
the coal industry, if not to wider debates about the character of 
British nationalisation and privatisation. The main aims of the thesis 
can be summarized as follows: 
(1) To provide an understanding of the historical development of 
relations between the nationalised coal industry and private 
suppliers of capital goods (see chapters two and three); 
(2) To examine the character of state ownership and the crucial 
influence of state policies on the evolution of the nationalised 
coal industry and upon the industrial structure and performance of 
mining suppliers (see chapters four to six); 
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(3) To examine linkages between external and internal relations of 
production in both the coal mining industry and its major 
suppliers of capital goods (see chapters five and six); 
(4) To provide an understanding of the very different sets of monopoly 
buyer-supplier relations and conditions affecting the fortunes of 
suppliers to the deep mining and opencast mining industries (see 
chapters six and seven); 
(5) To supplement studies of linkage and income multiplier effects in 
specific localities as a result of the decline in coal mining (see 
Hudson, Peck and Sadler, 1984) with a study of linkage multipliers 
at the national level (see chapter six); 
(6) To examine the piecemeal privatisation of the coal industry in the 
1980s (see chapters three to seven); 
(7) To examine some of the possible consequences of the privatisation 
of the electricity supply industry and of coal mining on the 
industrial future of mining equipment suppliers, and to consider 
who the major corporations are in the competition for stakes in 
the UK energy sector (see chapter eight); 
(8) To suggest some possible alternative courses of action and 
policies that would fully take into account: 
a) the income and linkage •knock on• effects of industrial 
decline for employees in the mining and mining supply 
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industries and on the local economies most dependent on those 
industries for jobs and livelihoods 9 and 
b) the policy linkages between energy matters 9 employment~ 
regional development and a clean environment (see the 
concluding chapter). 
1.3 ~E!~b_odological Strategy 
At an early stage in the development of the thesis I had decided 
to adopt a methodological strategy that would enable analysis of 
restructuring processes at three main spatial scales - international, 
national and regional. I have concentrated primarily on national 
changes as the critical level of analysis because of the special 
relationship that developed between the National Coal Board (NCB) and 
its primary suppliers. In severa 1 respects it can be argued that a 
monopoly buyer in the home coal market has insulated domestic producers 
from international competition. Nevertheless, it is not possible to 
understand national fuel policies in isolation from international 
energy markets and from international processes of change. 
Developments in the international mining and minerals industries have 
become increasingly important considerations for British mining 
equipment suppliers faced with a shrinking home market since the late 
1950s. 
At the national level I have concentrated on changes in state 
policies and priorities towards the nationalised coal industry and the 
role of the state in the national economy. This is the context within 
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which relations bet1t1een the NCB (now British Coal Corporation) and 
mining machinery suppliers are analysed. It is also argued that 
national fuel policies, state expenditure limits 9 pricing policies and 
wider political goals have had fundamental consequences for employees 
and their communities in both the mining and mining supply industries. 
The focus on two industries (coal mining and mining machinery 
makers) and the need to understand international and national processes 
of change has meant that it has not always been possible to carry out 
what one might call an intensive rather than an extensive research 
strategy. Some of my analysis of events in the coal industry, for 
instance, is at a very broad level and relies heavily upon secondary 
sources of information. In chapter five I briefly examine some of the 
consequences of technical change and new working practices within the 
deep coal mining industry. Most of the analysis is based on media 
reports, specialist articles in the financial, trade and technical 
press, and upon the work of other researchers. If I had chosen to 
study the consequences of new mining technology and Coal Board 
restructuring on the mining labour process as my prime concern it would 
have necessitated a much more intensive historical study of particular 
pits, and many interviews with miners, pit managers and union 
representatives. I did not, but I did need to understand broad level 
changes to the mining labour process. Indeed, capital-labour relations 
in coal mining have significantly influenced the direction of technical 
change in the industry, research and development on equipment and 
mining systems, and in turn, state capital-private capital relations. 
Hitherto, there have been few meaningful studies of the UK mining 
machinery industry, and none that examine the possible implications of 
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privatisation upon public-private sector relations and upon industrial 
structure. This means that I had little documentary evidence to draw 
on. To analyse inter-industry linkages and production reorganisation 
within the mining engineering industry I adopted a pragmatic mixture of 
extensive and intensive research methods. To illustrate and describe 
broad trends and developments I was able to obtain a wealth of useful 
statistics on the mining machinery industry as defined by the Standard 
Industrial Classification~ and upon other related industrial activity 
headings from the Engineering Industry Training Board (EITB). In fact, 
I have only used a tiny proportion of this quantitative material in the 
thesis~ although I have used numerous tables and figures to aid 
empirical description or to highlight important trends. For more 
detailed statistical data on specific companies within the industries I 
was studying I devised a questionnaire survey (see Appendices). The 
questionnaire returns proved very helpful in making sense of the 
industry-wide~ national, regional and sub-regional data supplied by the 
EITB. 
Throughout the research I have avoided "number crunching" methods 
in favour of a mainly qualitative analysis. Nevertheless there is alot 
to be said for combining questionnaire survey data with interviews. My 
own small surveys of companies in Yorkshire and the North East of 
England were helpful in identifying varying levels of dependency on the 
home coal industry market and secondary suppliers excluded from 
standard definitions of the mining machinery industry. It was also 
possible to gain an idea of the inter-relations between suppliers 
through sub-contracting. Questionnaire data also proved helpful in 
management interviews where there were often strict time constraints 
and questions had to be well prepared and carefully structured. During 
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the course of my research I interviewed several key actors 9 including 
senior executives9 middle managers, unionists 9 and in some cases, 
production workers (see Appendices). Nevertheless, as the thesis 
progressed I became more selective in who I interviewed, partly because 
my research had become more concerned with broader issues - nati ona 1 
energy policy, privatisation, and the like, and partly because 9 as a 
research student I simply could not finance all the research I wanted 
to. 
Oral interviews proved useful in two respects. Firstly, whilst 
much of the evidence could be considered to be anecdotal and 
subjective, taken together it enabled me to develop a much clearer 
picture of the pressures and problems facing equipment suppliers. 
Secondly, the oral evidence provided me with more detail and different 
interpretations of events which sometimes led me to re-evaluate my own 
ideas, assumptions and previous interpretations. Very often I was able 
to gain deeper insights than I would otherwise have had. But there 
were problems with my research strategy. I wanted to obtain information 
from several companies in different parts of the country. A truly 
intensive research design would have necessitated a spread of 
interviews at each company and several return visits. I only visited 
four companies more than once during the whole research period. So 
although I assembled some very interesting and potentially important 
detail from several interviews I have used only a small fraction of 
this information in the thesis. I did not want to rely too heavily on 
highly selective interviews without more evidence, either gained from 
long observation or numerous interviews. For several firms I could 
have described changes in working practices and the labour process, but 
the evidence I had was not detailed enough to do so without 
over-simplification. 
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There were differences in approach~ and sometimes~ in dress~ when 
interviewing managers and unionists. With managers I tended to wear a 
suit and use more formal structured interview techniques. With 
unionists I often turned up in casu a 1 dress and used semi -structured 
and interactive interview methods 9 or a conversational approach. In 
both cases I used a tape recorder except when to 1 d deta i 1 s 11 off the 
record 11 • Whenever it was pass i b 1 e to do so 9 I tried to organise 
meetings with both management and union representatives separately on 
the same day. This backfired on one occasion when a senior executive I 
had recently had a long discussion with walked into the union 
convenor • s room to discover me with my feet up enjoying a mug of tea 
with the convenor and two shop stewards! This particular director was 
most upset and told me so. After this incident I was much more tactful 
and held meetings with unionists well outside the factory gates. There 
was another memorable occasion when I met three company employees in a 
local pub. The meeting went very well 9 and I thought successfully. It 
was only when I was half way back to Durham on the inter~city 125 that 
I discovered I hadn't put the tape recorder on for the second half of 
the interview! 
It is important to stress that in approaching individuals for 
information I did try to avoid stereotypical assumptions about "us" and 
11 them 11 attitudes in industry. I think the opinion of Sayer and Morgan 
(1985:155) is valid: 
stereotypes arise through a failure of the 
investigator to listen and a tendency to criticize 
behaviour without understanding the reasons behind 
it. However 9 critical evaluation cannot be 
dispensed with or tacked on as an opti ona 1 extra 
under the heading of 'policy implications• for in 
assessing the adequacy of various explanations 
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offered by different groups of their activities, we 
inevitably have to judge which of these are more or 
less correct ... 
. . . What managers and others do is very much a 
function of the pressures and constraints which 
bear upon them9 and it is not the individuals but 
the form of social or anization which we would---
expect to criticize!' my emphasis . 
Another important constraint on my research progress and upon the 
sources of data was the 1 ack of cooperation I received from the Goa 1 
Board (British Coal) itself. During MacGregor's time at the NCB and 
following the national miners' strike the industry became more 
sensitive than usual about researchers, journalists, and most 
academics. Consequently I failed to obtain even the most basic details 
regarding the national and area purchasing of equipment, let alone 
colliery level information. So I had to rely on published data, plus 
additional but far from comprehensive information from the National 
Union of Mineworkers (NUM). 
Even before the miners' strike, the Financial Times had described 
the mining machinery industry as a "tight lipped" one. The reasons for 
this were probably due to the great uncertainty that existed then about 
the future shape of the coal industry and what the effects of the 
increasingly profit-orientated policies of the Coal Board would be on 
business with UK suppliers. Whilst I encountered reluctance to answer 
questions concerning the specific details about equipment orders from 
the Co a 1 Board, most interviewees were frank about their concern 
over the shrinking size of the deep mining industry, not least because 
in some cases there was (and is) a very real threat to their own jobs. 
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I was also able to gain a clearer understanding of the varying company 
responses to British Coal restructuring from company level interviews. 
which was impossible to do from media reports. 
One of the problems of examining changes in two national 
industries - coal mining and mining machinery - is that of coverage. 
To prevent my analysis of events from becoming over-generalized and too 
superficial to have any explanatory value I focussed primarily on 
specific product markets. namely the heavier items of underground 
mechanical machinery (coal cutters, road-headers. underground 
transportation equipment, roof supports). and upon two main localities, 
namely the North East and Yorkshire. Even so, I did attempt to visit 
primary suppliers suppliers of longwall machinery outside those two 
geographical areas, such as Dowty in Worcester and Aschurch or Anderson 
Strathclyde in Motherwell. Furthermore. the focus on a locality such 
as Tyneside meant that I had to take account of other forms of linkages 
with the coal industry. especially the power plant industry (see 
chapter six, part two). Once I had decided to consider the 
implications of privatisation on the industry my attention turned to a 
broad network of engineering and corporate linkages incorporating 
multinational energy conglomerates, civil engineering contractors and 
private mining operators (see chapters seven and eight). This all 
required cons i derab 1 e secondary research and further questionnaires. 
rather than face-to-face interviews. (Given the constraints of time 
and resources I could not do all the interviews and additional research 
I wanted to). At the international and national level of analyses I 
was mostly concerned with who would benefit from current policies and 
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trends? Who would lose? And what would be the main consequences for 
people employed in the mining industry~ particularly the private 
suppliers? (see Objectives above). 
For anybody reading this thesis there will be little doubting 
where my sympathies lie~ or indeed about my political proclivities. 
Nevertheless~ I have tried to remain as objective as possible in my 
research methods. At all times I have been conscious of the fact that 
whenever it comes to interpretation and analysis of data or events 
personal prejudices and assumptions do take a part. Even so, I hope 
that the empirical study and accompanying analysis will be useful to 
other researchers and academics 9 and of some relevance to current 
debates. The whole process of researching and writing a thesis has 
been a learning experience for the author. and after completing it I 
realize only too well how incomplete it is and how much more I have to 
learn. 
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FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES 
(1) To certain sections in British society there may not seem to 
be a "coal crisis" at all. For instance~ the current 
government view its political and economic attacks on the 
miners as a triumph and the preparations of the industry for 
complete privatisation as a major policy success. For 
sections of private capital. the expansion of opencasting in 
some places has brought huge profits. Others will gain from 
increases in coal imports and from the expanded opportunities 
offered to private investors. The term coal crisis has real 
meaning when looked at from the perspective of those who are 
dependent upon the industry for jobs and incomes and in terms 
of national energy policy. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
COAL BARONS AND MACHINE MAKERS~ 
PRIVATE PROFITS AND COAL PRODUCTION 
• In plain truth the coal owner is a gambler with 
the nation's coal resources and the life and 
well-being of the miner. Every effort he makes to 
decrease the financial cost of production tends to 
increase the intensity of 1 abour performed by the 
miner• (extract from Industrial Democracy for 
fv1jners9 1919). 
'A great pioneering task thus awaits the employer 
and the mining engineer9 which is nothing less than 
the rebu i 1 ding of the industry on the most modern 
lines• (from the report by the Technical and 
Advisory Committee to the Ministry of Fuel 
and Power9 19459 Cmnd. 6610). 
A central aim of this chapter is to examine the historical 
development of the British mining equipment industry in relation to the 
coal industry under private ownership. It focusses on the suppliers of 
the major items involved in the mechanisation of deep mining coal 
production, such as coal cutters, power loaders and conveyors (1). 
Some understanding of the relations between these firms and private 
coal companies is essential to understand changes wrought by state 
ownership to inter-capital relations after 1947. 
From the outset it is important to raise one big distinction 
between the coal industry under state ownership and the industry in 
private hands. Prior to state takeover it was the system of production 
for profits that influenced both the pace and direction of technical 
changes in the production process. In turn 9 the coal owners• ability 
to make profits affected the development of the specialist mining 
engineering industry. Nationalisation did not only alter the broad 
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institutional and organisational parameters within which technical 
changes took place~ it altered attitudes towards technical change. 
Capital investment decisions were based on long-term centralised 
planning about the future direction of the industry as a whole. This 
long-term perspective was virtually impossible in the cut~throat 
competitive environment that had prevailed under private ownership. 
This chapter concentrates on the pre-nationalisation era, 
particularly the inter-war and wartime periods. Hitherto 9 studies of 
the coal industry have looked at internal capital-labour relations, the 
politics of production, changes in the mining labour process, the 
history of the miners' union and the economics of the industry (2). In 
all these studies little attention is devoted to the mining machinery 
makers~ who were (are) important players in the technical 
transformation of mining from "pick and shovel" methods into the 
sophisticated "high tech" industry of today. This study should redress 
this imbalance. Whilst it does not aim to go into great detail about 
the impact of new technologies in the mining labour process, which are 
analysed comprehensively elsewhere (see especially, Heycock, 1986), it 
is important to recognise the crucial links between internal and 
external relations of production. In fact, changes in internal 
capital-labour relations and at the point of production can not be 
fully understood without reference to external inter-capital relations. 
As Nichols (1980:25) stresses, any analysis of the labour process that 
restricts itself to internal relations of production would 
'not only miss much, but fail to see why what 
happens does happen'. 
- 18 -
This alone is an important reason to study the relations between 
capital goods suppliers and the users of those capital goods. In this 
case the focus is on relations between the mining machinery makers and 
the coal owners. This is necessary to analyse how nationalisation 
changed the parameters within which important decisions about capital 
investment, technical and organisational changes were made. 
2.1 Pre-Nationalisation Mechanisation 
Table 2.1 provides a useful breakdown of vital statistics related 
to the level of mechanisation in the inter-war coal industry. There 
was an increase in the numbers of chain co a 1 cutters and mechani ca 1 
conveyors, and the percentage of coa 1 cut by machinery increased from 
19 to 59 per cent between 1924 and 1938. There was also a 
corresponding rise in the use of electrically driven machines and lamps 
underground. All this might indicate rapid technical change within the 
industry, but in comparison with other European~ and US, coal producers 
Britain•s advance towards mechanised mining was slow and uneven, with 
great variations in levels of capital investment in machinery between 
and within regions (see Table 2.2). 
As Table 2.1 shows there were over 2,000 working mines in Britain 
on the eve of World War II. The small-scale of most of these mines 
restricted the possibilities for mechanisation and achieving economies 
of scale. In contrast, many mines in Europe were deliberately laid out 
on a large-scale from the start. Whilst many British mines were 
typically producing 100,000 tons of coal per year, large-scale German 
mines were raising almost one million tons a year and some Dutch mines 
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almost two million tons. Before the General Strike of 1926 Britain•s 
national average mine productivity was as high as Poland•s coal 
industry9 the highest in Europe, and about level with the Ruhr 
coalfield and the Netherlands. A decade later9 output per manshift 
(OIViS) was half that in Poland and had slipped well behind German and 
Dutch levels of productivity. Between 1913 and 1938 Oi"IS increased by 
13 per cent in Britain 9 whereas over the same period~ in the Ruhr it 
had increased 64 per cent~ in Poland by 63 per cent 9 and in the 
Netherlands by 101 per cent. British mines were slower to adopt 
mechanised methods than many European producers. Call ieries in the 
Ruhr won some 97 per cent of their coal from mechanised means in 1934~ 
compared with only 2 per cent in 1913, whereas less than half the coal 
cut in Britain was by machine (see Table 2.1). 
By the late 1930s 9 the British coal industry was generally in bad 
shape and technically backward compared to several other coal producing 
nations. It was during the inter-war years that Britain had slipped 
down the league table in terms of productivity. As Pagnamenta and Ove~ 
(1984:182) put it, the industry 
•was weighed down by hundreds of worn out 
businesses, paying 1 ow wages to a workforce that 
was getting older as younger men left for the 
better-paid jobs elsewhere. The old, bad, coal 
industry was the one the public heard about, and 
the one that provided the case for state ownership•. 
Years of neglect by private owners was reflected in the report of 
the Technical Advisory Committee to the Ministry of Fuel and Power, 
under the Chairmanship of Sir Charles Reid in 1945 (The Reid Report). 
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The 11 professional 11 verdict of the committee of mining engineers was 
that 
'much of the industry is out of date .•. Methods of 
coal getting and haulage need to be modernised. 
There is an acute shortage of technical ability ... 
We are satisfied that throughout the industry 
drastic technical reo'r9anisation is not only 
practicable~ but virally necessary'. 
By exposing the industry's inefficient production methods and technical 
shortcomings the Reid Report provided ample ammunition for the 
advocates of state ownership (see Chapter Three), although Reid himself 
favoured voluntary integration of colliery companies without state 
intervention (see Shinwell, 1957). 
The Reid Report went into considerable detail about the technical 
shortcomings of the coal industry, and it became an official planning 
guide for many NCB investment projects and colliery amalgamations and 
reorganisations during the first decade of state ownership. But the 
Report made no r·ecommendations as to how to coordinate the production 
of mining capital goods with coal production, preparation and supply. 
It merely suggested the need for 11 greater technical assistance with the 
mine machinery manufacturers ... The dominant Government view after the 
war was that the problems in the supply of vital machinery to the mines 
was caused by shortages in the supply of labour and raw materials to 
the manufacturers, rather than deficiencies in the inherent structure 
of the machinery industry itself. A contrary view was put by 
Heinemann, writing in 1948, who suggested that the engineering capacity 
was too small to meet the enormous national demands of the Coal Board 
for equipment of all types. 
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Several inter-related questions from the above comments require 
deeper analysis. Why was the coal industry so technically inefficient 
by World War II? Explanations require an understanding of the system 
of production for profits as it existed in the early 1900s~ as well as 
the pattern of private ownership of land and coal. One underlying 
argument is that production for short-term profits and dividends shaped 
the whole innovation process. dictated the pace of technical change~ 
and to a large extent the nature of the innovations themselves. This 
is a basic point to make, for, if accepted, it dispels the notion that 
science and technology were (and are) somehow neutral forces in a 
political, economic or social sense. In the coal mining industry. as 
in many others~ scientific advances were introduced to increase profits 
and not directly to improve the working conditions of labour. Of 
course~ other factors influenced decisions to invest in new machinery, 
such as the age of co 11 i eri es, 1 oca 1 geo 1 ogy, phys i ca 1 obs tac 1 es to 
machine mining, wage rates and working practices. It is necessary to 
consider how these factors influenced the profitability of private coal 
cornpani es and coa 1 owners' attitudes to capital investment. 
In addition to the above issues there is another set of questions 
related to the supply of mining capital goods. Who were the machinery 
makers? How big was the mining machinery industry prior to state 
ownership? How vertically integrated was coal production with mining 
machinery production? Before examining these questions it is useful to 
ana lyse the relations between short-term profit and 1 ong-term capita 1 
investment decisions in the era of private coal capital. 
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2.2 Short Term Profits~ Production and Capital 
Investment 
Undoubtedly the British coal mining industry remained one of the 
most labour intensive and technically primitive of industries well into 
the Twentieth Century. Whilst other industries were adopting much 
greater mechanisation a great many mines were using pick and shovel, 
muscle and pony power. One of the reasons for this was the extreme 
difficulty involved in mechanising the labour process underground. 
Twisting roadways, cramped conditions, long distances from shafts to 
coal faces, tiny passages, poor drainage, faulted seams, danger of 
explosions caused by sparks or poor ventilation, were just some of the 
many typical problems encountered. Coal mines were unpredictable and 
dangerous environments, which made it both difficult to apply 
mechanised methods and hard for management to supervise or control the 
mining labour process (see Heycock, 1986). So coal mining remained a 
technically backward and physically exhausting occupation throughout 
most of the era of private ownership. As Mumford (1932:68) put it, 
'Among the hard and brutal occupations of mankind, 
the only one that compares with old-fashioned 
mining is modern trench warfare'. 
Coal was also the fuel that was crucial to the development of 
British capitalism in the 19th century and for Britain's industrial 
supremacy in the world. It was at once a raw material for scientific 
research (3), and a source of fuel to power machines. Coal was the 
basis of wealth and power for a large number of industrial capitalists, 
not least the coal barons themselves, iron and steel companies and the 
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railway owners. Writing in 19389 Orwell expressed the profound 
importance of coal for everybody. 
'Our civilisation ... is founded on coal 9 more 
completely than one realizes until one stops to 
think about it. The machines that keep us alive 9 
and the machines that make machines 9 are all 
directly or indirectly dependent upon coal'. 
It is all the more interesting that the mining labour process was only 
partially mechanised at the time of nationalisation. Coal had fuelled 
technical changes in other industries 9 but the coal barons were 
reluctant to invest in new machinery to produce more coal. Why? 
Capital investment in new machinery ultimately depended upon the 
colliery company or owner's willingness to invest. If an owner 
considered the eventual returns on capital investment to be minimal. 
none would be invested. Many colliery owners and directors of colliery 
companies were only interested in taking dividends rather than in 
re-investing profits into the mines (Carney, Lewis & Hudson 9 1980). 
Implementing new plant and equipment entailed changes elsewhere in the 
mine, altering mine lay-outs, changing working practices and 
piece-rates. Returns on investment were not immediate, and planning 
had to be 1 ong-term. Most co a 1 owners 1 i ved away from their pits and 
rarely visited them. It was exceptional if a coal owner had personal 
experience of working in a pit or knew very much about the production 
process. Furthermore, whilst labour could be cheaply exp1oited 9 there 
was little pecuniary incentive to increase the capital intensity of the 
mining labour process. In fact, some owners were against mechanised 
mining on the grounds that by raising productivity per miner it would 
also increase labour costs unless numbers employed could be cut. The 
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owners preferred to maintain short-term profits by suppressing the 
wages of miners. 
The coal owners themselves strongly resisted any attempts by the 
state to impose controls or regulations on the industry that they did 
not agree with. They were able to continue to make profits from their 
older9 inefficient collieries by wage cuts or intensifying the labour 
process~ e.g. by lengthening working hours. Every attempt by 
Government to interfere in the industrys whether to improve working 
conditions for employees or to promote more efficient organisation of 
the industry met with opposition from the owners. As Heinemann 
(1944:129) observeds the coal barons held 
•an important place among the most influentials the 
most voca 1, and on many matters the most 
reactionary ... mouth pieces of a narrow class 
interest 9 so narrow that it was once described by 
The Times as constituting "a danger to private 
enterprise 11 • • 
This narrow class interest had many sympathizers in Westminster, not 
least among those MPs who held directorships in iron, steels coal and 
engineering combines and small colliery companies (4). It is not that 
surprising9 therefore, that the coal owners staved off state ownership 
for so long (see Chapter Three). Similarly, they managed to earn 
handsome dividends from an industry that was increasingly out-of-date 
from a lack of proper organisation, co-ordination and long-term capital 
investment. Technological development was more rapid in the mining 
industries of other European countries primarily because of a greater 
willingness in those places to sink capital in long-term schemes 
(Heinemann~ 1948:37). 
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2.3 Scientific "Progress 11 & Mine Safety 
If one is to understand the reasons why mechanisation did not 
proceed faster in the inter-war years it is necessary to understand 
something of the underlying processes of change. What forces motivated 
capitalists in the coal industry to introduce new devices, to apply 
scientific inventions and new technology in the mines? Put another 
way, how did private coal capital benefit from technical change? The 
latter question is significant because it obviously implies that 
technology is political and is shaped by determinate groups for 
particular ends. In other words, science and technology were not 
applied purely for the benefit of humanity, but were applied for the 
benefit of a narrow class interest. In an articulate essay entitled 
•present Tense Technology•, Noble (1985:143) stressed how capitalism 
emerged 
•as a system of production that was identified with 
progress itself ..• This emergent ideology of 
technological progress served capitalist 
development well in the name of material 
prosperity, and diverted attention away from the 
exploitation entailed.• 
He argues that intellectuals• theories of modernity and technological 
change as a good in itself and 11 the transformation of such theories 
into a generally accepted •common sense• which9 being shared by all, 
has greatly weakened the ana lyses and actions of the opponents of 
capital•s hegemony 11 (pp. 139-140). Whilst Noble•s perspective is a 
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broad one concerning soc i eta 1 1 eve 1 changes ~ he is ca refu 1 to stress 
that 
'No one is against "technology", despite the 
frequently heard charge) because technology as such 
does not exist. Technology exists only in the 
particular, as particular pieces of equipment in 
particular settings •.. ' {p. 148). 
These observations have considerable relevance to the technical 
and scientific changes occurring in the British mining industry. It is 
necessary not to view improvements in the conditions of labour 
underground as the result of scientific and technological progress. 
Any improvements in the mining labour process were the result of years 
of struggle by miners and their political representatives, liberal 
Parliamentary reforms, and also the accidental by-product of technical 
change. This is not to argue that scientists and mining engineers 
ignored safety and health concerns altogether. On the contraryg safety 
standards did improve as a result of several inventions. Ratherg the 
coal owners were unlikely to invest in any device or machine unless it 
was likely to improve both productivity and profits. This was 
illustrated by Albury and Schwarz (1982) who examined how the miners' 
"safety lamp" designed by Sir Humphry Davy was notg as is often claimed 
in history text books, a great scientific discovery on behalf of 
humanity which helped to save thousands of miners' lives. 
'Davy's brief was rigidly defined. He spoke to no 
miners. He was told - and he believed - that the 
problem was not one of ventilation. His brief, in 
short, was the owners' brief- to build a lamp that 
would work in methane-rich atmospheres that existed 
in crept workings. It was not to investigate mine 
safety but to design a lamp' (Albury & Schwarzg 
1982:19). 
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As a direct result of Davy's lamp "crept workings" (i.e. methane rich 
parts of coa 1 mines) were re-opened in numerous mines of northern 
Englandg and mine explosions caused many hundreds of deaths in the 
following century. Whilst much of the blame for these deaths can be 
p·l aced on the greed of the owners who wanted to work dangerous places 
to earn more profits 9 and upon the lack of adequate ventilation in many 
mines~ there were also inherent design failings with the Davy lamp (5). 
If the miners had been fully consulted the mine owners would have had 
to sink new ventilation shafts and crept workings would have remained 
closed. 
The Davy lamp is only one example of a device being used as a 
cheapg simple solution to a mine owner's problem but justified in terms 
of improving mine safety even though it increased the dangers to 
miners. There are other examples of mine owners being unwilling to 
invest in or being slow to adopt some innovations because of cost. 
During the 19th century there were few improvements in the technical 
means to get coal from the face (see later). Wooden tools were 
replaced by steel ones and safer explosives were introduced. But mine 
owners were reluctant to introduce new intrinsically-safe equipment 
into mines. Several electrical engineering companies introduced 
equipment safe for use in fiery or dusty situations. An example was 
the Davis Magneto Exploder which enabled shots to be fired electrically 
from a safe distance without the use of naked lights. Nevertheless, 
many mines continued to use "match and 1 i ght" techniques, which were 
highly dangerous, rather than invest in the Magneto Exploder which was 
more costly. 
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Perhaps the most obvious example of coal owners• willingness to 
exploit human labour rather than improve working conditions or 
introduce more efficient methods is in the abuse of pit children (see 
Forster, 1978). The 1833 Factories Act limiting the hours of work for 
children to nine per day and provided a scheme of national inspection. 
The Act extended regulations to textile factories but not to coa 1 
mines, where only pit communities were aware of the true horrors of pit 
life. Young boys were employed as "trappers", minding wooden trap 
doors, sometimes for 18 hours a day six days a week, without seeing day 
light. The trap doors were crucial for pit safety, for they were 
located at strategic points in the mine galleries to direct "course 11 
air into the workplaces and to allow the passage of coal tubs pushed by 
older boys called 11 putters" or pulled by ponies (see Forster, 1978). 
Whilst the use of female labour underground was prohibited by the 1842 
Mines and Collieries Act, it took over sixty years before the use of 
boys under 13 years was prohibited by Parliament. 
The simple fact was that the coal owners found it very profitable 
to employ cheap child labour. Even when Bills were passed, such as the 
1842 Act and subsequent acts relating to the mines, it was difficult to 
enforce them or to ensure that coal owners were not flouting them (6). 
There were too many mines and too few inspectors. Many of the 
inspectors were drawn from the same class as the mine owners. And as 
already pointed out the mine owners were well represented in Parliament 
via kinship ties and directorships held by MPs (Heinemann, 1944). Any 
attempt to "interfere with their property11 met with stiff opposition 
from the colliery owners. As Kirby (1977:20) put it~ the owners 
continued 
•to fight a rearguard action against legislation 
which inevitably influenced the cost structure of 
the industry and increasingly impinged upon the 
day-to-day management of the colliery enterprise•. 
In some senses these attitudes also applied to technical change. Coal 
owners saw little reason to make long-term and big outlays of capital 
if they could continue to prosper using existing methods. 
2.4 Three Shift Mining and the Problems of Mechanisation 
Most mines operated a ••three shift" system of mining. Only one of 
the three daily shifts actually involved hewing coal 9 which meant that 
early mechanisation dedicated to improving pit productivity focussed on 
the coal getting shift. It was only after World War II that the 
technology was made available to integrate the mining production 
process and have coal getting on every shift, which was a major reason 
for productivity increases in longwall coal mines during the 1960s (see 
Chapter Five). 
The three shift system involved "an extreme division of labour" in 
face operations which destroyed "the unity of colliers• work" (see 
Burns et.al., 1983). In each shift teams of miners performed separate 
but complementary tasks- "getting", "filling" and "flitting". The 
first shift involved drilling holes into the face into which explosives 
were placed and an undercut was made along the floor to control the 
explosion. Then props and bars were re-set up the coal face, and 
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shot-holes were drilled into the coaL At the end of the shift the 
coal was shot off the face by shot-firers. The second shift was 
devoted to ''filling" the loosened coal either into tubs~ or less common 
in the early 1900s9 onto conveyors. On the third shift~ "flitters" 
advanced the face props for the next coal getting shift. Setting up 
netli rows of props and advancing tub rails or the mechanical conveyor 
into position close to the location of the new face was a very labour 
intensive exercise. In addition, roadways (main gate and tail gates) 
were essential as routeways for materials, men and coal, and for the 
movement of air to the workings9 but they required "ripping" (the 
removal of roof material) and "dinting" (the removal of floor material) 
to make the passageways more even and easier to transport men and 
materials down. 
For the coal owners the labour-intensive three shift system 
created bottlenecks in production. One bad shift could create delays 
for the subsequent two shifts. Coal mining could only be really 
efficient with greater integration between the different miners' tasks. 
Another problem for the owners was their lack of direct control over 
the mining 1 abour process. Once underground 9 it was difficult to 
supervise the miners. Although overmen and deputies were employed, 
holding positions akin to foremen in factories. But the cramped, tiny 
passageways 9 long underground travelling distances from shaft to coal 
faces, and poor working conditions made supervision a problem. 
Furthermore, colliers would sometimes refuse to work if an overman was 
watching them (Goodrich, 1920). 
It is important to understand why British mine owners did not make 
greater efforts to introduce labour-saving mechanisation during the 
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early 1900s and inter-war period. What advantages did the mostly 11 hand 
got 11 methods of mining have for the owners and colliery companies? 
Part of the answer lies in the method of payment to mine workers. 
2.5 Piecework and Wages 
In place of externa 1 supervision, the mine owners and co 11 i ery 
managers relied on the operation of the piecework system as a form of 
"internalised 11 supervision (Tomaney, 1988). Piecework involved the 
negotiation of a price for a given task or job between the overmen and. 
the group or individuals concerned. Piece rate earnings were variable 
depending on rates of pay criteria9 ways in which people were selected 
for particular jobs, mining conditions, local working practices (see 
Krieger. 1983). There were inter- and intra-regional variations in the 
piecework system. Many localised disputes were often the results of 
arguments about piece rates. For the mine owners the sys tern had a 
number of advantages. They know it was in the interests of workers to 
work as productively as possible. So if miners hit a bad seam they 
would work harder and longer to maintain their wages. If they hit a 
good seam they would work hard to increase their productivity and pay, 
which was largely dependent upon the quality and quantity of coal from 
the face. The owners had a choice, under bad conditions they could 
either abandon a seam or intensify the work process. 
In South Wales, and other areas, there was much bitterness caused 
by the lack of a minimum wage and by the fact that wages were affected 
by poor seams and miners were being forced to work in abnormal places. 
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The exploitative and wasteful system of mining was described in 
Industrial Democracy for Miners (1919) 
•1n order to obtain the greatest mass of profit in 
the shortest time~ and on the lowest investment of 
capital, the coal owner is forced to employ the 
most wasteful and profligate of methods. For the 
human factor, the miner, this means working under 
price lists, based not on average working 
conditions, but on ideal conditions which he 
perhaps encounters once or twice in a 1 ife time. 
The result is that he is driven to a toil of 
hellish intensity, to disregard safety, and to 
practise methods which result in an enormous waste 
of coal. This is intensified in the South Wales 
coalfield, where the common practice is that the 
hewer receives no pay for small coal which he sends 
out. Thousands of tons of the nation•s coal 
resources are 11 gobbed 11 every day owing to this fact 
alone. On the other hand where, owing to a 
difficulty occuring in a seam which makes for a 
considerable rise in the cost of production, and 
therefore a fall in the rate of profit, the 
management quite frequently leave behind, and thus 
lose to the nation, considerable tracts of coal 
bearing strata• (Coates, 1974:107). 
Another cause of resentment for the miners but source of profits for 
the owners was the operation of 11 Sliding scale 11 wage agreements. 
Colliery bosses took the selling prices of coal as a criterion for wage 
rate adjustments. In times of trade recession when coal prices fell, 
owners were able to recoup their losses by cutting wages. Thus the 
miners and their families had to bear the costs of recession, not the 
owners. 
Only after considerable struggle did the miners win the principle 
of a minimum wage. In 1909 the Eight Hours Act was passed, which 
reduced working hours from 11 bank to bank 11 from lOi - 10 to 8!. 
Unfortunately this added to miners• difficulties in making up their pay 
from so-called 11 abnormal places 11 , i.e. areas in the mine that were 
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exceptionally hard to win coal from. It was opposition to the sliding 
scale and calls for a minimum wage that led to a coalfields' wide 
stoppage for six weeks in 1912 (Edwards~ 1938). The miners did not get 
one nati ona 1 minimum wage. Rather the minimum wage was to be 1 eft to 
the Joint District Boards established under the Actg comprising 17 
mining districts~ each possessing historic differences in wage rates, 
different criteria for settling piece ratesg and different geological 
and mining conditions. 
During the inter-war period coal owners continued to cut wages and 
resist attempts by successive governments to impose controls on the 
industry. In the mid-1920s many coal owners began to suffer from 
increasing competition on overseas markets from other coal producers. 
By 1925 two-thirds of Britain's collieries were operating at a loss and 
probably a quarter of the industry's workforce was unemployed (see 
Cook, 1924). The exporting areas of South Wales, northern England and 
Scotland were hit by the return to the Gold Standard which made British 
coal dearer than that of overseas competitors. Coal owners called for 
bigger wage cuts and a longer working day. The Government appointed a 
Royal Commission under Sir Herbert Samuel, which was composed of "men 
considered to have a "safe" capitalist background and training" 
(Heinemann, 1944:114). Unlike the Sankey Commissiong which six years 
earlier had considered the industry was ripe for nationalisation, the 
Samuel Commission virtually agreed with the coal owners' prognosis, 
called for immediate wage cuts to solve the crisis, i.e. of low profits 
and 1 asses to the coal owners. Not only did the Samuel Commission's 
decision hasten the Genera 1 Strike of 1926, it de 1 ayed a thorough 
reorganisation of the industry. As Calvocoressi (1978:49) put it, 
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'Having won this battle~ the owners were not 
obliged by the economics of their situation tu face 
the need for modernisation~ although in shirkibg it 
they worsened their long-term plight and the plight 
of the industry'. 
Even the Samuel Commission saw the need for some form of 
industrial rationalisation and proposed amalgamations~ so that coal 
companies could reap economies of scale. Whilst amalgamations did take 
place they did not lead to a more technically efficient industry. 
Rather, they created bigger combines with more money and influence than 
the small owners. This in turn enabled the combines to create 
'a series of utied" markets for their coal in other 
industries where they were able to reap extra 
profits. They bargained (very effectively) with 
the Government to fix compulsory minimum prices at 
the 1 evel that protected their most backward and 
inefficient units. Many of the combines had been 
built up by purchasing pits at inflated prices 9 
were over-capital ise_d and burdened with bank debt, 
and more money than the economies brought in was 
paid out in fixed interest to the debenture-holders 
instead of being invested in the industry ... • 
(Heinemann, 1944) 
by 
The creation of large coal combines, eitherkvoluntary or state induced 
mergers, was and could not be an answer to the industry's problems. 
The industry required systematic long-term planning and investment on a 
coalfields wide scale. But the state side-stepped outright 
nationalisation between the wars and tried to generate some form of 
reorganisation in the industry. Private capital cleverly selected 
which state measures suited them most. The coal owners resisted state 
proposals for compulsory amalgamations (under three Acts relating to 
the coal mines)~ whilst they used state power to secure monopolies to 
sell their coal. 
The Coal Mines Act9 19309 helped establish cartels 9 i.e. price 
fixing and output fixing rings. Part One of the Act set up a Central 
Council comprising representative coal owners from each district9 whose 
main function was to allot output quotas to each of the mining 
districts9 with separate quotas for inland and export sales. Distinct 
quota allocations were distributed among all mines in accordance with 
the size of their respective standard tonnages. Each district 
Executive Board had the responsibility to set minimum price schedules 
for all classes of coal. The major consequences of Part One of the Act 
dealing with output quotas9 and Part Two9 concerning coal mines 
reorganisation9 were: 
(1) Price competition was controlled within districts, but increased 
between them due to the adoption of deliberately low price 
schedules by certain Executive Boards; 
(2) Prices for most districts stabilised during the depression and 
rose thereafter; 
(3) The more successful district marketing schemes were the less need 
there was to alter the existing industrial structure (see Kirby, 
1977:166). 
(4) Colliery companies were given a new lease of life by stabilised 
coal prices and low wages. In particular, the Act improved the 
profit margins after 1931 of the big coal, iron and steel 
combines; 
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(5) According to Heinemann (1948:118-119) 11 the consumer was made to 
pay to keep the coal-owners in the saddle and to stave off 
reorganisation 11 • Whilst small domestic consumers were buying dear 
coal. heavy industry. particularly steel (a business closely 
related to coal). bought relatively cheap coal. 
The various Coal Acts in the inter-war years were inadequate 
measures and failed to pin-point the fundamental problems afflicting 
the coal industry. District price schemes enabled many marginal 
loss-making operations to survive and their owners to make profits 
without re-investment into the pits. Mergers did create some large 
coal combines but few large. modern coal mines. Far from being 
synonymous with technological progress. the system of private ownership 
in the coal industry was a definite block on technical advances and 
capital investment. It is true that the late 1920s and 1930s were 
times of over production and under-employment in the coal industry, and 
greater capital investment in mechanised mining would either raise 
output and/or reduce employment, but it was the coal owners• ability to 
continue to cream off any profits from inefficient pits that was the 
real block on mechanisation. The large combines had financial 
interests in several industries and owned pits in different coalfields, 
and they were able to subsidize loss-making pits without major 
investment in them. In fact, it was expensive to close down mines due 
to the fixed capital already in them. Smaller coal companies, often 
owning two or three pits, simply lacked the necessary capital resources 
to modernise their operations. 
In addition to the problems created by the short-term 
profit-mindedness of colliery owners were those created by Britain•s 
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11 early start.. in coa 1 mining 9 and by fragmented patterns of 1 and and 
coal ownership. Before nationalisation there were hundreds of marginal 
workings and collieries with limited capital resources. Furthermore, 
•more than half and possibly as much as two-thirds 
of the coal produced in 1914 came from collieries 
which had been projected before 1875 1 (Taylor 9 
1968:67) 0 
Another impediment to technical change was the chaotic pattern of 
land ownership. Arbitrary boundaries between properties on the surface 
dictated where companies mined coal underground. 
1 This was often due to the bizarre illogicality of 
the mineral rights laws. Engineers developing 
mines had to observe underground boundaries that 
followed streams and hedges dividing property on 
the surface. One coal mine might have three or 
four land owners with the mineral rights to the . 
coal beneath, entitled to a royalty• (Pagnamenta & 
Overy, 1984: 179) . 
Co a 1 got from under such a property could cost over a penny a ton 
extra, so roadways were often bent to avoid expensive properties. This 
led to complex, narrow9 twisting passages unsuitable for locomotive 
haulage or long-distance conveyor belt systems. 
There was nothing rational in the way coal seams were extracted. 
Private companies bought the rights to extract whatever coal existed 
beneath a particular acreage of land. Indeed, one of the arguments 
advanced for public ownership was that it would lead to a more logical9 
coherent and less wasteful system of mining coal, and one that was not 
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restricted by the complex divisions between surface properties and 
colliery companies (see WERU, 1985:10-12). As many miners realized, 
•The division of a coalfield into numerous 
undertakings, each with a barrier of forty yards of 
unworked coal as a boundary, may be instanced as a 
specimen of the wasteful methods entailed by 
private ownership• (Coates, 1974:108). 
2.6 Mechanisation and the Machine Makers 
The system of private ownership, fragmented land and colliery 
holdings and the preference of owners and shareholders for short-term 
profits and dividends are all reasons for the relatively slow pace of 
mechanisation prior to World War II. They are also reasons for the 
slow and uneven development of a domestic mining machinery industry. 
In the absence of any degree of centralised planning at regional or 
national level or of coordinated equipment purchasing programmes, the 
general tendency was for many companies to try to supply particular 
collieries with a complete range of goods, rather than specialise in 
one or two items. 
In the nineteenth century, many of the early mining suppliers 
produced a range of items for pick and shovel mining, including hand 
tools, explosives, hand or pony pulled tubs, tracks, miners• lamps, 
winding. gear, rescue and safety apparatus. One of the early commercial 
pioneers of miners• lamps and electric devices was John Davis & Son 
(Derby) Limited, which in 1887 produced a catalogue containing no less 
than sixteen different types of miners• lamps, such as •the Davy•, •the 
Clanny•, •the Upton•, and •the Bonneted Muesler•. This variety 
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reflects a lack of standardisation and fragmented market demand in that 
period. Whilst John Davis (later Davis Derby) became one of the major 
suppliers of electrical equipment to British mines~ it was a supplier 
of many non-mining items to all parts of the globe. By the close of 
the 19th century the company had 
•an agent in Barbados who was selling hygrometers 
and other equipment in the sugar plantations. A 
Spanish railway company bought lightning 
conductors. Goods occasionally went to China and 
Japan, and there was a fair stock turnover in 
Brussels. Time saving calculators were being 
shipped to Yokohama! • (extract printed in The 
Colliery Guardian, April 1983). 
Pick and shovel makers were common. One of the most successful 
was Holman Brothers Limited, which was founded in 1801 by Nicholas 
Holman and remained a family business into the Twentieth Century. 
Based in Cornwall, Holmans started out as a boiler making concern but 
quickly developed into a general engineering company supplying boilers, 
hoists and various mining capital goods. It became a major supplier 
to the Cornish tin industry and copper mines. A company catalogue 
issued in 1879 listed the equipment made by Holmans : 
•steam engines, air compressors, pulverisers, 
hoising crabs, lifting jacks, screw Jim Crows, 
chains, cooking apparatus, mining machinery of 
every description.• 
The discovery of tin and copper deposits in other parts of the 
world ended the virtual monopoly Cornwall had enjoyed for centuries. 
Holmans had started supplying British coal mines, but with the 
declining Cornish mining industry it started to develop markets abroad. 
Sales of Holman Brothers equipment overseas may have been aided by the 
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diaspora of Cornish miners to the metalliferous mines of the Americas 9 
Africa9 Australia and Malaya, for they took with them tools upon which 
they could rely. By the 1920s Holmans were making a range of pneumatic 
riveters9 hammers and drills, in addition to conventional hand tools 9 
for the home coal industry. 
Whilst hand tools predominated until the l930S 9 the first 
experience in mechanised coal getting were in the Victorian era. In 
the 1860s a compressed air coal cutter was given a trial. It was 
reported that the machine discharged 11 a stream of pure atmosphere at 
every stroke adding to mine ventilation whilst coal cutting"(Journal of 
the Coal & Iron Trades, 21 September, 1862). At this time Gillot and 
Copley of Barnsley were producing a disc cutter9 which undercut coal by 
means of a horizontal disc with picks set around the circumference 
cutting as the disc spun against the coal face. By 1873 9 there was 
another machine utilizing a projecting horizontal jib around the edge 
of which ran an endless chain containing cutter picks at intervals. A 
third type of coal cutter used a bar cutter, which was a tapered round 
steel bar as a cutting arm with picks along its length in a spiral 
formation. It was not until 1893 that the first electrically driven 
coal cutter was implemented down a British pit. 
Table 2.3 shows the adoption of different types of coal cutters at 
different times in the early 1900s. The rate of adoption was slow for 
reasons already advanced 9 but there were other advantages to 11 hand got 11 
over machine mining. In the first place miners had a wealth of 
knowledge about underground environment. They knew when it was 
dangerous to mine. They could work bending and subsiding roofs to get 
more coal. Machines were only able to operate well under relatively 
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good~ unfaulted mining conditions. In areas where coal seams were soft 
it was more economic to use 11 hand got 11 methods. Where steep inclines 
existed it was far easier to employ men with picks than machinery (see 
Peel~ 1908:157}. The tacit knowledge of mineworkers could not be 
incorporated into mechanical devices. As an article in The Journal of 
Coal & Iron Trades put it in 1862 9 none of the attempts to produce 
steam-driven cutting machines had 
•superseded the old plan of 11 curving 11 and 11 nicking 11 
or 11 holing 11 and 11 shearing 11 by the pick in hand ... • 
(26 Apri19 1862). 
Some 84 years later mining engineers were still doubtful about the 
machine's advantages over conventional hand got methods. As one put 
it9 
• The major fault in m1 n1 ng practice in the past 
generation has been the neglect to control the 
natural forces involved and to rely upon powerful 
machines to get the coal, with disastrous results 
to many working faces and roadways • (Transactions 
of the Institution of Minin En ineers9 1946-47, 
Vol. 106:562-566 . 
Another disadvantage with machines was that they could not 
discriminate between qualities of coal and waste9 which meant that more 
energy was required to transport greater outputs and to sort it out on 
the surface. As long as miners were only paid for larger coal they 
would sort it out before sending much of it to the surface. Mechanical 
coal cutting did not necessarily reduce total labour costs. Whilst the 
numbers of miners needed to hew coal was reduced 9 more peop 1 e were 
often required elsewhere below ground to maintain roadways, coalfaces 
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and the machinery. It was also very costly to introduce new machinery 
into a pit. Not only had piece rates and working practices to be 
changed but mine lay-outs had to be altered to accommodate machines. 
As Howse and Harley (1960:110) pointed out with reference to the early 
experiments with the Meco-Moore cutter-loader. 
'The introduction of a revolutionary machine 
demanded changes in accepted practice of a minor 
revolutionary nature. It needed lengthy trials~ 
skilled and sympathetic operators~ and patient 
managements~ and it is small wonder that the early 
years of the Meco-Moore were fraught with 
difficulty~ disappointment~ and sometimes despair.' 
In an era when Fordist mass production techniques were being 
applied in motor vehicle factories and mechanisation was proceeding 
apace in many industries~ the coal industry of the early 1900s was 
still very dependent on labour intensive methods of production. Quite 
simply coal mines could hardly be compared with factory environments~ 
nor could the process of producing coal be compared with that of 
producing consumer or capital goods. Capital investment in coal mines 
has always demanded longer-term time horizons than similar investments 
in factories (see Schumacher, 1957}. Nevertheless, this does not 
explain why overseas coal producers were faster to adopt mechanised 
methods of mining than Britain. 
The main competition for British mining equipment companies came 
from across the Atlantic from machines such as Jeffreys, Sullivans and 
Ha rri sons. US machine makers had a number of home advantages over 
their British counterparts. Firstly, they had a vast internal market 
being opened up as their machines were coming onto the market. In 
contrast most British mines were developed at an earlier stage before 
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cutters and conveyors and other devices were commercially available. 
Thus, mine lay-outs and organisation in Britain were often 
inappropriate for the introduction of mechanical devices. Secondly~ 
different mining conditions to Britain prevailed in many parts of the 
US. Many more US deep mines were much shallower and with thicker seams 
than British ones. Whilst there were mines using room and pillar 
methods in northern England~ virtually a 11 US deep mines used these 
methods, and owing to greater reserve they caul d afford to be more 
wasteful. They could also afford to use machinery. 
Room and pi 11 ar mining involves cutting a series of cross-hatch 
roadways around and through coal seems leaving a chess board pattern of 
pillars of rock and coal from 40 to 80 feet on a side left standing to 
support the mine roof. The deeper the mine the larger the pillars are. 
In the final stage of mining coal pillars can then be extracted 
allowing the roof to fall in. The coal cutters initially designed for 
this system were similar (or the same) designs of machines used in 
British mines 9 mostly for longwall production methods (see Chapter 5). 
Many machines were exported to Britain from the United States. In the 
US itself, by the early 1900s, power equipment for drilling blast holes 
and undercutting the coal face ready for blasting were common place, 
and by the end of World War II some 90 per cent of US coal was undercut 
by machine (Marovelli & Karhnak, 1982). 
A major rival to US producers was Anderson Boyes, founded in 1899. 
One of the co-founders of the company (AB), was Alexander Anderson, an 
electrical engineer with mining knowledge, who 
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•saw that a revolution was overtaking the industry 9 
that the slow method of the hand pick must give way 
before the advance of the coal-getting machine and 
that the shovel must lead to the mechanical 
conveyor and loader• (Carvel~ 1949:21). 
Anderson Boyes produced its AB coa 1-cutter in 1906 to counter the 
Jeffrey cutters from America, \llhich at that time were being sold by 
John Davis (Derby). By World War I the company produced the AB 17 inch 
chain coal-cutter and the AB 14t inch cutter for thinner seams, but the 
company•s most popular machines were then disc-cutters (see Table 2:3). 
Another Scotland-based company, later to merge with Anderson Boyes~ was 
Mavor & Coulson~ Bridgeton, Glasgow, which produced electrically-driven 
coal cutters. Mavor & Coulson had grown out of an earlier partnership 
between two electrical engineers, Muir and Mavor~ founded in 1885~ 
whose dynamos were widely used in the mining industry for lighting, 
pumping and haulage. 
By the early 1920s several British firms were making coal-cutting 
equipment, although most were producing conventiona 1 or powered hand 
tools (see Table 2:4). The exceptions were Anderson Boyes, Mavor & 
Coulson, Cowlishaw, Walker & Co., and the Diamond Coal Company, who 
produced heavier cutting machines. Another company established in 1920 
"to undertake mining work by contract, to manufacture and act as agents 
for the sale and installation of machinery and equipment at the coal 
face" was Gullick Brothers (later Gullick Dobson). The two Gullick 
brothers, Charles and Geoffrey, had formed the partnership to exploit 
their experience of machine mining gained before the First World War. 
Initially they carried out coal-cutting contracts; first of all at the 
Pemberton Colliery Co. Ltd., Wigan, and later with the Holmside and 
South Moor Collieries Ltd. in Durham, and Maltby Main and Rossington 
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Collieries in Yorkshire. Later Gullick Brothers turned their attention 
to the growing market for longwall coalcutters~ and in 1923 they 
reformed into a private limited company 9 Machine Mi~ing Services 
Limited9 to provide accessories for those machines 9 including hoses 9 
ropes9 cutter picks9 steel props and lifting jacks. The company also 
pioneered and were later sole selling agents for a continental 
pneumatic pick9 the 1 Titan•. Sales were low, due in part to resistance 
to change in the pits, fierce competition, and the disruption caused by 
the General Strike (Purdy, 1982). 
Inspite of the number of suppliers selling small pneumatic picks 
and drills there were still only 5,679 of these in use by 1928. 
Heavier coal-cutters9 particularly disc or chain cutters, accounted for 
the greater part of the 28 per cent of coal mined mechanically in the 
late 1920s (see Tables 2:3 and 2:5). In the larger coalfields of 
France and Belgium as much as 50-70 per cent of total coal was cut by 
pneumatic picks or drills, and in the Ruhr it was as much as 75 per 
cent. Percussive machines were widely used in the Westphalia coal 
mines, and some ninety per cent of coal was won mechanically in Germany 
(see Redmayne, 1932:133). 
Dominant foreign competition in mining equipment came from the US, 
France, Germany, and to a 1 es ser extent, South Africa (e.g. the Rand 
Drill Company), although a number of South African mining suppliers 
were of British origin. Import penetration into Britain was helped by 
several British firms acting as selling agents to overseas 
manufacturers. Dollery & Palmer of Sheffield sold props and bars made 
by Gutehoffnungshutte AG of Oberhausen (GHH); compressed air picks 
made by Rudolf Hausherr & Sons; and products of Gewerkschaft 
Eisenhuette Westfalia (GEW) of LUnen near Dortmund, which in the 1940s 
produced the first armoured face conveyors to be tried by the National 
Coal Board. Indeed, GEW and Dollery & Palmer formed Underground Mining 
Machinery (UMM) in County Durham in the late 1940s to manufacture 
conveyors and a range of other mining machines for the NCB. German 
companies also sold equipment through Hugh Wood & Company (Limited in 
1914) a small Newcastle firm, which acted as agents for Eickhoff, 
Bochum, making shaker conveyors and cutting equipment, and Schwarz for 
roof props. 
Hugh Wood was largely responsible for establishing a US owned 
subsidiary, British Jeffrey Diamond (BJD), in Britain prior to World 
War II. During the First World War, Nicholas Hugh Wood, the company's 
Managing Director, sought to take over the sole British selling rights 
for Jeffrey mining machines made in Columbus, Ohio. At the time Hugh 
Wood was a sales agency not a manufacturer of machinery. But as a 
result of losses of Jeffrey machines due to submarine torpedos during 
the trans-Atlantic crossing, Hugh Wood arranged for the manufacture of 
the first "British" Jeffrey machines under licence. It was not until 
1927 that Hugh Wood persuaded Jeffrey Machine Company to begin 
competitive production in Britain. Whilst this was partly a move to 
avoid criticism from people who feared rising unemployment due to 
foreign imports, it was primarily a shrewd business venture by Nicholas 
Wood, whose company retained full responsibility for sales of Jeffrey 
machines in Britain (Huwood Limited, business archives). 
Jeffrey bought a well-established coal mining machinery firm, the 
Diamond Coal Company in Wakefield. British Jeffrey Diamond, as it came 
to be known, was left under the co-leadership of the former Managing 
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Director of the Diamond Company and Mr. N.H. Wood himself. Thus BJD 
was to be one of a small group of foreign owned companies in Britain 
that was going to benefit from the huge expansion in home demand for 
mining machinery following coal nationalisation (see Chapters Five and 
Six). After eleven years the agreement between Jeffrey and Hugh Wood 
was broken. In 19389 Hugh Wood parted company with BJD to build their 
own mining equipment factory on the Team Valley Trading estate in 
Gateshead9 which was the start of Huwood Mining Machinery Limited. 
Before World War II the two dominant British-based coal cutter 
suppliers were BJD with its •AcE• chain cutters and Anderson Boyes. 
Between 1900 and 1938 the percentage of machine cut coal had increased 
from one per cent to 56 per cent of the total coal output in England 
and Wales and 80 per cent in Scotland (see Table 2:2). Coal cutters 
increased coal output in the coal getting shift but had not eliminated 
the three shift system. Inefficient methods of loading and carrying 
coal back from the faces to the shaft and haulage out of the mine 
caused bottlenecks in production. 
Up to the end of the 19th century the most corrnnon system of 
transporting coal underground was to load coal into tubs at the coal 
face. The tubs would either be pushed by men or boys (7) or pulled by 
ponies to a rope haulage system used to convey coal to the pit bottom. 
There were many variations to this theme 9 although most haulage systems 
required manual and pony power. From about 1841, small steam-driven 
engines were introduced underground, replacing ponies where the 
distance, mine lay-out and conditions justified it. Haulage engines 
were later powered by compressed air and electricity, but as Preece and 
Ellis (1980:53) point out, 
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'whatever power was used~ establishing a haulage 
system was one of the largest outlays of capital 
for the colliery.• 
Many British mines stuck to ponies~ which was reflected in many mine 
lay-outs including underground stables 9 cleaning and feeding area food 
storages9 water troughs~ and harness repair facilities (see Bright 9 
1986). By World War II, Britain still had 30,000 working horses at the 
mines (see Table 2:1). A massive reorganisation of the haulage and 
underground transport systems was ca 11 ed for by the Reid Committee 
(l945L which compared Britain to other countries. In the US one 
haulage worker was needed for every 50 tons of coal produced; in the 
Netherlands the ratio was one for every 20-25 tons; but in Britain it 
was one to five. 
The first mechanical conveyors appeared in mines in the early 
1900s. These were made of a series of connecting troughs running along 
the length of coal faces through which ran an endless scraper chain. A 
second type of conveyor was originated in Germany and consisted of a 
series of steel pans which produced a shaking motion as coal ran along 
the pans. Whilst conveyor systems were not quickly adopted by British 
mines there were cost advantages once they were installed (see Table 
2:6). Redmayne (1932:158) noted that conveyors eliminated numbers of 
tubs, ponies and miners required~ led to savings in down-time, cheaper 
filling and increased output. One report stated, 
the use of conveyors frequently affects a 
saving in cost of more than one shilling per ton 
and thus enables seams to be worked which would 
otherwise be abandoned' (The Midland Institute of 
Mining Engineers, May 1929). 
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Only a small number of firms specialised in conveyor systems~ 
including both Anderson Boyes and Mavor & Coulson. Perhaps the most 
important supplier to develop in the inter-war years was the Mining 
Equipment Company (MECO). Meco was founded as an all~purpose 
engineering firm producing percussive coal-cutters~ rock drills, hammer 
dri 11 s and a range of rescue apparatus. Its early success was as a 
supply of equipment to mine rescue stations. Whilst it produced 
conveyors, such as the 1 Meco Worm Drive Belt Conveyor•, before World 
War I, many of its early conveyors were applied in the gold mines of 
the Rand in South Africa. 
In common with other mining suppliers Meco found the 1920s years 
of fluctuating fortunes, and at times it was a struggle for the company 
to survive. Companies were badly affected by the miners• strike in the 
winter of 1920 and Meco has to lay off workers. According to Howse and 
Harley, the company•s historians, the early 1920s were lean business 
years for Meco and its business was kept afloat by exports and by a 
South African subsidiary selling spares to mines there. Nonetheless 
there was a steady expansion in the conveyor business which 1 ed to 
production problems at Meco•s cramped Moorfield works in Sheffield. In 
1925 the company sold the rescue apparatus side of its business to 
Siebe Gorman and Co. Ltd. and moved from industrial Sheffield to the 
Cathedral City of Worcester. At the time the Worcester City 
Corporation was promoting the city as a centre for light engineering, 
and it offered Meco a good site for expansion, ten Corporation houses 
and cheap electricity supply. The Meco site was eventually served with 
sidings of the Great Western Railway Company for in-coming raw 
materials and for out-going mining machinery (see Howse & Harley, 
1960). 
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By the 1930s mining engineers had begun to deve 1 op ide as to 
integrate different operations - coal getting~ loading and haulage. 
The man who eventually provided 11 the missing link 11 between getting coal 
off the face and haulage was Matthew Smith Moore 9 who had worked on a 
simultaneous cutter-loader idea for almost twenty years (8). It was 
Meco that developed Moore's ideas and they eventually tried out the 
Meco-Moore cutter-loader at Houghton Main Colliery from 1936 onwards, 
which produced some 250,000 tons of coal before the outbreak of war. 
During the war the Mechanisation Advisory Committee to the Mines 
Department, fore-runner to the Reid Committee, pulled together 
engineers from Anderson Boyes and Me co to deve 1 op a more efficient 
cutter-loader. An AB coal cutter was mounted on to a Meco-Moore power 
loader to produce a machine that could cut and load coal simultaneously 
and for long periods. Carvel (1949:65) described 
'the ceremony of switching on the power to start 
the first AB Meco-Moore Cutter Loader in Rufbard 
Colliery (Notts.) in Easter 1943. By that simple, 
yet momentous act~ a new epoch in mining was 
opened, and the dream which had been with mining 
engineers for many years became a concrete fact.' 
2.7 Relations between Colliery Companies and Machine Makers 
Under private ownership close ties developed between specific 
colliery companies and engineering firms, although there was relatively 
little vertical integration. Most engineering suppliers were 
independent concerns from the large coal, iron and steel combines. In 
fact there was much greater integration between coal production and end 
uses, especially steel manufacture. Even so, some coal companies did 
have their own ''in group 11 manufacturing companies supplying mining 
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equipment. An example of this trJas Cowlinshaw ~Jalker 9 makers of the 
Shelton Power Loader9 which was an indirect subsidiary of the Shelton 
Company~ which in turn was part of the United Steel Companies combine. 
United Steels also owned engineering companies such as the Universal 
Grinding Wheel Company9 Davy and United Engineering~ and the Yorkshire 
Engine Company (Heinemann, 1944:122). Other large combines had similar 
involvements with privately owned railway companies 9 electric power 
companies9 shipping firms9 and shares in private banks. 
Whilst there was little direct linkage via mergers between coal 
companies and their engineering suppliers9 there were many informal 
1 i nkages. Informal ties were developed by people with mining 
experience and knowledge who then set up engineering firms supplying 
the mining industry. Many of the engineering suppliers were 
established by or employed qualified mining engineers who often had 
close connections with particular colliery companies. Mining suppliers 
were also established in centres with easy access to raw materials and 
components for production and close to or within coalfields. This was 
no accident. It was more profitable to locate industrial centres with 
good communications near to potential clients. Anderson Boyes chose 
Motherwell as a site for its main factory 
•because it was a good engineering centre in the 
heart of the Lanarkshire coalfield and because much 
of the raw material for the company•s needs could 
be bought locally• (Carvel, 1949:26). 
Clusters of mining engineering activity developed in particular 
localities. The Colliery Managers• Pocket Book lists many mining 
machinery firms in Sheffield, Wakefield, Barnsley and Doncaster in 
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Yorkshire; in Manchester and Wigan~ Lancashire; in Derby and in the 
fast developing 11 engineering heartland 11 of the West Midlands, in the 
1920s (see Chapter Six). Similarly, a number of suppliers were 
concentrated in Newcastle-upon-Tyne, and north of the border. Glasgow 
had numerous mining suppliers 9 including Mavor & Coulson 9 James Hendry 
Ltd.9 the Scottish Tube Company, Mirrlees Watson and Murray McVinnie. 
These companies probably had close links with the large Scottish 
combines such as the Edinburgh-Lothian Group, the Fife Coal Company and 
W.M. Baird & Co. Ltd. 
Mining engineering qualifications were an obvious advantage to a 
supply firm. One of the three co-founders of Anderson Boyes, Daniel 
Burns, had worked down the pit with his father whilst continuing his 
self-education into the techni ca 1 aspects of mining. He married the 
eldest sister, Margaret, of his friend Alexander Anderson. Burns 
wanted to do something other than work at the coalface, so he learnt 
all about mining from books and from colliery officials, eventually 
becoming a call iery manager (see Carvel, 1949). Similarly the first 
chairman of Meco, George Blake Edwards, was trained as a mining 
engineer at Wharncliffe Silkstone Colliery, where he put many of his 
engineering ideas to the test. In fact, Wharncliffe became a testing 
centre for many of Meco•s products (see Howse & Harley, 1960). 
These examples show how personal ties were important in the early 
development of some of the major mining suppliers. For companies such 
as Meco and Anderson Boyes it was very important to have close ties 
with particular colliery companies so that they could try and test 
their machines in underground conditions. Such testing facilities only 
became formalised and available for all mining machinery suppliers 
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after the first decade of nationalisation. State ownership also broke 
up some of the cosy relations between particular suppliers and buyers. 
Instead of hundreds of potential small buyers there was suddenly one 
large monopoly buyer and many suppliers, although the new relations 
that developed were if anything even closer, if less informal 9 than had 
existed under private ownership (see Chapter Five, Section 5.3). 
2.8 The First Phase of Mechanisation and Miners• Work 
By the late 1930s about half of the collieries of Britain had 
experienced the first phase in the mechanisation process as it was to 
develop (Burns et.al., 1983). Instead of working short stretches of 
the coal face, the advanced longwall method was adopted whereby 
headings (tunnels) 9 a tail gate and a main gate, are driven into the 
strata from the main roadway and coal is worked from the face between 
the headings. Only in Durham was the room and pillar method common 
(Haynes, 1953). In mines utilizing machinery it was common to have 
mechanised cutting, hand loading or filling of coal onto belt conveyors 
running along rollers and driven by pulleys from the loader gate end, 
with mechanised gate end 1 oaders transferring coa 1 into sets of pit 
tubs. 
This mechanisation phase had not ended the division of labour 
associated with the separate functions of miners on the three shifts, 
but it had introduced machines into pits where formerly only humans and 
ponies had worked. The main impetus behind the engineering endeavours 
to mechanise mining was to raise productivity and output and to reduce 
mining costs, mainly by reducing labour employed. And this has often 
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been justified in humanitarian terms as a process whereby humans are 
relieved of one of the most arduous and dangerous of occupations by 
machines. For example, the development of the Meco-Moore cutter-loader 
held out the possibility of replacing the heavy, monotonous and 
dangerous work of hand-loading. This ~'l!as very labour intensive. A 
lOOm face typically employed between 10-20 fillers whose job was to 
shovel (filling) the loosened coal on to a conveyor. Many thousands of 
men were employed in mines merely doing shovelling work, and a high 
percentage of underground accidents happened at the coal face where the 
majority of miners were employed in 1 oadi ng unprotected conveyors 
(Howse & Harley, 1960:108). 
Undoubtedly machines rep1 aced men in some of the worst mining 
jobs9 but they increased unemployment in mining communities and brought 
new hazards into the mining environment. Orwell's (1937) vivid account 
of a visit he made down a mine describes the use of an 
electrically-driven coal-cutter. 
'Incidentally it makes one of the most awful noises 
I have ever heard, and sends forth clouds of coal 
dust which make it impossible to see more than two 
or three feet and almost impossible to breath'. 
Noise pollution increased with coal cutters, conveyors, electric drills 
and more powerful pneumatic picks. Dust levels also increased, and are 
still a problem in the late 1980s with new heavy duty machinery. There 
were also the physical hazards of using unguarded machines in confined 
spaces, and the speed up of work (see Burns et.al., 1983 and Heycock, 
19869 unpublished thesis). 
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Mechanisation did not only affect the underground labour process, 
it extended to surface work as well. In the inter-war period surface 
washeries at pit heads were one of the most labour-intensive of jobs, 
employing women, boys too young to work below ground, and men who were 
unfit to work underground owing to age, injury or ill-hea 1 th. In the 
1980s coal preparation is one of the most automated parts of the mining 
industry, but it was not until nationalisation that mechanisation was 
systematically applied to surface works. After World War II the jobs 
at the washeries and preparation plants went to men, when previously 
they were the main source of employment at mines for women (see 
Camp be 11 , 1984) . 
2.9 The Transition to State Ownership and Bottlenecks 
in Mining Machinery Supplies 
The Reid Report (1945) had recommended better cooperation between 
the coal industry and machinery suppliers, but in fact there were 
serious problems with the structure and capacity of the mining 
machinery industry itself. Fragmented coal ownership, divisions 
between coal companies, and decision-making based on considerations of 
short-term profit and loss and dividends for share-holders, had not 
been conducive to the formation of a mass home market for standardized 
mining capital goods. According to Heinemann (1948:42) the typical 
mining machinery maker would have 
•a multiplicity of jobs within a single, 
medium-sized factory, with no long runs, and 
consequently none of the advantages of mass 
production.• 
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The inter-war mining machinery industry was characterized by: 
(1) Too many small and medium sized companies producing too many 
varieties of similar products; 
(2) Unnecessary duplication of products and a lack of standardization; 
(3) No coordination or direction of the most technically efficient and 
appropriate equipment to those mines where they were most needed; 
(4) A total mining machinery capacity that was too small for a rapid 
expansion in coal production. There were some larger producers 
but no use of mass production methods. 
The existence of hundreds of coal companies, each one with 
different needs and purchasing abilities tended to militate against 
national or even regional equipment markets. Although there was in 
fact regional differences in levels of mechanisation (see Table 2:2). 
Nevertheless, the general tendency was for machine manufacturers to 
produce a large range of different items rather than to specialise on 
particular ones. 
During the war years mining machinery was in short supply. 
Imports of American machines such as Joy and Jeffrey conveyors, Goodman 
Shortwall and Sullivan coal-cutters, shuttle cars. battery locomotives 
and numerous pneumatic drills, made up for some of the shortfall of 
British machines. Some 207 cutters, 284 conveyors and 117 power 
loaders arrived from the States between 1943 and 1946 to inaugurate 
room and pillar mechanisation schemes in Britain, plus large quantities 
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of opencast machines (The Colliery Guardian~ December 6~ 1946:745). 
Part of the problem was that mining engineering companies were ordered 
into production of equipment for the Armed Forces between 1939-42. It 
was only in 1942 that mining machinery supplies were considered 
essential for the war effort by helping to raise home coal output. In 
1940 only 40 per cent of pre-war mining machinery capacity was 
available to produce mining equipment~ but by 1943 it was almost 100 
per cent (Howse & Harley, 1960:61). The firms themselves were hampered 
by the shortage of skilled labour for many workers had joined the Armed 
Forces~ unlike the coal mines themselves which received drafted labour 
under the Essential Work Order. Although they did lose many skilled 
miners to the war effort. 
The co a 1 indus try i tse 1 f suffered from both a shortage of miners 
and materials, as well as poor management. The Government became 
increasingly involved in day-to-day direction of the whole industry via 
a wartime National Coal Board, which was running the industry 11 0n the 
basis of National Service 11 and took responsibility for labour 
relations~ production and re-equipment (Pagnamenta & Overy, 1984:183). 
Even though coal production was made a priority industry, output 
of coal had actually fallen from 240 million tons in 1937 to 183 m.t., 
which included 8 m.t. opencast, by 1945. The labour force in 1945, 
above and below ground, was 73,000 people fewer than in 1938 (9). 
Costs of production had risen from 17 shillings a ton to 36 shillings a 
ton over the same period. Output per manshift declined and overall 
productivity was down ten per cent on the pre-war 1 evel. There was 
some increase in mechanisation. Approximately 72 per cent of coal 
output was cut by machine and 71 per cent of output conveyed 
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mechanically in 1938. Power loading was still in its infancy 
accounting for little more than one per cent of total coal output. The 
industry was9 according to Harold Wilson (1945:1), "almost the only 
black spot on the home front". 
Faced with an out-moded 9 worn out industryg the Reid Committee 
(1945) called for a massive reorganisation of the industry that 
involved increasing supplies of just about every type of mining 
equipment from the face to surface washeries. Whilst many 
recommendations were given as to how to improve mines and coal output, 
there was very little thought to the problem of how to raise the supply 
of equipment to mines. More coal-cutters, drills9 conveyors, engines, 
electric lighting, locomotives, winding equipment, tunnelling and 
road-heading machines were required, but the same number of mining 
machinery suppliers as had existed before the war had to supply them. 
Throughout the history of mining a popular scapegoat for low coal 
output or a failure to meet targets has been the miners themselves. 
This was no less true after the war when low coal output was blamed on 
absenteeism and localised disputes over pay (see Hall, 1981). In fact, 
a far more serious problem was the shortage of equipment. The 
production of specialist items of mine plant and machinery was 
dominated by the 17 member companies of the Counci 1 for Underground 
Machinery Manufacturers (CUMM), although around this 11 core" of firms 
were numerous suppliers of genera 1 engineering i terns, components and 
surface plant (see Chapter Six) (10). 
Pre-war mining machinery output represented some £3 to £4 million 
a year, part of which went on exports. This should be compared with 
0 
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the annual average expansion programme envisaged by the 1946 Coal Bill 
for some £25 million to be invested, half of which on mechanisation 
(Coal Age, April 1946:146). Even larger estimates of the expenditure 
required on mining machinery was provided in the report of the European 
Cooperation Committee in September 1947. This suggested that the 
British Government intended to raise coal production from 199 million 
tons in 1947 to 249 m. t. by 1951, which would require approximately 
$1,042 (US dollars) or some £250 million of mining equipment. Using 
these figures Heinemann (1948:42) drew the obvious conclusion that this 
would require a major expansion of the mining engineering industry. 
'The output of m1n1ng machinery before the war 
(1935) was only £3,000,000 (out of a total of some 
£560,000,000 in the engineering industries as a 
whole); and over two-thirds of this was exported. 
This represented a labour force of only 13,000 or 
so. Even supposing that prices have trebled since 
1935, it is clear that an enormous expansion of 
capacity would be needed to provide £52 million 
worth of machinery (a year) for the home market 
alone, without taking into account the need for 
exports.' 
At nationalisation the mining machinery industry was much as it 
had been prior to the war with only a few new companies entering the 
industry. Heinemann (1948) argued that the existing industrial 
structure of the machinery suppliers was "obviously absurd" with the 
creation of a single, nati ona 1 buyer. She argued for more 
specialisation, standardisation of goods, and recommended the use of 
Royal Ordnance factories and sections of the motor vehicle industry to 
be mobilised to make large quantities of standardised mining machines. 
Her logic was simple. The nation was short of coal, so it was a gross 
misallocation of resources to have some 560,000 people engaged in the 
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production of motor vehicles, cycles and aircraft and only 12,000 
people engaged in the production of underground mining machinery. 
It is true that the majority of home-based suppliers were hard 
pressed to satisfy the growing demands of the coal industry and they 
failed to meet delivery deadlines. Many factories were working flat 
out. In 1947 Huwoods announced it was breaking new production records 
monthly. They were producing three machines a day, conveyors mostly, 
plus the odd power loader (Coal & Colliery News 9 8 May 1947:209). By 
the end of 1947 the total monthly production of coal cutters was 105, 
together with ten power loaders of all types, and 280 conveyors. 
Heinemann (1948:41) compared this with the monthly production of some 
25,000 private motor cars (see Table 2:7). Meco-Moore cutter-loaders 
were being installed at the 11 Very leisurel} pace 11 of 11 0ne a fortnight 11 , 
and this was when Meco's entire output was for the home market. Owing 
to the great home demand it was not possible for Meco to recommence 
conveyor exports until 1948. Meco and other engineering companies were 
hindered by materials and fuel shortages themselves. 
the (Meco) Works had to operate on a 
completely unbalanced production, assembling 
complete machines for which raw materials and 
components were available, without regard to any 
particular order or delivery promise' (Howse & 
Harley, 1960:67). 
Whilst the Labour Government publicly placed the onus of raising 
productivity and output in the coal industry on the miners' shoulders, 
it soon realized that the highest priority should be placed on mining 
equipment production. In April 1947 the Government announced that they 
were adopting a wartime system for raising the output of machinery 
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needed for the m·ines9 for gcnerat·iVlg p!nnt and for coal··Oil convers·ion 
equipment (see CoaJ. _& Coll·iery Ne\."Js~ 10 April 1947:165). The Ministry 
of Supply (MOSL hthich had originally controlled supplies to the Armed 
Forceso took over control of supp<!ies of heavy e1ectr·ical plant and 
mine madYinery in the batt"le for coal. CoaHa.ce machinery c.nd 
conveyors \."Jere classified. c:.s o•programmed equipment:~. The ne~·Jly formed 
NCB notified the MOS of its requirements for programmed i terns~ which 
were then translated into a production programme for specific 
manufacturers. Hork was sub" contracted if orders could not be meL 
All unon-programmed 11 orders were placed directly by the NCB t<Jith 
manufacturers, although the MOS progressed the supply of labour. raw 
materials and components to major suppliers (see Colliery Guardian, 6 
June, 1947). 
The Government a 1 so approved factory extensions and new buildings 
for mining equipment production in the North East~ West Cumberland, 
South Lancashire and Scottish Development Areas (Colliery Guardian. 30 
May 1947:695). Projects were underway for the manufacture and repair 
of opencast machinery at factories in Cardiff and Aderdare. South 
Wales. 
Furthermore. the Trade Union Congress (TUC) had urged a stop to 
exports when mining machinery was needed in British Mines (11) 
everything possible in the way of hastening 
the manufacture of mining machinery and equipment 
must be done• (Colliery Guardian. 23 May, 1947). 
Both the NUM and the engineers• unions had met to negotiate ways in 
which the supply of equipment to the mines could be increased. 
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lhus there was a ser·i ous shortage of equipment as the coa·l 
industry IA•as handed over to state ownership, The problem was 
structura 1 in nature in the sense that the mining machinery industry 
~'\las too small ar.d ind·iv·idual suppliers I:Jere unable to meet the large 
increase in demand after the war, The heterogeneous demands and 
fragmented market of the industry under hundreds of private coa·i 
companies had left an ·inadequate home supply industry, As Heinemann 
(1948:37) had argued~ 
1 Private enterprise for a hundred and fifty years 
has been getting rich by extracting the easiest 
seams of coal at a minimum of capital expense.' 
State ownership was to increase the level of investment in machinery 
and plant~ and provide a more planned and cohesive domestic market for 
suppliers, The following chapter focusses in some detail on the 
in-house engineering facilities of the National Coal Board, and on why 
the NCB did not become more involved in the manufacture of its own 
capital goods, Chapter Five then considers how relations between the 
NCB and its suppliers have evolved and have affected "the technical 
transformation" of the industry. It also considers the role of the 
State in public-private sector relations in the UK mining sector. 
('!) Th(:~re 2.re l"itetaJly thot;s~nds o-F p:~oduccs~ matct·ia·ls a::tl 
sc·rv·:n~s us2d by t~·12 (":Cal ·:ndt~st:r·yo r·'i"Ji1·ii19 nac:~·L12:r·y cuvers 
:>otf~ undel"9:"0L':·ld a:1d sL:"·fr;.c2 :::·!0.nt and cq~~·ipn:2:;L rc 
·] nc lt:.d P.S r.1ach ·lncry ~ i1VO 1 v 2(: : :1 ·~he p \"C· · procJu c~ ·: !W :~ l1c: s es af 
rn·ine deve'!oprnent, eogo maddnery i::o sin~< shafts9 bu·l'lcl 
t11·nnels9 e'Lc; coal ge·tt·ing and transportation; c.:ou.·l 
prepar-at·ion c,nd processing. ThP. ni'lnnw fncrzc::: on ·;·he 
production process. on the mechanisation of the coal face and 
underground transport9 is deliberate. It enables a more 
detailed unclers tanding of inter--capital relations. and 
analysis of changes in intcr··capit~l relu.tions due to 
nationalisation. 
(2) There are numerous detailed histories of the coal industry 
and of the mining union. For example. Ness Edwards. (1938) 
~-istu_ry __ of the South t~ales Miners' Federati..Q!!_, Lc.H"!tence & 
~li shart. 
R. Page~Arnot (1953) The ~IJiners Years of Str:_u_g_g.le.~ George 
Allen & UntfJin. 
For a full list of references see Bibliography. 
(3) Coal tvas an important raw material for a II'Jhol e range of 
scientific discoveries9 including Hardock's experiments on 
the applications of coal gas for economic purposes in the 
early 19th century; Faro.day 1 s discovery of benzene; 
Mansfield's research on coal-tar; and Kidd 1 S examination of 
naphthalene. Coal was an important raw material for 
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sy;lthe·~·lc dyest:Jtfs. Coal tar led ·to the discovery of 
saccharine. a new sweetening agent. In 1809 the Committee on 
the Gas Light and Coke Company's Bill ·incorporated certu·ln 
( 4) flei nemann ( 1944) refers to a deta ned study of directorships 
held by I~Ps lrJhich showed that in 1938, 51 MPs held 109 
directorships of iron. steel. coal ana engineering companies. 
Former Conservative Prime Ministers camffrom families with 
long associations in heavy industry ~ ~ir. Baldwin's with 
Baldtvins Limited, South t~ales coal and steel comb·ine; Mr. 
Chamberlain's with Guest. Keen and Nettlefolds, coal. steel 
and engineering combine. 
(5) A mining inspector at the time put it like this 
'the (Davy) lamp is liable to accident by 
falling pieces of coal, by dusty atmosphere 
clogging the gauze making it red hot. by coal 
particles igniting on the hot wire mesh' 
(Holmes, J.H.J. (1816) quoted in Albury & 
Schwarz. 1982: 17) ' . 
Furthermore. the methane cou 1 d exp 1 ode by entering the gauze 
too quickly as a result of "blmrJers" or sudden currents of 
air. The wire gauze itself could be damaged and detached 
from the lamp body, permitting the flame to escape and 
explode in the surrounding atmosphere. 
r r· Q,j ' 
~~ours ttor'ked by boys was rt's·~r·i cted to ten hours w'lth the 
prov·i s ·;on that they v1crc ·t.o a'ci:end school ·t-or not ·1 ess than 
twenty h0urs per fortnight. The Mines (Prohibition of Child 
l.abour Underground) Act was not passed until 1900. and raised 
the age limit of boys to 13 years. 
(7) Homen and !)ir.ls t'IE'rf' also emp1oyed pushing or pulling tubs. 
Reacting against a Bill to prohibit the use of female workers 
underground, Lord Fitzwilliam of Yorkshire. assured the House 
of Lords, that it ~vas misleading to talk of ~vomen 11 WOrking in 
chains" since the chains were merely used to drat\! the 
carriages or tubs they pulled (quoted in Harr.mond, J.L. & B .• 
1969:77). 
(8) Matthew Smith Moore was trained as an engineer at the Royal 
Technical College. Glasgow, and had joined Mavor & Coulson 
before working for Cowlishaw. Walker & Company, which made 
chain and bar coal-cutters. Then he moved to Anderson 
Boyes, before transferring to a Belgium firm, Habeuses Aj~of 
Brussels. It was whilst in Belgium he began trials of a coal 
cutter-loader before returning to England and Meco to 
capitalise on the idea. 
Go .. 
aBevin Hoy<' \·Jho had been dlf'c."fted ·]nto the mh1es to raise 
~arti~e n~tpui ~~~n mdny miners ha~ jui~rri the Armed rorccci. 
thousai"'C men t'JE'Y'e 1·; i;era! ·!y trc.ppcd ·j 11 the ·: ncustry by the 
Essential Work Ordero unable to join the Armed ~orces or to 
work in mlnitions factories with better pey. Ex-miners 
demobil"ised after the 1rJar went to join othPr trades. As 
five years spent in other parts of 
Britain, and overseas, will have given them a 
wider hori7on than they possessed before : it 
is cloubtful vlhE:ther many will wish to return 
to the mines 1 of v1hich they have such unhappy 
and bitter memories.' 
{ 10) The Council for Underground Machinery ~!ianufacturers was the 
first mining tradP association, 1r1hich developed out of the 
Coal Face Machinery Exhibitors Association established by 
just twelve manufacturers in 1935. 
(11) British mining machinery exports in 1945-46 were influenced 
by the world coal shortage. ~lachinery was directed to 
European countries capable of producing large quantities of 
coa 1. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA) requested some $3.6 million (US) of 
machinery from the Ul< (Coal Age, September 1945:137). The 
Ministry of Supply controlleG exports and issued licences to 
the approximate value of £2.4 million of mining equipment to 
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complc:·:11ed o.bcL:t e;,pm~·~ controls and ilrg:Jed ·~:1at the Un:·tcd 
s·i:c-ri·.Ps l.Vi'l s tal< i :1g DdV antage of the ':!orl d hL;:1ger ·(or mb ·~ r.g 
m2.chi:l(-:;·y in markets '3':·italr t''Ol•lC: sco·r: i1ef.c! (Hot'JS2 ~. Hv'~"!cy, 
'j %0:f?)' 
TABLE 2.1 
Mechanical and Electricai Machinery in use in Coal Mines, 1924-1938, (Including Number of Horses ~nc Ponies) 
I Coal Cutting Machines Vi2chanical conveyors I So fety 1 amps I Electr'ca: Equipme~t and loaders in use 
I I .~ggregate horse- "0 Number and kind of Coal cut by f\!~mber in 
"' machines in use machinery use power instal:ed "' 
"' I 
<l1"0 I I 
"'"' 
I 
"' "' ' c:"'
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1 No. "'c: 
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"'0 c ,. Flame Elect:--ic 0 "-EO 
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·-"' tity ,_ '- QJ '- ~ =-· .. E 0 "''-
"'E ... "' OU<IJO'I "' 
<1:00 Lamps Lamps "" at 
"' 
1 ,000 " ...... >.<O.C: ... C'UO ...... . , I "0 f- V'J t :::> ,_ 
"'0 ::l QJ ..... ::!: ~ 
"' "' 
0 OV> 3 c: <J) "' a; aJ ::: 
work u <l1 tons u ... a. >- (IJ 0 ·o c:- • :::> 0 :::> :> ::l .o-o s...c: ,_ ... C::tOI/1...-
"' "'"'-
-a 0 0 E::::-
., ... ., .... :::> o o- aJ 0 o o .. 0 c: "''-
.0 ,_ ~ 0 a; 
c.. a c..oo u u QJ .c I ..J ,_u Z·-
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:::: ::>..;B I 
I 
192412,855 I 
i 
1,213 921 2,281 2,812 6,830 49,911 19 
·1 ,373"1 - - 576,318 356,817 - 810,896 67: ,036 65,2"\) 
1925,2,840 978 767 2,645 2,122 6,512 27 ,778+ 22 1 ,667" - - 493,325,370,i23. 34,257 ~ 852,0451 768,100 sG .762 I 
: 
I 
1928 2,539 793 635 3.391 2,312 7,131 61,388 26 2,856 - 27.976 476,018 375,186 36.695 I 897,660 824.67 2 50,4CS 
39,979 I I 
I i 
954,789 ~ I 49,243 i 1930 2,328 572 566 4,131 2,367 7,637 75,756 31 3,747 453 42,1;95 379,551 389,238 861 ,680 
I 
I 
1932 2,158 300 412 4,442 1,983 7,! 37 80,286 38 4,120 526 52,66E 295,52i 391,142 41,358 570,~3: i 885,131 4: ,75£, 
: 
I I 1934 2,123 257 I 325 5,006 1,818 7,406 103,701 47 5,369 537 81,493 242,9C1 394,820 45 ,3l>2 i ,022,104 927,082 37 '75' 
193612,080 206 251 5,516 1 ,627 1 7.600 125,670 55 6,727 716 109,318 209,539 407,318 i5C,C8~ !;,134,318 974,284 33 ., i 30 i 
: 
19381 2,125 I ! l I I :34,9581 7.826 1 I 1,045,726 ·, 32,5241 140 186 6,005 1,398 ! 7,729 59 766 122,915 175,462 474,913 I 55,80<J 'i '198,261 I I I I I I 
Source : Based on the Annual Reports of the Secret~ry for Mines 
~otes + 1926 Miners' Strike led to 1o• production figures 
-
o Mechanical conveyors used at the coalface only. Figures for elsewhere below ground are not r~corded prior to 1928 
- ~ot recorded 
m 
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TA3LE 2.2 
Number of Coal Cutters, Conveyors. and other Facilities- England tnd ~~les, and Scotlsnd In 1938 
Coal Cutting Machines 'lHh;;nlcal conv;;yors s~fety l>m;;s ar.d loaders In use 
I ! : Rumber and k lnd of ~ Coal cut by r\umber in 
machines In use machinery u~e 
""' ' 
"' "' rio. Tot a Is Quan- <!J I.. >, i~o. of ilo. of 
"" 
"'<!J"' "-"' 
District of Disc Bar Chain for tity 
,_ !..U.<: o>~ Flo.ce ! Electr:c ..... ., 
0 "' " "' 
co 
mines all 1,000 = ........ ,., ..... QJ I.. ~00 l~m~s l~mps <!J 0 " 
"' "' "' 
O>UO 
at types tons u ..... c. >-- "' "' 
. 
I.. ..... 
"'"' QJ "' 
=--
work <11 ..... " 0 0 0 "'"'~ 0..00 U Uc<l ....J 0 0 I ,_ u 
DURHAM 247 - 19 711 364 ~ ,094 13,1B3 42 6Cl 72 7 ,B22 ' 40,563 i 44,793 
I 
I 
YORKSHIRE, SOUTH 
I 
237 36 2 811 248 1,097 23,696 56 1 ,236 145 22,91:) 28,76C I :cs.~os & WEST I 
LANCASHIRE I I & CHESHIRE 155 2 19 371 369 761 9,661 68 725 45 110,250 19,877 32,055 
DERBYSHIRE, NORTH 103 - - 427 57 484 !l ,4!9 88 50·~ 73 9,639 11 ,s: 2 30.517 
I I 
STAFFORDSHIRE, SOUTH 64 - 4 9 1 14 88 6 G 3 2' 925 2,383 ANO flORCESTERSHIRE 
I 
I 
SOUTH HALES !lr 424 12 453 70 535 9,183 I 26 1,306 36 15,845 'I 23,692 1C5, 195 F-lONMOUTHSHIRE -
I I 
TOTAL FOR All I ,699 ) 48 94 4,692 II ,354 6,188 110,665 56 6,691 I 596 105,343 I [;37 ,721 ENGLAND 8r fJALES I 1165,694 ' I I 
LANARKSHIRE, LINLITH-
I I I GOfl, STIRLING, REN- 284 75 41 656 24 769 10,958 84 ~4E 87 6,053 5,04 20 '28~ FREH II DUMBARTON 
TOTAL FOR SCOTLAND 426 I 92 I 92 11 ,313 
I 44 I l ,541 124,292 ! 80 11 '129 :70 17,572 9,768 37 '192 ' I ' I 
-··-- --
(Based upon th~ Annual Reports of the Secretary for Mir,es) 
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li),(04 
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i ,554 I 
I 
' 
I 447 I i 
7.423 I 
I 
I 
3i ,735 
668 ' I
I 769 I 
m 
;.o 
Date 
" JO C> 
Numbr.r and ·rypes of Co~·!C<cyt_t·ing_Madl'lncs ·illl G.B. 
·: 9·1·1, '19?.3 and 1938 
MinP~ 
Total no. usinq disc bar chain All 
Total 
types of 
m·ines coa1~cuiters coal~cutters* 
1911 3. l 00 471 1 9020 390 148 2 9146 
1923 2,902 857 l 9240 882 1 9841 69155 
1938 29125 140 186 69005 1.729 
* Includes percussive coal cutters 
Source: Annual Reports to the Secretary for Mines. 
/1 ~ 
T/-\BL.E ?. :~· 
Climax Rock Drill & Fngineering ~orks Limited 9 London 
The Diamond Coal Company9 ~akefield 
George Cohen, Sons & Co. Ltd., Stanningley, near Leeds 
The Hardy Patent Pick Company (hand held drills and 
percussive machines) 
Padley B1 Venables Limited (pneumatic chisels, picks and 
special 11 all steeln rock drillings bits), Sheffield 
Mavor & Coulson, Bridgeton, Glasgow 
Messrs. Reavell & Company (producing the 'Eloy' hammer pick) 
and its subsidiary, the Reavell~Mossay Pneumatic Tool 
Company, Ipswich 
Source The Coll·iery fVtanagers Pocket Book, 1923 and 1925. 
0 
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Pneumatic (Mechan1f~J) Picks and Drills: 
Number in Usc 1928-1938 
Coal~getting 
No. of mines with cutting 
Year where used machines 1ndependently Ripping 
Dri 11 s for 
boring 
shot··ho l es 
1928 
1929 
'1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
281 934 * 1 ,318 
284 1 9 383 * 1 9 622 
318 29214 * 1 9 953 
327 29557 * 2,173 
316 302 2,363 2,243 
347 596 2,980 2,367 
387 713 3,752 2,709 
414 967 49557 3,088 
441 1 9 191 5,273 3,450 
457 1 9 281 6,340 3,824 
485 l '685 7,250 49202 
* Only Total in use for coal getting recorded prior to 1932 
Based on the Annual Reports of the Secretary for Mines 
5,504 
5,876 
6,057 
6 9112 
6,069 
6,392 
6,615 
6,857 
Date 
19?.9 
1938 
.. /3 .. 
Tt\BU: 2 :G 
Number· of COJ~Veycrs anC: gate end Jga_g~rs i l'l_ 
use 1929 and 1938 
conveyors yate end loaders 
tons of coal conveyed 
mechanicc:.lly 
3,218 
7,826 
355 
766 
From Preece~ Go & Fllis~ Po (1980) 
A Hand boo~ _of the Hi story of 
Coalmining Gallery~ Salford 
~ining Museum : Manchester 
Free Presso 
37~150,000 
1229915~000 
1946 ·1st qro 
2nd qro 
3rd qr. 
4th qro 
1947 1st qro 
2nd qr o 
3rd qr 0 
4th qro 
" / £; ... 
"i"A8LE 2:/ 
And of Motor Cars 
Coal cutters 
-----
53 
70 
61 
81 
67 
84 
80 
105 
Pot--Jer 
Loaders 
10 
9 
9 
9 
6 
10 
9 
10 
------- --. 
Conveyors 
164 
"169 
"160 
189 
149 
196 
231 
280 
Private 
Cars 
18,200 
18,600 
26,900 
24,700 
24,900 
Taken from Heinemann. 1948:41 
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CH/-W! U~ '!'HIH:E 
THE BOUNDARIES OF Sl"ATE OWNERSHIP: 
-~·--·. --
lHF_ CASE OF THF: COA!. BOARD 
to the Brit-ish~ a publ·icly m-Jnf:d ·industry 
usuul"ly means a nat·ional·ised, centra·l-!y ot1InEd c;nd 
controlled state enterprise embracing an entire 
sector of the economy~ and operating vrithin 
carefully prescribed limits which prevent it from 
venturing into new fields• (Holland, 197(::45)0 
Nc:tionalisation led to a redistribution of privatE: capital, with 
some sections of private capital being taken over by the state whilst 
others had to readjust to the mixed economyo The suppliers of mining 
plant and equipment were suddenly faced with one big national customer~ 
the National Coal Board (NCB) in place of hundreds of colliery 
companieso The NCB was the only major purchaser of mining equipment in 
the UKo Its investment and purchasing policies had a direct impact on 
the industrial structure of the supply industry and upon the economic 
fortunes of mining machinery makerso 
This chapter examines the evolution of public-private sector 
boundaries in the coal industry. It considers why state ownership was 
confined mainly to the working and getting of coalg and why there was 
so little diversification from the outset into related activities. Why 
was nationalisation in Britain not used to coordinate vertically 
integrated production processes? Whilst the chapter examines the NCB 1 s 
attempts at diversification and greater integrationg it focusses on the 
production of mining capital goods and the Board•s in house engineering 
facilities. Why did the NCB adopt a tacit policy of non-competition in 
. ' 7 f) .. 
the private sector and !save the supply of v~tal cap1tnl goods al~ost 
entiv-ely ·in the hancis of extel"nal manufac~urers? In a'i:tempt·ing to 
pro vi de exp l anat·i ons this chapter concentrates on the state sector. 
relatio~s and the effects of NCn polic~~s and restructuring un private 
suppliers in some detail. 
3.1 Public or State Ownership 
It is useful to clarify what is meant by the terms public and 
state ownership. Nationalised industries in Britain are organised as 
public corporations, but the terms are not necessarily synonymous 
(Sloman. 1978). In 1976 the National Economic Development Office 
(NEDO) defined nationalised ·industr-ies as public corporations whose 
assets are in public ownership; whose board members are appointed by a 
Secretary of State but are not ci vi 1 servants; which are primarily 
involved in industrial or other trading activities; and whose revenue 
is derived from customers. This definition is useful but raises the 
concept of public ownership. which has misleading connotations if used 
loosely, as it implies a level of common or collective ownership that 
has never existed in Britain 9 except in the most narrow of senses. As 
McEachern (1980:176-177) puts it9 
'The community only owns the industry to the extent 
it controls the government. At best that control 
is formal and so is the ownership. The community's 
other stake in the industry is through taxation and 
the national debt, which are used to buy the 
industry and to provide it ~:lith needed additional 
funds. More accurately9 nationalisation makes an 
industry state-owned •. 
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Selective nationalisation incr~ased the direct role of the state 
in industrial and economic planning. It also enlarged the state owned 
eh::ment h1 Britair: 1 s mixed cap·;talist eccnomy, b~!t contra:r'y to th~ 
social·ist aspirations ond promises of LabotH':S 1945 manifesto~ Let Us 
Face J'lle Futl_:lre .• it was not a first step tmvards 11 a ne~\1 social order 11 • 
The industries and ·institutions nationalised ·in 1945~51 inc·luded the 
Bank of England, coal9 gas, electricity, the rail~:Jays~ a part of inland 
transport, cable and wireless, and eventually steel. All in all about 
80 per cent of the economy was 1 eft untouched, and once compensation 
was set at generous terms, only steel 1 S nationalisation was vigorously 
opposed by its private interests (see McEacher~,l980; Miliband, 1972). 
Very few industries were seriously cons·idered for complete state 
takeover. The industries that were nationalised were central to the 
nat·ion 1 s economic performance, but they could hardly be described as 
its 11 commanding heights 11 (Hudson 9 1986:181). They were in need of some 
sort of national reorganisation and coordinated long~term planning. 
Even Winston Churchill endorsed the Coal Industry Nationalisation Bill 9 
1 noting that some major state commitment9 through 
systematic reorganisation or outright 
nationalisation, provided the only hope for 
reconstruction of the (coal) industry and for 
provision of the large amount of capital necessary 
for technological innovation 1 (Krieger, 1984:36). 
Labour 1 s chief architects of nationalisation hoped that state 
monopolies would improve resource allocation and planning and produce 
economies of scale, raise technical efficiency and lead to lower costs 
for industry and consumers. In turn9 greater productive efficiency 
------ --- -- ----------
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wou1rl help to secur~ more welfare benefits a~d better ~orking 
cLnditions for producers. 
Left t..ring crit·Jcs of Ldbour's nationalisat:ion rrogramme cf 194·5·-51 
argued that H d·id not go far enough~ par·Ucularly trJilen th~ JH'c'lf~P 
Government had ·inher'ited "o system of 1:1ar"time controls and disciplines 
which would not have been realised in normal conditions without 
something approadring a revolution" (Bevan. 1952:'10). ~lo attempt tvas 
made to challenge private ownership in the more profitable and growing 
sectors of the economy, such as commercial banking and the newer 
industries of chemicalso food processingo motor vehicle manufacture 9 
consumer durablesg and light engineering. 
By removing sections of private capital from the older base 
industriesg the state was ratiunalising the infrastructural base of the 
national economy by ridding it of many v.1orn out private businesses. It 
was believed by Labour's leaders that the nationalised industries would 
provide cheaper power, a more efficient transport system and essential 
raw materials, such as coal and steel, for the export industries, most 
of which were privately owned. The state owned industries effectively 
became tools for achieving a range of economic objectiveso from 
improving the competitiveness of British industry and raising national 
growth rates to improving taxation yields and the country's balance of 
payments. The fact that successive governments, both Labour and 
Conservative. used the nationalised industries to improve national 
output and growth. and it was not until the Thatcher years that there 
was any full-scale attempt to dismantle the mixed economy. says much 
about its political character. For Labour's nationalisation programme 
had helped create 
.. 79 .. 
<:~ system of n,,·Jel"fd:e ccq;ha!·ism:• ·in u11·ic:1 "Lf1l 
conct~ntra t"i on of capHa I and econom·i c pr·i v-1·; 2ge 
rem~ined and in which th~ old power structure was 
undt:;l·lably ·jn·i;acL Hrls t:Jas a system t:Jhich ·i:he 
Conservat-ive P2rty proved capable of rur.ni:'lg \:Jitll 
ease ... 1 (Coates~ ·!975:74). 
Some ob~:::r·vers have even suggested that far from advanci ns soc-l a·i -j sm 
the Labour Party are 11 th€ plnogressivc voice o·i= capHal"lst development 11 9 
although perhaps not intentionally so. 
'Even though H pursued these policies (such as 
nationalisation) for other rec.sons, and the.Y ~·Jere 
conceived ~~~; th other purposes -j n mind g its actions 
had the effect of creating a mixed economy wh·i ch 
could provide for the profitable expansion of 
pn va te capita 1' (~1cEachern? 1980: 178). 
3.3 Coal Nationalisatio~L_C_o_!llpensation and Consent 
The first Parliamentary step tm'lards nationalisation was the Coal 
Act of July 1938 9 which established a Coal Commission to act as a 
.. , andl ord 11 to promote the better organisation of the industry and put 
an end to private ownership of coal royalties~ but mining operations 
other than boring or search·ing for coal were left in private hands. 
During World War II the state took control of the coal industry as in 
t1orld War ! 9 only this time the extent of the industry•s accumulated 
problems after two more turbulent decades of private ownership v;ere 
starkly exposed (see Chapter Two). In 1945 ~ the Techni ca 1 Advisory 
Committee to the Ministry of Fuel and Power unwittingly sounded the 
death knell for private mine ownership by producing a report detailing 
the industry's technical problems. As Page-Arnot (1979:93--94) put it, 
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t~e m1ni~g cnginee~s ha~ clule thci~ s~are of 
the I:JUrk only 'i:oo 1:1erl. H:e i~eid Repor·i: t·!c.s an 
cxamph~ of CJVE:ri<i ·! L H.E ·; nterri:'i o:1 V!O.s to prove 
the r.eeri fo:r- a complete overhat.(, dnci ::eotgan·: sati on 
of the coal trade. In the ea r·ly sun,mer of 19'!-5 
they found thdt they had rwov2d much more" that 
they had corvi~ced the general public that pr~vate 
ef"!·~c:r·pl'< se 1:-: co" ·1 mL~ s t i:)e St:Jc(Jt OIJ"i: of ex ·is tcncc. 
'r'he~t hac; C\Ocle no morf as tedmol O~fi ca.'~ experts t!lar. 
ccmp1ete what S~r Reg~nald Reclmayne 1 H~ Ch~ef 
Inspector of ~i·ines~ had done in 1919 ·in h·ls 
evidence to the Su.nkey Comm·!ssion. He liiH.l shown 
that the coa·l trade ~l!as l'"'·ipes rotterHripe 9 for 
unification. Tv1enty five years aften'lards 1 the 
Reid Report disclosed to the public a coal trade in 
an advanced state of putrefaction. 1 
For the Labour Government~ nationalisat·ion of the mines \<'Jas llan 
overwhelming polit·ical necessity 11 (Beynon~ 1985). For the coal ot"Jner·sg 
represented by the M·i ni ng Association and with strong connections in 
Westminsterg the political tide had finally turned against them. Butg 
as predicted by Hutt (1928:134) 9 they made sure 11 that they got their 
pound of f'leshg 111ith a few odd ounces in as make-weight 11 • The state 
took over the coal industry on terms that were considered 11 fair and 
just 11 to the mvners~ partly in recognition of existing property rightsg 
and partly to achieve a peaceful transition to state ownership. 
Compensation ensured that the general consciousness of consent 
upon which nationalisation was to be based applied even to those 
private capitalists it displaced. For as Krieger phrased itg 
capitalists have been quite content to offload 
moribund industries onto the state under extremely 
favourable terms 1 (1984:4-5). 
The actual compensation amount equalled £164 million. whilst the figure 
given to former royalty owners was fixed at f78g457 9 000. The principle 
of a global sum to represent the value of the coal industry was 
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v.dapted. 
t"Jholc possf:sse.d compared t'\fith any rart·icu·lar col'! ·Jer,Y, The process of 
task, Fver.v p'it t:Jc~s visitcc by a !ocal District Valuat·lon Board, b"Jhose 
respons·ib·llit_y was to e>..ilmine the pit 1 S history, Hs prospects anci 
f~sti mateci l He span, Factors included ·in the assessments t•Jere the 
condition of items of plant9 the statt: of underground road haulages 9 
access·ibility of and quantity of coa·l still to t'Jork9 as v1ell as past 
dividend records to shareholders. As Conner (1962:22) points out from 
the perspective of Scottish experience~ 
1 Each separate company 1 S position had to be 
considered in relation to its ovm special 
circumstances. Pre-nationalisation dividend record 
is of special interest, It shows that in spite of 
the be 1 i ef I:'Ji de 1 y encouraged by the Owners when 
wage claims were submitted that coal was a 
profitless enterprise. the opposite was the case in 
respect of many of the companies in the Scottish 
c oa 1 f i e 1 d 1 , 
Eventually the Valuation Boards made their assessments based on 
11 What a ~'Jilling buyer woulc; pay a willing seller 11 , The total sum was 
then scaled down to match the global amount made available for 
compensation. Valuation of ind·ividual collieries \AJas made even more 
complex by the existence of large comb·ines owning many pits in more 
than one district and by the multiple directorships some owners had in 
companies with coal stakes, For individual companies there was one 
overriding consideration - to get the best possible price for their 
businesses as they t'lere bound to demand ·; n the interests of their 
shareholders. 
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to be fixed by the lreasury~ on compensc:.'cion fl"om the pr·imary vest·ing 
date until the elate when compensathn1 was sat'isfied. ·rhe liability of 
these pay~ents plus the interest on capital bol"l"owed since vesting day, 
he'lped to ·i:urn coal industry profits ·into 1osses h1 f'ive yea:s out of 
the r·irst ter. of the Na·t-iona·l Coal Board. From the ·!ate '1950s onto:ards 
th2 operat·i ng profit margin narrm·Jed and the l'i abil 'ity of compensation 
became a heavy d·rag on an industry that had long been neglected by many 
of the coal owners. 
The NCB not only had to pay the owners during the first decade of 
national·isation, it had to invest enormous sums into the industry to 
integrate it. Linder single ownership~ to modernise its collieries9 to 
raise output, and to undertake research and development. In this 
context, compensation payments ltJere like "sending good money after bad" 
(see Hutt, 1928:134). They saddled the industry 
'with a burden of debt which materially contributed 
to difficulties that were 1 ater ascribed to the 
imminent character of public ownership' (Miliband9 
1972:288). 
3.4 Horizontal~ not Vertical Integration 
Before nationalisation~ the coal industry comprised hundr-eds of 
companieso including a few large iron~ steel and coal-combines owning 
collieries in various coalfields each (see Heinemann9 1944). One of 
the initial problems facing legislators was where to draw the 
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houndc;;ics (;"f state o1:mcrship" This t'!as u prob.lem rccogr.ist-:d by the 
Samuel Cornm·lss~on over tt"Jenty years carl·iero 
11 H mh1·: ng h'e:r·e nation a l·i sed and other 
asscc·'ated ·:ndus·~;~cs tcmahH:~d ]n pT"·1ve:te ilands~ a 
net~! fror.t·~cr t"JOtdd be drawn across the domdino 
Integrations that have already been effected would 
haveg in factD to be broken up" Probably not less 
than one~f·i ·?til of the coa 1 production~ other than 
for export~ is a 1 ready carried out by companies 
which conduct at the same time blast furnaces. or 
coking enterprises in other local"it"ies~ or other 
associated industries" It ~s proposed to sever 
into its component parts all this organisation 1 
(The Samuel Commission. 1925)" 
In practice9 it proved to be a complicated business separating 
coal production from steel making. for many companies had interests in 
both. Although the Coal Board did take over some coke reduction 
plants~ which were significant manufacturing employers in some areas~ 
it became~ first and foremost, an industry devoted to the working and 
getting of coal. The NCB was constituted under the Coal 
Nationalisation Act of 1946" Its duties t"Jere defined in the opening 
section of the Act. Briefly these were as follows: 
(1) to work and get coal in Great Britain; 
(2) to secure the efficient development of the coal mining industry; 
( 3) to supply without 11 Undue preference" to any one and to regulate 
qualities and sizes9 quantities and prices so as best to further 
the public interest in all respects" 
In addition to coke ovens. the NCB inherited other useful 
ancillaries such as brick-making facilities dependent on the use of 
shale~ but it also inherited a mixed assortment of non-coal related 
assets, including agricultural land. farms, houses, hotels. swimming 
poo·is~ flrllk rounds~ a ho!·iday ccUi1P d:'lci c. cycle t:ack (Berkovhdi~ 
1977:56). In areas ~vhere some verUcal ·integrat-ion b'Jas both logical 
and rrofHab·l e the f1!CB had at most only a pc.rti a·! ·1 nvol vemcnL From 
the start~ the NCB's primary ftlnct·ions I:Jere to nrine coa·~, ra·is2 coal 
cLr~put and ·~ower coa·l pro(:L:ction costs. In 194-7~ the NCB :)ad 958 
collieries under its control. It was virtually a coa~ mo~opoly. 
~Jhilst very small pr·ivate m·ines emp"loy·ing less than 30 men undergroLJnd 
were a 11 owed to continue oper·ati ens" ptovi ded they pa ·j d roy a 1 ties to 
and received an operuting licence from the Coal Board. their combined 
annual output has rare·ly climbed over 2.2 million tonnes (see Chapter 
Seven). 
It is surprising that there tl!as very little debate t-Jithin the 
labour movement or indeed within Parliament about the most appropriate 
boundaries9 funct·ions and objectives of the nationalised coal industry. 
Undoubtedly9 nationalisation of the mines was high on Labour 1 s list of 
priorities, but other than taking over the many private collieries" 
plus a few useful ancillaries, little action was taken to create a more 
vertically integrated national monopoly. More attention was given to 
the structure of the management hierarchy and the complex task of 
administering hundreds of collieries in the far flung coalfields. The 
Labour leadership followed the Morrisonian model of a publicly owned, 
semi-independent Public Service Board, with a top-down management 
structure extending from central headquarters, through areas and 
divisions. to pit level management (1). 
Di versiti cat ion 
Nationalisation Act. 
was not entirely ruled out by the Coal 
But the Act concentrated on the handing over of 
private collieries to the state and gave few operational guidelines 
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·industry t"Jas nationalised as a hor'izonta"lly integrated moVJolHh vrith 
set pr·lmary functions to pr:rformo and a management structure designed 
to administe~ coal working a~d getting. Cnce the nationalised 
p'!ace9 they were unable to divetrsHy w~thout Parliamentau~y approva·l. 
Whilst the Act itself allowed some diversifications 9 the development of 
profitable ancillaries was low on the NCB 1 s priority list and was not 
given prominence in the Act. This strongly suggests that the state did 
not t>Jant to encourage the coa·l industry to venture into nevJ spheres of 
production or into competition with the private sector. Inde~d~ it was 
not unti I the 1960s that the NCB had its own Coal Products Division, 
separately managed 9 and concentrating on the development of the 
industry 1 s by-products. 
Compared to state owned industries in Europe 9 ~'lhere often the 
divisions between public and private sector activities were less 
rigidly drawng in Britains there was little provisio~ or encouragement 
given to expand into other activities, Countries such as Austrias 
Sweden and Italy used a holding company model9 which enabled 
state-owned companies the freedom to diversify and to expand into new 
fields (Saville & Kerevan 9 1987:33). There were few enterprising 
departures from the primary functions outlined for the Coal Board. 
According to Allen (1981:108)9 
1 lt was isolated from other processes 9 a single 
product concerng fully exposed as a basic cost 
factor with no value in itself except as a source 
of domestic heating, In the conditions of post 
second world war Britain no reasonably intelligent 
capitalist would have wanted to own or control the 
coal industry on the terms entrusted to the NCB 
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n0.m2·ly ·to be confined to l ·~he vJor:(~ ng c.1·!c, ge·t.t 1 t19 
of coa·l;. BLrL a :reasonably i11tel'l"igent capita'!ist 
faced tvith the ·i nevitabil Hy of na·u on a l·i sat·i on~ 
t:Jould have t:Jarrted coal to be so ·iso-:atedo ·~o b0 
exploitf~d as a subs·icti7.ing fr~ctor as it t:Jas unti1 
the 1ate 1950s and to be castigated for its cost 
ra ·j s ·jy!g qua 1 it·i es ~ u.s H t1!as uftert:Jards. 1 
3.5 E:~ci'll_a_ry Activities 
In 1963 the NCB set up a Coal Products Division in charge of its 
coke ovens and chemical plants previously managed by its coal 
pt·oduction divisions. The fact that it took 17 years to set up a 
distinct administrative division devoted to coal products is an 
indication of the extent to which the NCB treated its non-mining 
activities as side line operations. During the sixties~ the NCB was 
losing its coal markets to oil 9 and it received government approval to 
engage in various activities allied to coal production in order to 
improve the industry 1 s overall financial position. The logic behind 
this move was explained by Lord Robens 9 NCB chairman during the 1960s: 
1 l~hat we did was to utilise our own resources~ 
physical and human~ our own particular expertise9 
which a shrinking mining industry had made 
available. The aim was to produce profits which we 
could use to stabilise the price of coal and 
thereby improve the financial position of our 
primary business' (Robens~ 1972:320). 
The Coal Products Division introduced new products~ handled North 
Sea gas activities~ and took over smokeless fuel plants. The NCB's 
coke ovens produced benzole as a by-product~ which for many years was 
used as a motor spirit. Eventually the NCB built a modern benzole 
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dist·inc.t·io:l plant ·~n associat·ion ~:rltr a b~g ste:::·l compc:.ny. Ar~other 
by .. products jo'lr1t venture t'Jas t:rith Dutch State Mines~ tvh·ich established 
a p·lant to make l':aprolactamo the rm11 mater·;c.i·! for Nylon 6. 
It ~as in the 1960s that the NCB exterded its expertise in 
continental shelf exploration. It already had experience in off-shore 
drilling for coal off the Durham coast and in the Firth of forth. On 
the bas·is of this9 Raben's began discuss·ions tlith Gulf O"il about the 
poss·ib·ility of forming a partnership ·in North Sea exploration. 
Eventually the Coa I Boa1~d was granted statutory powers to dri 11 for 
gas9 and Raben's was permitted to enter an agreement with the 
Continental Uil Company to explore for gas in the Viking field of the 
North Sea~ which had huge profit potential. 
The NCB also mmed solid fuel appliance showrooms9 but it could 
not sell the appliances. So the NCB became the majority shareholder in 
a builders' merchants business 9 J H Sankey & Son Ltd. ·rhe NCB owned 77 
per cent 9 and Brit·ish Sisalkraft Limitedg an American subsidiary 
company 9 owned the rest. Sankey became the third largest builders 
merchants in the UK 9 and the Board's nationwide showrooms provided 
clients with both purchase and installation servicesg especially for 
domestic coal burning grates. 
Anci 11 aries were profitab 1 e. During Roben • s decade they made 
profits every year. From 1965/66 to 1969/70 their profits (after-tax) 
increased from £9.3 million to £20.6 m. This followed a Labour 
Government ~jhite Paper 9 The Financ~s of the Coal Industry (November 
1965) ~ which gave the NCB the go-ahead to diversify into non-mining 
activities by investing up to £75 million9 at 1964 prices9 in the five 
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years to ~arch 1971. Whilst this sum was only a fraction of the NCBls 
total expenditure. particularly on the mechanisation of mining. it was 
recognition that the NCB could generate at least some internal finance 
hy diversify·ing. Even so. diversif·ication was a piecemea·l proc~ss and 
ancillaries remained peripheral concerns to the main busi~ess of mining 
coal. 
In fact the NCB failed to capitalise on some crucial market 
opportunities. Whilst the NCB had the facilities and expertisP 
available to develop oil and gas from coal. it made no serious attempt 
during its first two decades to enter these markets. As early as the 
1930s the Maclaurin Scheme was put before the Scottish National 
Development Council as a positive and practical response to check the 
economic depression. The Scheme offered a grid using oil supplies 
distilled from coa"i by low temperature carbonisation. The aim was to 
make Scotland at least partially independent of foreign oil supplies. 
At the time oil imports into the UK ltJere seven mi 11 ion tonnes per 
annum, of which four m.t. was motor spirit. By 1961, oil imports had 
reached 50 m.t. and were increasing. 
The Maclaurin report had optimistically stated that all the 
filling stations of the future would be at collieries and gas works. 
which would supply petrol, diesel oil, bottled gas and compressed gas 
tor all purposes (Conner, 1962:86). To implement such an ambitious 
scheme on a nationwide scale would have meant very large additional 
tonnages of coal for carbonisation. Although it was beyond the coal 
industry•s capability to displace oil imports entirely, a share of the 
oil market could have rejuvenated mining. More than this, some such 
scheme would have helped to create a more diversified national energy 
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nat·i on 1 s o'il ·import b·i 11 9 a[I'Jd strengthetdng the 1 ong term security of 
energy supplyo 
Duri~g the early l960sD the Gas Boards were importing nat~ral gas 
from North Africa and est~blishing a grid. Instead of cooperating with 
each other~ the gas and the coal industr·ies were 11 at each other 1 S 
throats... Greater coordinat·ion betlrJeen the national eneryy industries 
under the framework of a national energy policy would certainly have 
helped create a more diversified energy base without the massive 
run-down of the nation 1 s co a 1 industry due to fuel imports (see 
Schumacher9 1960). As Conner (1962:88) put it~ 
1 A fuel policy, in one sentence. means making 
sensible use of our native and natural resources. 
If gas had not decided to go its own way it would 
have been cooperating in means to obtain cheap 
supplies from coal rather than the oil fields of 
the Sahara 1 • 
State monopolies in the energy sector have tended to move along 
divergent paths due to conflicting objectives and a lack of strong 
central direction by the state. When coal was national'ised it was 
almost the only fuel source for the whole nation. Very little thought 
was given to integrated energy sector planning and cross subsidisation 
between state owned industries. It is ironic that a loss~making Coal 
Board should be subsidizing an electricity supply industry making big 
profits when both industries ar·e state owned, and to cut costs more 
collieries are closed, adding substantially to unemployment bills and 
the social costs of coalfield commun-ities (see Chapters Four and Five). 
Similarly, a lack of long-term coordination between the state owned 
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coal anc1 stee·! inc:u.stries resulted iVl a nlll··dovm of BrHe;.in 1 S coking 
coa·l capacity at a ·t"lme of ·increasing coking coa·l ·imports (see Beynon, 
Hudson & Sadler~ 1986). 
"fhe Coa·l Board 1 S COiTtro'l over pdccs tvas l-imited by Hs 'le.ck d 
control over retail and wholesale distribution networks. The National 
Hoard for Prices and Incomes had in 1966 recommended amalgamations into 
larger coal distribution organisations, rationalisation of ordering, 
collection and delivery services, and an expansion of NCB retailing 
activity. 1\lthough the NCB acquired some retail interests, including 
Amalgamated Anthracite Holdings Limited covering the west of England, 
and the Lancashire Fuel Company, it was still high'ly dependent upon the 
activities of private middlemen. In 1976. the NCB was dealing with no 
less than 280 wholesalers and 7,800 retailers involved in distribution 
to domestic users. This led to NUM allegations that private 
distributors were charging over double the pit head prices for coal. 
An investigation by the Price Commission in 1976 revealed large 
dispar·ities between different types and quantities of coal, between and 
within regions 9 and between different retailers. Often there was a 
large mark up in retail outlets over the pit head coal prices. As 
Allen (1981:109-110) points out9 the situation in the nationalised coal 
industry contrasted sharply with that of the oil industry~ lt4hich was 
mainly controlled by multinationals. These corporations tightly 
controlled their own retail outlets for oil products and 11 infiltrated 
coal distribution by persuading coal distributors to handle competitive 
heating oil 11 • 
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One neve i Hie a to cut out the nl"i dell eman p:r-oved ·i:o be a mt\'th:U ng 
flop. This t'llas the ·idea of 11 S!ot mach·ine coa1r•. The f"irst demonstrat·ion 
machine was tried in 1961 by Lord Robens in London. He inserted four 
shi.ll·ings into the n1ach·ine and received ?8 lbs of t·Jashed nuts. But as 
Conner (1962:84) observed~ 
'Only London's West End could afford to buy coal at 
that price even if they preferred it to oil or gas 
or electricity as a heating medium of which there 
is no great evidence•. 
3.6 'In House• Engineering 
The NCB did not take over any mining machinery facilit·ies from the 
old private companies9 although some coal combines did own engineering 
subsidiaries (see Chapter Two). It did inherit the Cowdenbeath 
engineering repair workshop from the Fife Coal Company. And after 
nationalisation new centred workshops tvere built. Nevertheless9 with 
the singular exception of a small factory in South Wales, Tredomen 
Engineering at Hengold~ acquired in the 1960s~ the NCB did not 
manufacture mining plant and equipment. This is in spite of being at 
the forefront of developing the mechanised longwall system of mining in 
the 1950s and 1960sg and automated mining systems in the 1970s and 
l980sg at its central research and development facilities. In 
practice 9 the Coal Board passed on many of its innovations at nil cost 
to private manufacturers who then profited by them (see Townsend~ 
1980). 
9? L> 
J:n tl1eory9 there tvas no·iJI'ing pteventing the f~CB from c·lversHying 
into the produC"t'ion of machiner.Yo The 1946 ~Jationalisation Act 9 
Chapter 599 Section Onces Part Tt\10 9 left th·is possibility opcl'L It 
states 9 
'The funct"ior. of the NCB shall inc"ludr. the carrying 
on of & n such act i vit·i es as it may appear to the 
Board to be requisite9 advantageous or convenient 
for them to carry out in connection v.Ji th the 
discharge of their duties 000 and in particular: 
(d) producin!=) or manufacturing any goods or 
utilities tvhich are of a kind required by the Board 
for or in connection with the working and getting 
of coal or any other of their activities or which 
can be advantageously produced or manufactured by 
the Board by reason of their having interests or 
facilities for the production or manufacture 
thereof in connection with the working and getting 
of coal or any of their activities 9 and supplying 
and selling goods or utilities so produced or 
manufactured. 
(e) any activities which can be advantageously 
carried on by the Board with a view to making the 
best use of the assets vested in them by this Act'. 
Why did the NCB rely on private suppliers for its capital goods needs 
when it had its own network of engineering workshops9 Research & 
Development facilities and in house mining engineering expertise? 
After nationalisation the NCB's demands for all kinds of plant and 
machinery increased. The mining machinery industry was unable to meet 
deadli~es and there were serious bottlenecks in the supply of 
underground equipment. Whilst the problems of supply were aggravated 
by a chronic shortage of sparess raw materials and skilled labour 
·immediately after the War 9 there were also inadequacies in the size and 
structure of the machinery industry itself (see Chapter Two). But the 
government made no moves to encourage equipment manufacture within the 
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Cod·l Board. Rather~ the recommenC:at·Jcns of 't1'1e '!echnica·l Advisory 
CommHtee ('1945) t·JEY'e follo~'!ec: and the NCB sougl'l't close technical 
cooperation with its suppliers. 
Private manufacturers benef·i tted fi~om t·Jhat Tmvrsend ( 1976) 
described as a 11 COmplimentary interactive process 11 of tech:rrical 
collaboration with the NCB. They benefitted from the Coal Boa1nd 1 s 
superior technical resources and its centralised Research & Development 
facil"ities9 as t'lfell as from var·ious technical innovations made hy ~ICB 
personnel outside the formal Research and Development system. Most of 
the initial innovations to the Anderton Shearer Loader originated from 
the NCB and were passed on to the three major cutter~loader suppliers 
for further design and development (D & D). The same applied to later 
t"\lork on microprocessor based mining technology and the Coal Board•s 
preferred automation systems the Mine Operating System (MINOS)s which 
was developed by specialised staff in the Mining Research and 
Development Establishment (MRDE) at Bretby (see Burnss et al., 1983). 
Suppliers also benefitted from the NCB 1 s laboratory and underground 
mine equipment testing facilities~ which proved to be an invaluable 
11 shop window 11 to them by promoting their products to potential overseas 
customers (ABMEC~ 1986). Such services have effectively been a big 
public subsidy for private industry. 
An important study of Scotland•s engineering workshops has 
highlighted their potential manufacturing functions. Saville and 
Kerevan•s (1987) study stresses the fact that the coal industry•s 
central workshops are far more than mere 11 engi neeri ng hospi ta ls 11 for 
overhaul~ repair and maintenance work. They have also been involved in 
the design and development of cost cutting technology and in making 
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increrr.8iTta·! i:lncvi:lt1or.s to a t'Jho.ie vL:r·iety of madlinP.s worth £ 
millio~s. The Scottish workshops were also adept at manufacturing '1one 
offsG' and small batch itemss such as shearer drums. cm(ls~ LH1derframes. 
girder· clamps, conveyor structures, AFC line pans, ran crossings. mine 
cars and other standard items. The opporturl'i ty ~,.'as a hvays there to 
extend their manufacturing range or to specialise on particular 
sped a l'i st items if given the go-ahead by senior I~CB management. But 
as Allen (1981:115) observed. 
1 The NCB had, it seems, an innate preference for 
encouraging the private exploitation of its 
activities. • 
fJuri ng the 1950s and 1960s, there was plenty of scope for more 
internal contracts to be given to workshops at a time when the NCB was 
spending millions of pounds by awarding hundreds of contracts to 
private companiess including simple replacement, repair and small batch 
manufacturing jobs. In the 1960s when it was threatened with closure, 
the Cowdenbeath workshop ruanagernent and unions put forward positive 
propos a 1 s for the manufacture of sma 11 batch standard i terns. More 
ambitious proposals were also suggested~ including the manufacture of 
larger 9 more sophisticated mining machines in competition against 
existing outside suppliers~ and outside tendering for general 
engineering work. It was argued that such schemes would help the NCB 
financially by reducing the flow of money from the Coal Board to 
private suppliers 9 including overheads and profit margins. 
The ideas to increase outside tender·ing and the manufacturing 
activities of central v10rkshops met 1r1ith 11 in built resistance within 
the NCB 11 • Hobart House and Divisional headquarters preferred to embark 
' 95 ·~ 
on a ·1 ong term strategy c·( tight budget~r.Y contro·l {d t'JOlnkshop 
expenditure~ centralisation of Research & Uevelopment engineering 
resources~ and increasing 11 contracting out'1 (see belmv), 
Saville ana Kerevan (1987) offer a number of reasons why proposals 
for greater in house manufacturing met with '1 in built resistance within 
the NCB 11 , They argue that the almost military lines of command within 
the bureaucratic adm·inistrc.t·!ve structure of the NCB and Hs rigid 
rules and regulations stifled imaginative initiatives in the workshops. 
Furthermore~ the productionist mentalHy of senior NCB mining eng·ineers 
meant that the workshops became viewed as ala troublesome subordinate 
element in the real business of digging coal 11 and their commercial and 
technological potential was missed, The centralisation of R & D at 
Bretby concentrated resources there~ and Bretby attracted and 
accumulated the innovative ideas of staff and workers from all parts of 
the m·in·ing industry~ including the workshops, Many t'llorkshop 
innovations and improvements to machines vvere tested and proved at 
Bretby and their manufacture was passed to the private sector, Saville 
and Kerevan (1987:57) cite the examples of 11 the Alloa Heading ~lachine 11 ~ 
flameproof equipment~ electrical panels9 hydraulic props~ and a range 
of other equipment~ which had workshop innovations, 
'Instead of developing these within the NCB~ 
Headquarters merely amalgamated improvements and 
handed over details to private industry~ 
representing a colossal public subsidy to the 
private sector,• 
The case of the coal industry 1 s engineering workshops highlights a 
certain lack of flexibility and entrepreneurial ability9 which many 
right-wing critics have ascribed as an inherent weakness of 
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na.tiona~ised ·lndu.strie~ (see C'Jarke 9 '198/)o Some ·left .. t:ri:rJg crHics 
have argued that nationalisation should have encompassed mining 
machinery manufacture 9 othert'!i se it 1 eft the Coa 1 Board open to p;~; vate 
exploitation (Allen 9 1981)" Indeed theY"e is some evidence of 
over~cilargi ng <we, excess prof'i ts made by important suppl·i ers dur·i 119 the 
late 1960s ~ early 1970s (see lhe Select Commi'i:tee on r~ationa'lised 
Industries~ 1974~75)" 
In order to develop effective in-house manufacturing the Coal 
Board would have had to invest in high density production lines in 
specialist workshops~ and would have had to let workshops stray into 
competition against private sector firms. even if it was only for Coal 
Board contracts" Successive governments have always been reluctant to 
allow this" Consequently. over the years the central workshops 
suffered from a 1 ack of capita 1 investment and under-uti 1 i zed 
resources" According to Saville and Kerevan (1987)~ the Coal Board has 
missed commercial engineering opportunities by misallocating its 
resources" More recently massive capacity cuts in both coal production 
and workshops have increased unemployment 9 making human ski 11 s 
redundant 9 which represents a failure in both commercial and social 
terms" Thus the issue of in-house manufacturing raises basic questions 
about the form 9 character and purpose of the nationalised coal 
industry" 
3.7 Sell Offs and Contract}ng Out in the Eighties 
Whilst privati sati on programmes of one kind or another have been 
adopted in many countries 9 and even to a limited extent in China and 
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the Ussr<~ they have had a special ;:>olit-ica·l sigvl"if-icance ·in BrHai111 as 
a centra 1 tenet of Thatcheri sm, Successive Conservative governments 
from 1979 have sought to effect a sweeping and irreversible shift ilfl 
the structure of the Mtional ecov'omy in favour of free~ enterprise 
capHalism, Government pol·icies art: a·irned at opening doors for the 
expansion of private capital~ reducing the state's direct involvement 
in industry and in public service prov·is·ion 9 reducing burdens or. 
taxpayers, encouraging ltJider share-ownership. reducing the scope for 
collective industrial action 9 and ultimately killing off socialism in 
Britain, As one of Thatcher's disciplines enthuses9 by 
'freeing institutions and people from the cobwebs 
of the state privatisation will be the 
technique finally to neutralise all socialist 
ideas' (Clarke, 1987:67), 
In fact, nationalisation is in practice a Labourist concept and has 
little to do with the fulfillment of socialist objectives (Miliband, 
1972)' But this has not deflected the Government's ideological 
commitment to the privatisation programme. 
Various measures are included under the umbrella term of 
"privati sati on", Four broad areas of privati sati on policy are most 
commonly identified 9 although there are many subtle variations on the 
same theme (see Kay 9 Mayer & Thompson9 editors, 1986; Heald & Morris~ 
1985). These are : 
(1) Denationalisation. In its most literal sense privatisation refers 
to both the selling off of nationalised industries to the private 
sector and the gradual withdrawal from comprehensive public 
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provision in areas like education. health. and the social 
sel~vices. It also ·includes the partial sen off of state o1:med 
assets, 
(2) Customer ~ees. Incr·eo.ses ·in serv·ice d1arges ·iii p1ace of tu.x 
f·i nance. 
(3) Liberalisat:i_l?!l_~nd deregulat·ion. Refers mainly to the abolition 
or relocation of the monopoly powers of nationalised industries. 
e.g. the illiberalisation" of coach and bus services in the UK. 
(4) "Contracting ou~·~._j_r_a_!lchising or competj_t_ive tendering. A common 
case of 11 Contracting out" is ~·Jhere a local public authority 
)> 
continues to bear direct respons·ibility both for the provision 
arrangements and for service quality. although the work is 
actually carried out by private firms. Another common case is 
where a state owned industry buys end products and services from 
private contractors which it would otherwise provide 11 in house••. 
Competitive tendering can involve 11 in house 11 employees 
competing against external firms and individuals for public sector 
contracts. 
It is important to be specific about the form of privatisation one 
is talking about and what precisely is being privatised. For as one of 
its advocates puts it. privatisation 
•is a complex and subtle process. It is not a 
panacea or a forn1ula Overwhelmingly. the 
impression emerges that each case is unique and 
requires a different remedy• (Pirie. 1985:6) 
" gg co 
The Gove:r·mnent has made ·it c·lear that it docs not ·inte:1d to 
privatise the t'Jhole of the coal industry unt'il after 1992, H 'it is 
re-elected. Neverthelesso during three Thatcher terms of office since 
1979, the ~JCB9 renctmed ·the BrHish Coal Coy-po~~auon (BC) 9 has been 
encouraged and coer'ced to embark OTI a numbr.r' or privat'isc::tion measures. 
Privatisat.ion of BC 1 s primary activity 9 coa1 mii'ring 9 w·il'J be considered 
'later (Chapters Five and Six). The centra·! focus here is on the 
selling off (partial renationalisation) of ancillary activ-ities and the 
contracting out of repair and maintenance work. Neither of these forms 
of privatisation ·is ne~J to the coal industry 9 but they have had an 
added political significance and momentum in the eighties. 
a) Sell Offs 
During the 1970s there t-.Jas a change in direction in the NCB 1 s 
policy towards ancillaries9 whereas the sixties had seen greater 
diversification into non-mining activities 9 the election of the Heath 
Government of 1970-74 saw a measure of retrenchment. Sir John Eden 
became the Minister of State with responsibility over the nationalised 
industries. He held discussions ltJith Lord Robens about the possibility 
of hiving off some of the NCB 1 s ancillaries. A Coal Industry Bill was 
introduced (and later defeated) that would have reduced the NCB 1 s 
activities below the statutory authority of the 1946 Act. In 19719 the 
Coal Industry Act was passed~ which required the NCB to report to 
government on its ancillary activities and on those companies in which 
it had a share or interest. It was obvious that the Government wanted 
to sell off to the private sector profitable NCB activities outside its 
main business of mining. In fact9 Lord Robens gave his reluctance to 
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become 11 the instrument for 'hi vi ~-~g off • o• as a pr·lmary reC!son for his 
decision to resign from the chairmanship of the NCB (Robens, 1972:323). 
The period 1974-79 was one of expansion in capita·! investment ·in 
new productive capacity and mining technology in coal mining~ but there 
was no great change in attitude towards NCB ancillaries. The election 
of the Conservatives in 1979 sparked off a majcr offensive against the 
public sector, and the mining industry in particular. The Government 
placed tight financial limits on the industry and encouraged the Coal 
Board to introduce measures to reduce its operating costs and overheads 
(see the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 9 1983). As part of this 
process the coal industry shed several non~mining activities in 
addition to its big colliery closure programme. 
The Coal Board's subsidiary companies and shareholdings in other 
firms were controlled by two holding companies - Coal Products Limited 
and NCB Ancillaries Limited. In 1983/4 the combined book value of 
subsidiaries equalled £118 million~ and Coal Board shareholdings in 
other firms were valued at £58.7 million9 11 mining related 11 turnover was 
£633 million~ or 13.6 per cent of total turnover (see Table 3:1). 
Since 1983 9 the Coal Board has sold off several subsidiaries and 
shareholdi.ngs. J.H. Sankey Limited, the heating equipment and building 
material supplier, was sold in 1984. The Board also sold its 30 per 
cent stake in Associated Heat Services (AHS)9 which designs~ installs9 
and operates boiler and air-conditioning plant. AHS was partly owned 
by the NCB since 1966. In 1983~ AHS had pre-tax profits of some £3.3 
million on a turnover of £35 million~ but it was sold for £7.5 m. 
(Whitfield9 1985). The company is now a fully fledged energy 
combined heat and power (CHP) stations~ which sell hot water as well as 
electricity. It is now a fully owned French concern (Compagnie 
Generale de Chauffe of Lille)~ but its UK cheirman is Lord Roben•s NCB 
successor~ Lord l::zrcL As the Financia1 -rimes (16n03 .. 88:/) put it 1 
•;t ·is ·irvrdc ... that one of the foremost hunters 
for openings in the private gas and electricity 
markets should be Lord Ezra~ who twrked for the 
state~run National Coal Board from 1947 until 
1982 o o o I 
This is a reflection of the times. New private groups are queuing 
up to take advantage of the potentially profitable openings which_are 
offered by the impend·ing electricity privatisation. Meanwhile the Coal 
Board has continued to reduce its non-mining roles. It has 
discontinued as a separate management division its Ancillaries Group by 
11 integrating some of the remaining activities ·into the core business 11 
(BC Corporation Annual Report~ 1986/7:11). For examp1e9 its computer 
company, Compower Limited 9 was 11 reintegrated 11 into the Corporation•s 
main organisation through the creation of an Information Technology 
Department. 
Simultaneously~ the NCB rationalised capacity in the Coal Products 
Group, \vhich employed nearly 3,000 people in 1985/6 and some 1~732 
people in 1986/7. Part of this process was the closure of National 
Smokeless Fuel•s coke ovens at Fishburn9 SmithyltJood9 and Nantgarw~ and 
British Benzol•s coking plant at Bedwas (BC.~ 1986/7:7). According to 
British Coal such capacity cuts were necessary 11 to return the works to 
full throughput and so minimize unit costs••. But it was also designed 
to 
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'leave the Coal Products Group as a viable business 
in its own right and removes any need for financial 
support from the Corporation• (BC~ 1986/7:11). 
In other words~ the Products Group has become a financially attractive 
concern ready for complete sell off to the private sector (see Table 
3:2). 
The coal industry has also divested itself of much property~ land 9 
and housing stock. The sa 1 e of Co a 1 Board housing has been 
controversial ever since the NCB adopted its disposal policy in 1976. 
In just over a decade the NCB had sold nearly 50,000 houses~ a 
reduction from a total of 66,000 houses in 1976 to 16,700 NCB houses in 
1987 (BC, 1986/7:11). Councils, private companies and individual 
tenants have bought houses, but there are many victims to speculators 
who have gained control of some former NCB homes (Yorkshire Post, 
30-02-88). According to British Coal•s 1987/8 Annual Report, by March 
1988 it owned some 8,950 houses. Since 1976, sales to sitting tenants 
tota 11 ed nearly 47,000, and some 27,300 houses were sold to 1 oca 1 
authorities, Housing Associations, Investment Companies and with vacant 
possession. 
Coal Research and New Coal-Use Technologies 
The Coal Board has a Coal Research Establishment at Stoke Orchard, 
near Cheltenham. The CRE has devoted its time and resources to 
researching efficient, cost effective and environmentally acceptable 
uses of coal in collaboration with private manufacturers and other 
public sector bodies such as the Central Electricity Generating Board 
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(CEGB). As with British Coal•s Technical Headquarters at Bretby 
(formerly the MRDE) the private sector has commercially benefitted from 
CRE 1 s activities (2). 
In the markets for coal-fired industrial heating the CRE has won 
some big orders, including one with ICI Wilton in 1988 which involves 
an associated coal burn of 460,000 tonnes per annum (BC., 1987/88:8). 
The CRE has introduced fluidised bed boilers designed to reduce 
nitrogen and sulphur oxide emissions. Fluidised bed furnaces producing 
flue gas at 850°C were developed for use for drying stone, clay, grass, 
etc., and units with ceramic heat exchanges producing air temperatures 
up to 1,000°C for applications where hot clean air is needed, such as 
drying in the food industry (Colliery Guardian Supplement, January 
1987:64). For smaller markets, such as domestic combusion, the CRE 
produced a range of ~coalflow" appliances with low-cost automatic coal 
and ash handling equipment. 
It is in the power generation market that the Conservative 
Government • s clamp-down on public expenditure has most affected the 
CRE•s activities. British Coal is at the forefront of developing ways 
of burning coal for electricity in ways that minimise sulphur and 
nitrogen oxide emissions. Britain•s main experimental plant is at 
Grimethorpe, South Yorkshire, which is an 80 MW power station utilising 
pressurized fludised bed combustion (PFBC) technology. PFBC can be 
used in combined cycles with the use of limestone to retain sulphur, 
which enables power stations to generate power at higher efficiency 
than conventional power stations fitted with expensive flue gas 
desulphuisation (FGD) technology (Dainton, 1988). 
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In 1988 the Grimethorpe plant has been threatened with closure due 
to lack of funds. Initially the project started life as an 
International Energy Agency scheme 9 but more recently it was jointly 
financed by British Coal and the CEGB. The CEGB decided not to renew a 
three-year agreement with BC to share Grimethorpe's research costs 9 and 
BC can only contribute a part of the £38 millions required to continue 
the project9 which is £14 m more than the CRE's total annual 
expenditure (see Table 3:3). 
Part of the problem is that PFBC plant developed at Grimethorpe 
would only work well in relatively small power stations up to 300 
Megawatts. The CEGB have tended to develop large-scale conventional 
plants with 900 MW turbine generators, although many of these will 
require FGD plants attached to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions. 
Furthermore 9 US research on a ri v a 1 techno 1 ogy 9 known as integra ted 
gasification combined-cycle (IGCC), has shown that emission figures for 
both sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides are 1 ower than for other 
technology or plants less than 200 MW (New Scientistp 7 May 1987:21). 
In spite of these difficulties British Coal has an important pollution 
control coal combusion technology under its wingp and one that has much 
commercial potential. The only commercial orders until July 1988 for 
PFBCs were won outside Britain by Sweden. The first and largest is a 
combined heat and power plant due to open in Stockholm in 19899 which 
will generate 135 MW of electricity and 220 MW of heat for the city's 
district heating system, meeting strict emission control requirements. 
Two more PFBC orders won by ABB9 the giant Swedish-Swiss engineering 
group were in Spain and in the USA in partnership with Babcock & 
Wilcox (FTP 15-06-88:35). 
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The British Government 1 s official response for more money to be 
injected into PFBC research has been negative. Their argument is that 
future funding should come from those who intend to benefit from PFBC 
technology~ particularly the private sector. This is part of the 
process of creeping privatisation that has led to BC reducing its other 
ancillary activities and cutting research and development in other 
areas, including mechanical equipment (see below). But it is also a 
policy that may have serious implications for the UK 1 s energy supply in 
the 1990s. It is ironic that the Government has proved to be so 
reluctant to invest in public sector R & D into ways to reduce sulphur 
dioxide and nitrogen oxide pollution at a time when the European 
Community have called for stricter limits on coal-burning pollution. 
This is particularly so when PFCB technology is a cheaper alternative 
to FGD, which costs around £200 million per power station to fit, and 
it is more appropriate for smaller power stations, private companies 
are likely to opt for smaller generating stations. It is also the case 
that whilst the Government argues that British Coal continues to be too 
large a burden for the public purse, it actually spends less than other 
Western coal producing nations on coal R & D. This represents only 
five pence per tonne of coal used for power generation in the UK~ 
compared with the US government 1 s 31 p per tonne and Japan 1 s 1 05p per 
tonne for 1987/88 (FT, 15-06-88:35). 
The Government have also scrapped coal-related research outside of 
British Coal. The Lothian waste heat plan was a CHP scheme to use 
waste heat from the Cockenzie coal-fired power station in East Lothian. 
The estimated cost of converting Cockenzie was approximately £34 
million, and it would have provided heat via pipes to factories, 
offices and homes in Edinburgh. The public consortium managing the 
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proposed venture included the Edinburgh District and Lothian Regional 
Councils, the Scottish Development Agency, the South of Scotland 
Electricity Board and four public companies set up to advance the 
project. The government•s decision not to give financial support was 
based on the argument that CHP/District Heating schemes should be 
advanced by the private sector. The decision was not based on notions 
of energy efficiency or on the projected energy savings and long term 
benefits of the scheme. The decision added to doubts about the future 
of the Cockenzie power station and the remaining deep coal industry in 
Scotland at a time when there was a public row over coal prices between 
British Coa 1 and the SSEB, and nearby Torness Advanced Gas-coo 1 ed 
Reactor (AGR) nuclear power station was coming on stream (FT, 
16-03-88:8) (see Chapter Four). Above all, the decision reflects the 
political objective of curtailing public sector initiatives regardless 
of costs or benefits whilst encouraging private sector investment and 
expansion in the energy sector, with the no tab 1 e exception of the 
nuclear industry, which still receives considerable government support. 
b) Contracting Out Engineering Work 
As part of the privatisation process British Coal have 
rationalised workshop capacity in the 1980s and increased •contracting 
out• of repair and maintenance work to private firms. In 1983, the NCB 
had 26 central workshops (see Table 3:4), with an annual turnover of 
£215 million, employing nearly 10,000 engineers and managers. The 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1983, para. 15.34) recommended 
closures. 
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'We consider that 26 workshops is too large a 
number to service the needs of the industry 
efficiently and economically. They are not located 
to the best effect and there is duplication of 
facilities'. 
Fallowing the 1984-85 miners' strike~ workshops were closed and 
their workforce was cut by over 3,500 (see Table 3:5). The number of 
workshops was cut from 26 to 11 by 13 closures, the transfer of three 
to Area control as jobbing shops, and the inclusion of repair work into 
Tredomen Engineering Limited, the wholly owned manufacturing subsidiary 
of BC. Tredomen was then closed in March 1988 111i th the 1 oss of 270 
jobs (Western Mail, 31-03-88:5). By March 1988, total workshop 
expenditure was reduced by £66.4 million, from £222.4 million in 1983/4 
to £156.0 million in 1987/8, a decrease of some 30 per cent. 
Reorganisation of central workshops was in line with MMC (1983) 
recommendations and changes in the total business operations of British 
Coal, which was seeking to become more competitive within the tighter 
external financial limits (EFLS) imposed on it by central government. 
British Coal's reasons for cutting workshop capacity are connected with 
its pit closure programme and financial limits, technological and 
organisational changes, and the political pressures to increase 
contracting out throughout the state sector. 
The Effect of Pit Closures and Financial Constraints on 'In House' 
Engineering 
Between 1978/9 and 1987/8 some 129 collieries were closed, and the 
total number of "men on colliery books" declined by almost 130,000 (BC, 
1987/8:18-19). Overcapacity in world coal markets, the loss of 
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traditional coal markets~ Britain•s PWR nuclear programme and the 
threat of cheap coal imports, low oil prices~ are current and potential 
future constraints on British coal demand. Setting output targets in 
line with static demand, with an emphasis on lowering operating costs, 
translates productivity increases into more pit closures. 
Workshops located in areas of numerous pit closures are liable to 
closure themselves. Without the patients why have the engineering 
hospitals? This was the logic of the •vicious circle• behind the 
rationalisation of Scotland•s central workshops. Bogside, Polkemmet, 
Frances, Comrie, and Killoch pits were closed, quickly followed by 
Lugar and Newbottle workshops. In 1979, three workshops employed 1,000 
workers in Scotland, but by 1987 there was only the Cowdenbeath 
11 jobbing shop 11 left with 114 employees (Saville and Kerevan~ 1987). 
These closures were designed to reduce costs, especially labour costs, 
and improve short-term financial viability of sc•s total business at a 
time of reductions in government finance to nationalised industries 
(for further details see following Chapters). 
Technological and Organisational Changes and their relevance to BC 
Engineering 
The combination of a 11 free rna rket 11 government philosophy, tighter 
financial controls and depressed coal markets have influenced Bc•s 
whole corporate strategy in the 1980s. BC has continued to concentrate 
coal production in larger 11 super pits 11 and on the most productive seams 
in the 11 central coalfields 11 • These measures are designed to reduce 
costs so that coal is mined at 11 the right price 11 • But the tendency to 
compare British Coal with international spot market prices for coal, 
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including cheaply mined opencast coal and coal dumped at below cost~ 
means that the right price is very low (see Chapter Four). 
In addition to pit closuresg BC have introduced heavy-duty 
machinery and el ectroni ca lly controlled and integrated mining systems 
to raise productivity (see Chapter five). These technical changes have 
reduced the amount of equipment leaving pits for major overhaul in 
surface workshops. Remote control monitoring techniques enable 
colliery management to monitor machine health and performanceg mine 
environments and the production process from surface control stations. 
More powerful s robust machinery has been designed to spend all its 
working life underground, and its manufacturers are increasingly 
responsible for the operati anal efficiency of their machines after 
installation. To win contractss suppliers have had to design long life 
equipment. There is also more stress on modular designs for rapid 
machine dismantling and removal of plant to new faces without it being 
brought to the surface. 
All these technical changes were introduced to move the industry 
closer to continuous production and to reduce non-productive 
refurbishment costs. The 11 refurbishment cycle 11 is costly in both time 
and capital expenditure. It comprises six main phases - installation 
of equipments production, salvage from the mine, 11 dirty plant pool 11 , 
workshop overhaul, return to 11 clean plant pool 11 for eventual 
installation at another or the same mine. A typical example is the 
life cycle of power loaders. One power loader may spend 50 weeks at a 
collierys ten to 12 weeks in the dirty pool, another 12 weeks in the 
workshops, followed by 20 weeks awaiting re-use in the clean pool. 
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After the MMc•s (1983, para. 15.9) recommendation for 11 stringent 
targets .. on refurbishment costs9 BC have increased in situ maintenance 
and monitoring at most mines. 
To carry out these changes workshop functions and spatial 
operations were reorganised. Since September 1985, they have acted as 
specialist product repair shops operating on a national basis as 
opposed to general jobbing shops taking in work from collieries within 
their local division or area (also see Chapter Five~ Section 5.4). 
Each workshop deals with two or three major items in volume rather than 
a great variety of products in small batches or one off jobs as they 
used to. Remaining workshops have also increased direct technical 
assistance to collieries. Seven workshops have liaison engineers to 
coordinate technical assistance to all BC pits, and mobile teams :are 
available to carry out fault diagnosis, on-site repairs, install and 
commission new coal faces, and supply sub-assemblies when necessary 
(see Table 3:6). Colliery jobs have also been rearranged to 
accommodate new technology. BC has replaced many craftsmen with fewer 
multi-skilled maintenance workers, and machine operators are trained to 
do minor repairs. 
A Commercial Challenge - Contracting Out and the Case for Competitive 
Tendering 
Arguments for increased contracting out to private companies were 
advanced by NEoo•s Economic Development Committee on the mining 
machinery industry. 
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•rhe NCB spends roughly £215 million annually at 
its central workshops and a further £500 million on 
rna i ntenance etc. at the mines; economies made in 
these areas could feed through into additional 
equipment demands• (NEDO~ 1984:5). 
The Coal Board have not~ however, always been wholly in favour of 
contracting out to the private sector. As the MMC (19839 para. 15.44) 
found, the Coal Board claimed that external contracts 
•would adversely affect the ability of specialist 
workshops to provide the type, extent and 
flexibility of service required for their colliery 
customers. • 
They added that work should be sub-contracted only outside during 
peak-load periods or when specialist needs can only be met by the 
original manufacturers. Significantly the NCB claimed that repair 
charges were in excess of those charged by central workshops. Whilst 
the MMC (1983) 11 did not challenge this evidence 11 , which was contrary to 
the government•s wish to extend private sector involvement, they 
stressed, 
•we consider it too limited for an equitable 
judgement to be made.• 
Although private suppliers have won more after-sales service 
contracts since 1984/5, central workshops still carry out the bulk of 
repair and maintenance work for BC in 1988. As Bishop, sc•s Head of 
Workshop Operations, stressed, the initial purchase price of equipment 
is only a small part of the total cost of ownership. Apart from 
maintenance costs at pits, the corporation spent some £210 million on 
major overhauls of underground machinery, of which some £150 m was 
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spent in its own workshops. £60 million was spent by original 
manufacturers and other outside contractors (The Mining Engineer9 May 
1988:493). 
British Coal's workshop network is a feature of the nationalised 
industry which is not found in other coal producing nations. Certainly 
the coal companies of the predominantly private western coal industries 
are unable or unwilling to support in-house engineering workshops on 
anything like the same scale as the Coal Board. The coal industry has 
been able 
'to buy9 operate and maintain equipment in a way 
that most overseas mining companies find 
uneconomic' (NEDO, 1985:45). 
In the United States some large organisations like Baker Mine Services, 
Penn Machine or Joy have fairly big repair facilities on offer for 
coal companies, but nothing compared with British Coal. One of the 
major coal concerns, Peabody, has no in-house repair facilities and 
everything goes out to competitive tender to small contractors. Jim 
Walter Resources has set up a number of collieries with central 
engineering workshops, but the majority of producers use engineering 
contractors. In the USA there is an extensive secondhand market in 
mining machinery, and a number of companies specialise in buying up 
surplus machinery, overhaul it and offer it for re-sale. 
Historically, the Coal Board has not allowed its engineering 
workshops to tender for outside business, and has allowed only the odd 
small batches or one off items to be manufactured in house. Saville 
and Kerevan's (1987) analysis shows in-built rigidities in the 
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nationalised industry framei.I'Jork which prevented a full utilisation of 
local engineering skills and resources. The top-down bureaucratic 
structure stifled local initiatives, and increasing centralisation of 
purchasing and stores and management control 9 from the 1960s onwards, 
gave little freedom for workshop personnel to run their operations as 
they sav11 fit. Tight budgetary constraints and a flawed accounting 
system meant that workshops were considered to be areas for 
economising9 rather than increased capital investment, by Coal Board 
accountants and senior management. 
Whilst outside tendering by the state sector has not been openly 
encouraged by a government preferring private sector expansion, limited 
tendering has been permitted, which may be a prelude to workshop 
privatisation. In 1987/88, workshops did jobs on contract for Boulby 
potash mines in north east England, and have repaired mining machinery 
for manufacturers who have sub-contracted to sc•s workshops. Workshops 
are also able to provide some services unavailable elsewhere, such as 
load testing of power loader gearheads, AFC and belt conveyor 
gearboxes. 
British Rail Engineering 
The case of British Rail Engineering Limited (BREL) makes 
interesting comparison with sc•s own engineering workshops. BREL, 
formerly a wholly owned subsidiary of British Rail, has, like the 
central workshops, undergone a complete business reorganisation in the 
eighties. In common with BC this has been characterized by plant 
closures and a workforce reduction from 31,000 to 7,500 people in just 
seven years. BR 1 s Board decided to split BREL•s operations into new 
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construction (contracts at home and abroad) and repair work (British 
Rail). Eventually BR announced the sale of BREL to the highest private 
bidders~ although BR would keep the company's routine maintenance and 
repair activities as a separate business. 
In preparation for market flotation, BREL started slimming for 
profits. Redundancies of around 2,600 workers were made at both the 
Shi 1 don and Swi ndon BREL factories. There were further redundancies 
elsewhere. In Doncaster, BREL employment fell from 3,200 employees to 
only 1,400 between 1986 and 1988. Its operations were split up into 
three companies, the Doncaster Wagon Works (employing 680)~ was taken 
over by a management consortium, British Rail Maintenance Limited (630 
people) and the National Stores Depot (100 people) both remained part 
of British Rail. The town lost BREL's apprentices' training school, 
which was taking in 120 students in 1980. 
In preparation for BREL's privatisation, the BR Board introduced a 
competitive tendering policy in 1985/6. By then it was operating a 
11 leaner11 in-house engineering capability from premises in Doncaster, 
Wolverton (near Milton Keynes), Eastl eigh (near Southampton) and 
Glasgow (FT, 17-05-86:22). The new policy enabled private firms to 
compete for contracts against BREL. All contrasts were awarded on the 
lowest bidder criterion, whether to in-house plants or outside firms, 
although it still managed to win around 70 per cent of the total orders 
placed by British Rail between 1985 and December 1987. During 1987 
some £14 million in contracts were lost to external private suppliers, 
and in spite of some success overseas BREL was operating at only 75 per 
cent capacity (FT, 30-11-87:11). 
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BREL is preparing for complete privatisation. A management-
employee buy-out team led by Peter Holdstock~ the chief executive 9 has 
financial backing from Trafalgar House and Asea Brown Boveri ~ the 
Swiss-S~:Jedish electrical engineering group. FKI Babcock already has an 
established presence in the manufacture of railway equipment and have 
stressed interest in BREL • s railway works at Derby 9 Crewe and York. 
Large foreign-owned corporations~ including General Motors (US) 9 and 
Mitsubishi and Kawasaki (Japan), are interested in establishing 
European manufacturing bases in preparation for the relaxation of 
intra-European trade restrictions in 1992 and the Eurotunnel project 
underway (The Sunday Times, 04-09-88:02). 
Privatisation of BREL is opening new avenues for international 
capital with no firm guarantee that headquarters• control will remain 
in the UK. BREL, like BC Workshops, has provided •in house• services 
on a non-profit basis for years. The introduction of competitive 
tendering has led to a rapid reorganisation and rationalisation of 
existing capacity. In both the case of BREL and British Coal Workshops 
this has meant substantial redundancies and several plant closures with 
the consequent 1 ass of apprenticeships. Internal enterprise schemes 
with limited resources and scope have proved unable to cope with the 
scale of job losses. Instead of being cross-subsidized as essential in 
house operations for the success of total business efficiency in the 
overall operations of the nationalised industries, they are now being 
treated as separate businesses and ones ripe for rationalisation. 
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3.8 Public versus Private Efficiency 
The examples of nationalised industry engineering workshops raise 
many questions concerning the role of state ownership, Undoubtedly~ 
the cut backs in the eighties are part of a political attack on the 
very notion of nationalisation, The government•s view of 11 efficiency 11 
is based purely on commercial profit and loss criteria. It is also 
short term profit or 1 oss ~ based on end of fi nanci a·l year results. It 
is important to clarify what criteria are used for determining 
efficiency, for different criteria can change the whole direction of 
public policy. As Huby and Hartley (1985) point out, efficiency could 
mean producing the same output with fewer resources~ including people 
(i.e. labour saving and cost reducing)~ or it could mean more output by 
employing the same or more resources. Alternatively, it could mean 
improvements in service quality. 
Whilst the government may cite the profitability of the Doncaster 
Wagon Works as a triumph of private sector efficiency, it is important 
to point out that the Wagon Works were profitable as an in house 
facility providing rolling stock for British Rail (Interview : Day~ AEU 
District Secretary, June 1986). It is true that competitive tendering 
and the sale of in house public facilities have created wider market 
opportunities for private capital investment and profits. But there is 
nothing axiomatic in the argument that private means profits, public 
means losses. 
More to the point, should private sector profits, shareholders• 
dividends and lower consumer prices be the only measures of efficiency 
after privatisation? In the case of British Rail, long term research 
- 117 -
is required to find aut the effects of se 11 offs and competitive 
tendering on BR's total business performance and its passenger service. 
Many would also argue that the immediate net loss of jobs 9 the loss of 
public sector apprenticeship training 9 and the reduction in the number 
of skilled employees in local labour marketsg in times of high 
unemploymentg represent substantial social and hidden costs that should 
be 11 part of any sensible definition of efficiency.. (see Rentoul 9 
1987: 17) 0 
Political arguments have crystallized and polarized into promoting 
the virtues of private enterprise per se versus the vices of state 
owned monopolies or public sector provisiong and vice versa. This has 
diverted attention away from consideration of proposals to change the 
structure and organisation of existing public sector services which 
includes a better utilisation of existing in house skills, expertise 
and resources. State owned industries were from the very beginning 
constrained by their own nationalisation act, ambiguous commercial 
functions and by the financial and product pricing constraints of 
successive governments. Allen (1981 :117) argues that state owned 
industries have suffered from their ambivalent 11 hybrid 11 status, which 
has led to bad entrepreneurship. 
'Through ambivalence towards its purpose, through 
the advice given by governments and the contra 1 s 
they imposedg through its own incompetence, the 
National Coal Board was a bad entrepreneur. While 
successive successful capitalists were 
diversifyingg integrating, ensuring control t)f 
supplies and outlets, the NCB was moving in an 
entirely opposite direction. This did not occur 
because the coal industry was not and is not a 
capitalist undertaking but is a nationalised 
indus try for if the coa 1 indus try had not been 
simply publicly-owned but organised to serve 
society then the Government would have allowed none 
of the options which the NCB took.' 
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Proposals advocating outside tendering to make nationalised 
industries more self~financing have been pushed aside or ignored by 
both governments and top level management within those industries. It 
is a sign of the times that British Coal workshops are becoming more 
commercially adventurous in the run up to what the Conservative 
Government hopes will be the complete privatisation of the industry if 
it is re-elected in the 1990s. As Bishop {1988) noted 9 outside 
tendering 
•has always been a politically sensitive area. 
People in Westminster do not like British Coal 
getting involved in things other than mining coal 9 
but we have now started to put our toe in the 
water 9 particularly in the field of mining 
machinery. • 
A positive set of proposals for improving the financial viability 
of workshops9 and providing employment and training were set out in 
Saville and Kerevan•s {1987) 11 action plan 11 for Cowdenbeath workshop. 
They argue that the workshop could be organised to produce a range of 
mining machinery, particularly equipment designed for faulted and steep 
seam mining conditions similar to those found in parts of the Scottish 
coalfield 9 and exported to coal producing countries like the USSR and 
Yugoslavia where similar conditions prevail {see Chapter Five9 Section 
5.4). In addition 9 the workshop could produce items such as cheaper 
underframes, skips and mine cars for British Coal as well as general 
engineering items for outside customers. They further proposed that 
four year engineering apprenticeships could be provided as part of an 
integrated scheme involving the Scottish Development Agency, regional 
and local authorities 9 public sector training bodies, local technical 
colleges, private firms, unions, and BC. 
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In the 1980s British Coal has chosen to sell off some of its 
non-mining assets and it has restricted its sights to short term 
financial fitness at the expense of thousands of jobs. In its main 
business of coal mining it has adopted policies based on fewer and 
fewer collieriesg and an increasing concentration of productive 
capacity in the central coalfields of Yorkshire and the Midlands. 
Saville and Kerevan•s (1987) 11 action plan 11 is interesting because it 
offers an alternative approach to the utilisation of nationalised 
resources based on diversification~ a measure of competition against 
private sector firms, and maintaining employment and training. It also 
raises the possibility of using workshops for producing technology 
specifically designed for local mining conditions. As Chapter Five 
shows, British Coal has tended to adopt a highly centra·lised~ unilinear 
technological path since the late 1950s. Such a strategy has enabled a 
rapid rundown of productive capacity in the so-called peripheral 
coalfields, adding to the enormous social costs of those communities. 
Efficiency criteria based on short term financial performance have 
produced policies destructive of mining communities. They have also 
meant that some valuable assets and functions of non-mining elements in 
the coal industry have not been fully appreciated. An important aspect 
of the workshops• work is that it has been done on a non-profit basis. 
This is precisely because they have been providing an in house service 
and it is of no value over-charging different parts of the same 
organisation. No accounting system could reflect the economies secured 
by workshop personnel•s efforts to make machine repairs last over a 
long continuous period of use. Private manufacturers would have had 
much less incentive to work to such stringent cost parameters, and 
would be more inclined to charge for replacements rather than repair 
machinery. 
- 120 -
3.9 Redefining the Public-Private Sector Boundaries 
Labour•s nationalisation programme of 1945-51 was not the 
foundation for further expansion of state ownership. In fact, the 
Labour leaderships following the Attlee government became stubborn 
opponents of any significant extension of state ownership. Even when 
they re-nationalised steel in their second spell as government 
(1964-70) after World War II 9 they ~Jere anxious not to appear a 
doctrinaire party bent on nationalisation on principle. Successive 
governments, both Labour and Conservative, did not attempt a wholesale 
redefinition of the boundaries of the mixed economy established under 
the A ttl ee government. Even though the Conservative Party stands as 
the party for private enterprise, it was not until the Thatcher 
government after 1979 that attempts were made to roll back the 
boundaries of state ownership throughout the public sector. 
It is no longer any secret that the Thatcher government intends to 
privatise the coal industry following the completion of electricity 
privatisation. Many observers and people connected with the industry 
have 1 ong suspected that co a 1 privati sati on was high on the 
government•s political agenda. John Moore, when he was Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury, declared in autumn 1983, 11 No state monopoly 
is sacrosanct 11 , and he listed coal as one of several likely candidates 
for privatisation to a gathering of City stockbrokers. Whitfield 
(1985) stressed how significant victory over the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM) in 1984/5 was to the government•s privatisation plans 
for the industry. At the time Ian MacGregor was NCB Chairman. He had 
built up his business reputation in the USA as chief executive and 
shareholder of Amax, a multinational mining conglomerate, and there is 
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no doubting his preferences for private ownership. In December 1984~ 
MacGregor claimed it would be 11 Wonderful 11 to sell off 11 uneconomic" pits 
to miners. In The Enemies Within (1986:67) he argued that: 
'Nationalised industries were created by 
well-meaning people~ but are~ in the mains 
inefficient~ uvermanned and heavily dependent on 
public funds. Mrs. Thatcher has been right to seek 
to make them more responsive and efficient and to 
keep them that way by privatising them ... Far from 
being the 'family silver'~ as one articulate but 
perhaps ingenuous politician described them~ most 
of them are - or were unti 1 recently - family 
millstones, dragging down not only themselves but 
also the whole economy.• 
MacGregor's successor as head of British Coal, Sir Robert Haslam, has 
proved to be more ambiguous in his references to privatisation, but has 
never ruled it out. Shortly after taking office he stated, 
'Privatisation on an individual colliery basis 
would be a mistake, but I am not against 
privatisation11 (The Guardian~ 12-11-86:36). 
There are several strands to the preparation of the coal industry 
for privatisation. Firstly, there is the sale of ancillary mining 
related businesses and increased contracting out to the private sector, 
as discussed above. Secondly, there is the whole business of improving 
the productivity, short term cost competitiveness, and financial 
fitness of the whole organisation, particularly deep mining (see 
Chapter Five). Thirdly, there is 'the liberalisation' of the UK coal 
market and expansion of private investment into BC's primary business 
of working and getting coal. The latter includes relaxing British 
Coal's monopoly and regulations on existing private operators, such as 
the large engineering contractors on BC's Opencast Executive sites and 
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the numerous small licensed mine companies (see Chapter Seven). As 
shall be discussed with reference to public-private sector relations in 
the deep mining industry9 privatisation can be a double-edged sword9 
benefitting some sections of private capital but weakening others 
dependent on the monopolistic home market (Chapter Six). Before 
examining the public-private sector interface in the coal industry in 
more detail it is necessary to examine other external relations and 
pressures acting upon the nationalised industry9 in particular the role 
of the state 9 and the fluctuations in energy demand and supply. This 
is the purpose of the following chapter. 
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FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES 
(1) Herbert Morrison was the Labour Leader of the London City 
Council at the time of the setting up of the London Passenger 
Transport Board which ended the free-for-all chaos of the 
former system. The basis of the new system with a Public 
Service Board at its head was outlined in Morrison's 1933 
book "Socialisation and Transport"s which influenced Labour 
plans for the nationalised industries. 
(2) The Coal Research Establishment is involved in other projects 
with promising commercial prospects. It has successfully 
demonstrated the Liquid Solvent Extractions (LSE) process. A 
2.5 tonne/day pilot plant at Point of Ayre in North Wales has 
been established to manufacture transport fuels from coal. 
The £30 million project is being carried out in collaboration 
with Ruhrkohle. Other CRE work includes research into 
gasification and carbonisation. CRE are also involved in 
scientific studies of environmental problems of coal use in 
collaboration with Scandinavian scientists and the CEGB (BC.s 
1987/8:15-16). 
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TABLE 3:1 
NCB Turnover 1984 
Mining activities 
Mining related activities 
Manufacturing coke and 
smokeless fuels 
Chemicals and secondary 
by products 
Distribution of solid fuel 
Distribution of heating 
applicances 
Estates and Land 
Engineering 
Computer Services 
Total of mining related activities 
Source NCB Annual Report 1983/84 
£ m 
49551 
239 
30 
209 
113 
2 
12 
28 
633 
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TABLE 3:2 
British Coal Subsidiaries and Ancillaries 1987/88 
Principle Subsidiaries 
Coal Products Limited* 
National Smokeless Fuels Ltd. 
Thomas Ness Ltd. 
National Fuel Distributors Ltd. 
British Coal Enterprise Ltd. 
Other Subsidiaries 
Main Activity 
Holding Company 
Manufacture of 
smokeless fuels 
Manufacture of chemicals, 
by-products, etc. 
Solid Fuel distribution 
Investment financing 
CIN Management Ltd. and subsidiaries Pension Fund 
+ Coal Developments (Queensland) Ltd. (89%) Coking coal joint venture 
Compower Ltd. 
EMS Thermplant Ltd. 
SFAS (Services) Ltd. (51%) 
*Interests held by Coal Products Ltd. 
Percentage 
in Australia 
Computer services 
Boiler design and 
ins ta 11 at ion 
Trade promotion 
Interest Main Activity 
Staveley Chemicals Ltd. 
Pitch Polymer Products Ltd. 
Hyload Inc. (registered USA) 
Aveley Methane Ltd. 
Bidston Methane Ltd. 
45% 
50% 
50% 
50% ) 
50% ) 
Manufacture of chemicals 
Leasing of factory premises 
and plant to Thomas Ness Ltd 
Manufacture and sale of 
'Hyload' 
Exploitation of gas from 
1 and fill sites 
+ Interest held by Coal Developments (Queensland) Ltd. 
Capricorn Coal Development Joint Venture 12% 
Interests held by British Coal Corporation 
British Fuels Ltd. 20% Solid fuel distribution 
British Mining Consultants Ltd. 50% 
Gwent Coal Distribution Centre 20% 
Mining and engineering 
consultancy services 
Solid fuel distribution 
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TABLE 3:3 
British Coal Research and Development Expenditure in 1987/88 
Mining research, development and 
demonstration 
Coal utilisation research 
Medical research 
Other 
Total 
EEC and ECSC grants 
Net Total 
£ million 
1987/8 
19 
24 
2 
45 
9 
36 
£ mi 11 ion 
1986/7 
16 
29 
2 
48 
10 
38 
- 127 -
TABLE 3:4 
Central Area Workshops by Area/Region 1983 
~JORKSHOP 
Cowdenbeath 
Newbattle 
Lugar 
Ashington 
Whi tburn 
Philadelphia 
Tursdale 
Allerton Bywater 
Carcroft 
Shafton 
Birdwell 
Elsecar 
Fence 
Duckmanton 
Blackwell 
Moorgreen 
Bestwood 
Swadlincote 
Ansley 
Trentham 
Cannock 
Kirk less 
Walkden 
Tredegar 
Mountain Ash 
} 
1 
l 
J 
J 
AREA WORKSHOPs• REGION 
Scottish } Scotland 
North East 
North Yorkshire 
Doncaster 
Barns ley 
South Yorkshire 
North Derbyshire 
North Nottinghamshire 
South Nottinghamshire 
South Midlands 
Western 
South Wales 
North East 
Yorkshire 
J East Midlands 
Lancashire and 
the West Midlands 
J ~Jales 
Tondu Kent 
Source The Mining Engineer, May 1988 
YEAR 
1984/85 
1985/86 
1986/87 
1987/88 
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TABLE 3:5 
Reduction in BC Workshop Capacity since 1984/5 
£ M 
222.4 
162.4 
155.0 
156.0 
INDUSTRIAL MANPOWER 
7 '1 06 
49758 
4,358 
3,515 
NUMBER OF WORKSHOPS 
26 Central Workshops 
13 National Workshops 
13 National Workshops 
11 National Workshops 
Source The Mining Engineer, May 1988 
WORKSHOPS 
ASHINGTON 
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TABLE 3:6 
Workshop Product Support for Collieries 1987/88 
LIAISON TEAM 
ENGINEER PERSONNEL 
YES 8 
ACTIVITY 
Power 1 oaders 
Roadheaders 
ALLERTON BYWATER YES 22 Roadheaders 
SHAFTON 
FENCE 
DUCKMANTON 
I~OORGREEN 
BESTWOOD 
TRENTHAM 
YES 7 
NO 23 
YES 20 
YES 38 
YES 5 
YES 10 
Power 1 oaders 
Coa 1 and Stone 
Loaders 
Powered Roof Supports 
Road headers 
Power loaders 
Roadheaders 
Power 1 oaders 
Source The Mining Engineer9 May 1988 
- 130 -
CHAPTER FOUR 
GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE AND EXTERNAL CONTROLS 
ON THE NATIONALISED COAL INDUSTRY 
•Energy industries within the public sector have 
been encouraged. and wi 11 be encouraged. to act 
commercially and efficiently within a strong 
framework of disciplines. The aim is to settle 
the financial framework of the nationalised energy 
industries to reflect the conditions of an open 
market as closely as possible' (memorandum 
submitted by DoE and NCB to Energy Committee~ 
1985/86). 
This chapter represents a slight departure from the previous two 
and subsequent chapters for it is mainly concerned with events outside 
the coal industry but of major importance to it. In fact no adequate 
explanation of changes within the UK mining industry can be made 
without consideration of the wider economic and political parameters 
within which the industry operates. Put simply, it is necessary to 
develop 11 a proper conceptualization of government-industry relations .. 
(O'Donnell, 1987). Or as Beynon et.al. (1986:28) put it, it is 
necessary to analyse 
•relations between the NCB's internal management 
decisions and the wider environment within which it 
operates, the connections between these decisions 
and government economic policies, and the operating 
constraints imposed upon nationalised industries as 
deliberate choices by governments•. 
As pointed out in Chapter Three, state ownership increased the 
role of the state in the running of important national industries. It 
was also stressed that the community only owns the nationalised 
industries to the extent it controls the government. At this point, a 
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further distinction should be made between "state ownership" and 
"government control ... The government is only one part of the stateg 
and is itself influenced by a great variety of powerful institutionsg 
i ncl udi ng the various branches of the ci vi1 service 9 The Treasury and 
big financial institutions 9 as well as powerful outside vested 
interestsg especially business interests. In factg the state as such 
does not exist. According to Miliband (1973:46) 9 
'What uthe state" stands for is a number of 
particular institutions which, together, constitute 
its reality, and which interact as part of what may 
be called the state system•. 
Thus, the nationalised industries are very much a part of Pthe state 
systemu, and they are influenced by the interaction of the various 
bodies and institutions within the system and by powerful vested 
interests acting upon the system. Government policies affecting each 
nationalised industry and relations between them are formulated within 
this framework. Government power is constrained by a whole range of 
external constraints and vested interests influencing and informing 
government policies. 
The significance of this view of the state system in a study of 
the British coal industry and its relations with outside supplies is 
that internal policies and external relations are heavily influenced by 
a whole range of relationships and constraints outside the mining 
industry. Furthermore 9 whilst there are limits on government power, 
the central government is able to impose direct constraints on the 
operation of the nationalised industries via its controls on prices 
charged and financial resources (public sector borrowing). Governments 
have also tried to use nationalised industries to secure other economic 
----~~~~~~ 
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and political goals9 such as improving the balance of trade 9 
anti-inflation policy through controls such as prices and wages 9 etc.~ 
which have had both intended and unintended effects on nationalised 
industries• performance. In the energy sector, the government is able 
to influence fuel policies without having any long-term national energy 
plans. Governments can do this through import controls (or the lack of 
them), through the regulation of relations between nationalised 
industries9 through a range of macro-economic policies affecting energy 
demand and supply, through regulatory controls and taxation on private 
sector operations, and through more direct controls and 11 political 
influence" on the public sector enterprises. Figure 4:1 is an attempt 
to simplify some of the major relations and constraints affecting Coal 
Board planning, policies. and relations with suppliers (for more on the 
latter see Chapters Five and Six). The following sections provide more 
details about the way in which coal industry restructuring can only 
really be understood within this broader conceptual framework. The 
period of most interest is since 1979, for it is in this time that 
consecutive Conservative Governments have sought to redefine 
public-private sector boundaries and relations, with profound 
consequences on the energy sector, particularly on the performance and 
f~ture viability of the deep coal mining industry. 
4.1 Fuel Policies and Financial Controls on the Coal Board 
Two of the major constraints acting upon the Coa 1 Board s i nee 
nationalisation have been beyond its control. These are the fuel 
policies adopted by successive governments, and the financial and 
pricing controls successive governments have imposed upon the coal 
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industry. Another consistent feature of the post-war period is that 
there has never been a coherent national energy policy. Within this 
context successive governments have allowed the deep coal mining 
industry to decline (Table 4:1 and Figure 4:2). A proper understanding 
of the long-term contraction in British coal production can only come 
from an analysis of the wider market constraints operating as the 
industry and of government-industry relations in the energy sector. 
To simplify mattersg the post-war history of the coal industry is 
divided into four main periods relating to the major phases in coal 
outputg employment, investmentg etc. Brieflyg 1947-56 was a period of 
massive coal investment and expansiong followed by 1957-73g an era of 
rapid contraction in deep mining capacity, then came the 1974 Plan for 
Coal and an upturn in coal investment and outputg followed by another 
sharp period of contraction in the 1980s. The purpose of the following 
account is to examine some important external constraints upon the coal 
industryg and not to give a comprehensive historical account of changes 
in the industry since nationalisation (see Ashworth, 1987). 
4.2 1947-56 
For the Attlee Government the coal industry•s performance was at 
the centre of their whole economic programme, and it was, as the first 
industry to be nationalised after the war, a test-case for their 
nationalisation programme. Thus there tt/as no shortage of funds for the 
industry in the first three years of state ownership. In 1950, the NCB 
introduced its first Plan for Coa 1, which was supposed to act as a 
production guide and capital expenditure outline for the industry until 
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1965. As coal was the dominant fuel source accounting for 
approximately 90 per cent of the nation•s fuel needs~ the Plan was of 
considerable importance to the energy future of Britain. In fact, by 
the late 1950s the Plan was becoming a massive irrelevance. Why? What 
were the implications of this sudden change for the NCB? 
The 1950 Plan estimated that some £635 mill ion would need to be 
spent on the industry. The emphasis was on capital expenditure at the 
collieries, including 250 reconstruction and amalgamation schemes, 22 
new deep mines and 53 new drift mines. During the first six years of 
the Plan, capital was readily available to the coal industry for its 
ambitious modernisation programme. In fact, according to one observer 
capital was 11 too readily available 11 • 
the industry has tended to look on the signing 
of blank cheques as the one and only solution to 
its problems in the knowledge that there was plenty 
more where that came from• (see Conner, 1962). 
In just five years the NCB invested £353 million, an average of nearly 
£60 million a year. By 1955, annua 1 capital expenditure was 
approaching £100 million (see Figure 4:3). Expenditure on major 
colliery schemes amounted to £40 million a year, that was 15 times the 
annua 1 amount prior to 1950. Although the NCB was progressing s 1 owly 
with its 11 maj or projects 11 , it continued to p 1 an ahead on the basis of 
its belief that coal output would continue to increase. In 1956, the 
NCB•s Investing in Coal, envisaged that some 230 million tonnes of coal 
would be produced annually between 1961 and 1965. It outlined further 
capital investment of some £1,000 million to be spent by 1965. This 
included some £550 million on major colliery schemes to create about 50 
m.t. 11 new capacity ... In fact, large amounts of capital expenditure is 
~ 135 -
needed in any extractive industry~ particularly deep mining. New 
capacity is needed to maintain output as older collieries became more 
difficult to work and other pits were closed due to exhaustion. 
According to Schumacher (1957)~ who was then the NCB's economist, the 
Coal Board was having to replace about four to five million tonnes a 
year just to stand still. He compared the task facing the industry to 
"running up a downward escalator". 
Even though large amounts of capita 1 expenditure were necessary 
simply to maintain output levels, the NCB were investing capital to 
expand capacity. To do this they had to invest on the basis of long 
lead times between the start of a major capital investment commitment 
and the start of actual coal production. For instance, it could take 
anything between eight to fifteen years between sinking a new pit shaft 
and production at new coalfaces. This partly explains why, out of 167 
major schemes started by the NCB since 1947, only 20 were complete by 
1955 9 that is all but £11.5 million of £128 million spent were still 
not completed capita 1 investment projects. The fact that the Coa 1 
Board were having to plan, invest, and operate to such long lead times 
meant that a sudden change in energy demand leading to a drop in coal 
sales could literally wipe out £millions of capital expenditure on 
projects started many years previously. This is precisely what 
happened in the late 1950s. 
What is of interest here is the lack of coordination between the 
state's fuel policies and the long term plans presented by the Coal 
Board. In 1955, the Conservative Government announced its intention to 
supplement coal supplies with other kinds of energy, including atomic 
energy and oil (Reid, Allen & Harris, 1973:16). Yet the NCB was 
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allowed to pursue its expansionist policyg and to borrow capital at 
high rates of interest from the government when it was already saddled 
with paying back compensation to the old private owners. Furthermore, 
the NCB was unable to charge the prices it wanted to for its coal. 
From the time the NCB was established the government interfered in its 
pricing arrangements, which made it impossible for the Board to operate 
independently at arm's length from government. As Lord Ezra 9 the 
former NCB Chairman (1971-82) noted 9 
'Right from the start, the underlying i'tiorrisonian 
principle was breached. In spite of the explicit 
intention of leaving it to the management 
themselves to fix the prices for their products, 
having regard to the public interest, the 
Government persuaded the Coal Board to continue the 
''gentlemen's agreement" reached with the former 
coal owners during the war to peg prices at their 
1939 level. Thus coal prices in Britain were kept 
well below the world market level throughout the 
Attlee Government, and indeed until 1957 when ... the 
market situation fundamentally changed through the 
influx of large quantities of oil from the Middle 
East • (Ezra, 1987: 39) • 
Coal price pegging meant that the world market pri~e was well over 
the price of domestic coal, up to £2 a ton higher. This meant that the 
NCB was unable to reap full benefits from coal sales when there was a 
shortage of coal in Britain and on world markets. Between 1946 and 
1956, the NCB produced some two bi 11 ion tons of co a 1 , which as Ezra 
(1987) pointed out, would have built up a substantial financial reserve 
for the coal industry at a time when it was beginning to face severe 
price competition from cheap oil and gas imports. Ezra estimated that 
the industry lost at least £2,000 million of justifiable revenue in the 
first decade of state ownershipg and £500 million in the period up to 
1975 (Investor's Chronicle, 12-12-76). In common with pther 
nationalised industries, the NCB did not receive any compensation from 
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price restraint~ and its capital investment programme was undoubtedly 
limited by lack of internal resources in the late 1950s and throughout 
the sixties. 
Another problem for Britain's nationalised industries was that 
they were restrained from borrowing from the private capital market~ 
which meant that they had to borrow from the government and often at 
higher rates of interest than could have been obtained in private 
sector financial markets. This made the achievement of its commercial 
objectives more difficult, particularly during times of increasing 
competition from alternative fuels. Its financial targets were 
outlined in Clause 1 (4)(C) of the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act of 
1946~ which stated that its revenues should 
•not be less than sufficient for meeting all their 
outgoings properly chargeable to revenue account on 
an average of good and bad years'. 
In the second decade of nationalisation this modest target became 
increasingly difficult to achieve. 
4.3 1957-73 
Inland coal consumption reached a post-war peak of 221 m.t. in 
1956. In the three years to 1959, total coal consumption (including 
exports) declined by 33 mt. More ominously, seven power stations had 
converted to oil. Nevertheless, 1956-59 was another peak capital 
investment period for the NCB (see Figure 4:2). This included some new 
major schemes and a large investment in plant and machinery (see 
Chapter Five). 
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By 1960 the NCB's view of the prospects for the coal industry had 
changed from over-optimism into despondency. Schumacher ( 1960) began 
to warn against the closure of collieries l:Jith substantial reserves 
left in them and against fuel policies over-reliant on what he termed 
the "fleeting convenience" of cheap imported oil and natural gas from 
North Africa and the Middle East. Suddenly the NCB was abandoning 
projects in which it had sunk £millions such as Rothes and Glenochil in 
Scotland. As Conner (1962:63) put it, 
'It may be that the artificial market conditions 
which prevailed throughout the world in the 
immediate post-war years lulled those responsible 
for formulating and directing broad coal policy 
into a fa 1 se sense of "demand security 11 and, in 
consequence, influenced developments in the obvious 
and orthodox direction almost to the exclusion of 
the new'. 
Having allowed the Coal Board to continue its massive investment 
projects, including some costly holes in the ground that were abandoned 
before completion, the government was unwilling to restrict fuel 
imports. This led Will Paynter, the NUM Secretary, to warn at the 1960 
Miners' Conference, that the Conservative Government was attempting to 
break up the nationalised coal industry, first by competition with 
foreign oil, then by making the Commons annually responsible for how 
much money should be made available to the NCB, and finally by making 
individual pits competitive against each other for their very survival. 
The NU~J called for restrictions on oil imports and use, a hault to 
power station conversions from coal to oil, and for a merger of coal 
distribution into the nationalised industry framework (see Hall, 
1981:78-82). 
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In spite of limited government measures to slow down the rate of 
the NCB•s rationalisation~ including a tax on fuel oil adding 2 pence 
to every gallon in the 1961 budget and measures to prevent steel 
companies importing cheaper coking coal from overseas, the early 1960s 
witnessed a big increase in pit closures. Between 1959 and 1963 there 
were 126 closures, and between 1963 and 1967 there were a further 173 
closures. Whilst there were some 174 pit closures in the first decade 
of state ownership, there was a qualitative difference between many of 
those and the later closure programme. Earlier closures concentrated 
on pits nearing the end of their working life or where local geology 
was especially difficult~ and on low productivity pits where labour 
could easily be transferred to higher output pits in the same 
localities. From 1956 onwards the pattern changed, more and more pits 
were closed deliberately to lower NCB operating costs and cut capacity, 
and this included many pits that had received substantial investment in 
the first decade and that had plenty of estimated working years left in 
them. 
During the sixties the NcB•s capital investment programme become 
more highly selective. Shortly after taking up his position as NCB 
Chairman, Lord Robens told miners that, 
•no one owed them a living, and that the only route 
to a better life was by concentrating output on the 
best pits in the most productive coalfields•. 
Two years and 50,000 fewer mining jobs later, he told the 1962 Miners• 
Conference, 
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• This is not an era of coa 1 at any price - that 
ended in 1957 - we are in the era of hard selling 
based on price, quality and service ... • (quoted in 
Ha 11 , 1981 : 110) • 
Young men who were enticed into the industry in the mid-1950s by Coal 
Board slogans such as ~coal mining gives you a job for good 11 sudcienly 
discovered how transient such promises were. 
Unfortunately the NCB had no freedom to reduce coal prices for it 
was limited in its ability to borrow from the government. In contrast, 
the multinational oil companies were able to transport oil in huge 
tankers and they had the flex i bi 1 i ty to offer discounted prices in 
order to get a share of the European energy markets. Coal also lost 
traditional markets due to technical changes in the rail and steel 
industries. In the sixties, British Rail demand for coal fell from 
almost ten million tons in 1960 to only 140,000 tons per annum by 1970 
as a result of the switch from steam to diesel. Natural gas began to 
displace coal, and the state•s commitment to an expensive civil nuclear 
power programme meant that by 1970, nuclear stations produced 22.8 
million kilowatt hours of electricity, which was enough to displace 9.4 
m.t. of coal per year or nearly 18,000 mining jobs (Robens, 1972:179). 
Most accounts of the post-war coal industry concentrate on an 
analysis of the changes in energy demand and supply, particularly as a 
result of oil •s price advantages over coal (see Robinson, 1988). It is 
important to point out, however, that market conditions can to a large 
extent be influenced by government policies. In particular, through 
adjustments to external controls on and relations between nationalised 
fuel suppliers and fuel buyers the government could have attempted some 
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measure of long term fuel planning. What is obvious is that neither 
the Conservative nor the Labour governments of the sixties were 
interested in doing this. Official thinking in government, relevant 
government departments, in the Treasury and among non-coa 1 industry 
"energy experts 11 , was that oil was plentiful, prices would remain lower 
than coal well into the future and oil supplies were secure. 
Incidentally, this was also the thinking in decision-making circles of 
other European coal producing nations, all of whom reduced coal's share 
of domestic energy consumption to below 50 per cent by 1965 
(Schumacher, 1974). 
It was a Labour Government that presided over the peak period of 
colliery closures in the late 1960s. In opposition, Labour's National 
Executive under Harold Wilson had argued strongly in favour of 
integrating fuel policies and for a strong national coal industry. 
This was when they needed the miners' support to get into office. Once 
in power. they did very little to reduce Britain's growing dependency 
on imported fuels. Whilst one of Labour's first acts in 1964 was to 
write off a £415 mi 11 ion debt to the Exchequer, a number of other 
policies made matters worse for the NCB. Most revealing was the Wilson 
government's determined adherence to the Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor 
(AGR) construction programme. One of the most damaging and symbolic 
blows to the coal industry was the decision to go ahead with the 
construction of Hartlepool nuclear power station right in the middle of 
the North East coalfield. At a time of rapid colliery closures, a 
coal-fired power station would have helped maintain existing pits and 
jobs (TUISU, 1985). The NCB estimated that the Hartlepool AGR cost the 
Durham coalfield upwards of 5,000 jobs. 
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The Fuel Policy L~hite Paper of November 1967 projected that by 
1975 there would be only 159~000 employees in the industry, and that 
was some 2219000 people fewer than in 1967. It also projected that 
emp 1 oyment in the industry would be down to 65 ,000 peop 1 e by 1980 if 
production was to be reduced to 80 mt. The White Paper also envisaged 
an expansion in nuclear power which was relatively greater than that of 
any other energy contribution. It anticipated only a slight growth in 
gas consumption, and gave oil the major quantitative role. By the 
mid-seventies all the Paper•s assumptions and estimates had been proved 
wrong. Nevertheless, it continued to be influential amongst 
decision-makers in Government and Whitehall until oil prices rose 
during the early 1970s (see Robens, 1972). There was, partly as a 
result of the government•s view of Britain•s future energy mix, no 
attempt to intervene in the fuel market to prevent widespread pit 
closures. Between 1965/6 and 1968/9, the NCB closed over 200 
collieries, that is almost one pit every week for four years. 
Successive governments were lured by cheap and abundant oil 
supplies at the expense of a long-term national energy policy. The 
dominant argument was that security of energy supply should be sought 
through flexibility via diversification rather than dependence on a 
high cost indigenous fuel. The result was that coal was treated as 
"the residual legatee" after other fuels, which put pressure on the NCB 
to cut capacity in order to reduce supply to the level of demand. The 
way in which the Coal Board went about this task was heavily influenced 
by the tight financial parameters within which it had to operate. 
As noted above, during the era of peak coal consumption the price 
of coal was pegged artificially low as a matter of government policy up 
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to 1957. Applications made by the NCB for price rises were either 
delayed» ignored or only partially fulfilled. Lord Ezra (1987:40) also 
noted that the Coal Board was required to import dearer American coal 
and pay the price difference itself. 
1 This was an example of the Government imposing a 
social obligation on the coal industry much to the 
detriment of its commercial well-being•. 
Another problem for the Coal Board was its dependence on the government 
for finance and the Treasury • s method of a 11 ocat i ng resources to 
nationalised industries in the context of overall macro-economic 
policies, and not on an appraisal of each industry•s needs. The fact 
that the NCB had commi tteed £mi 11 ions of taxpayers • money on severa 1 
major projects that would never be completed without further finances 
made little difference to the Treasury•s approach. In turn» the 
financial resources allocated to the Coal Board was an important 
consideration for senior NCB managers when determining their 
rationalisation strategy. Through the application of wider economic 
and financial constraints the state is central in the production 
targets» financial plans and to the overall profitability of the 
nationalised industries (o•oonnell, 1985). 
It is in this light that the NcB•s (1959) closure target of 
between 430 and 500 pits should be viewed. The problem for the Board 
was how to order their capital expenditure programme. This was partly 
resolved by the method of categorizing pits into three main groups. 
•class A1 collieries were new mines and completed reconstructions, and 
were considered to be long life pits with a profitable future. •class 
s• pits had sizeable reserves, but their future prospects were 
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uncertain. They caul d either be promoted to the upper group if it 1r1as 
thought advisable to invest more in them~ or they could be relegated to 
the lower group~ which usually signalled imminent closure. 'Class C' 
pits were the ~no hopers~. Many were near exhaustion~ but others were 
categorised as "uneconomic" or 11 loss making" or had limited 11 realistic" 
reserves. 
The point about all the definitions used to select pits for either 
one category or another is that they are very elastic and open to 
various interpretations. The other crucial point is that definitions 
such as 11 economic" or "realistic" are partially determined by external 
financial and economic constraints that had little~ if anything, to do 
with the long term viability of production or management of strategic 
non-renewable resources. An industry in better financial shape than 
the Coal Board was in the 1960s would have sought to push more 'C' and 
'B' class collieries up the hierarchy by investing in them. And as 
O'Donnell (1987:71) has argued, capital investment was itself an 
important determinant of future pit productivity and profitability. 
'Whilst geological considerations play an important 
role in determining the NCB's hierarchy of pits it 
is also the case that once established it tends to 
be self-reproducing. That is to say, once a 
colliery is designated as a high performer and it 
is allocated capital expenditure then a virtuous 
cycle is created since investment leads to improved 
performance and yet more investment in the future'. 
In the sixties, the NCB was faced with over-production problems. 
As the market position for coal deteriorated more and more pits were 
deemed to be "loss making" or "uneconomic 11 and were relegated down the 
investment hierarchy. In practice, many of the pits that were closed 
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down \<Jere ones that had received substantial resources in earlier 
rounds of NCB investment when the fuel market position of coal was 
brighter. In other words~ pits were closed for short-term 
profitability reasons when a slight increase in oil prices would have 
made them very profitable. Occasionally pits in the Class 'C' group 
were given a stay of execution by the NCB. Local miners would be told 
that they have six months to raise productivity to a certain level to 
avoid closure. But very often such announcements seemed to be an NCB 
bluff in order to win time, for eventually the pits were closed down 
after local miners had made substantial productivity improvements 
( Ha 11 , 1981 : 112 )'~· 
Another important dimension of the NCB's whole policy is where 
pits were closed. It was during the sixties that closures were 
concentrated in the so-called "peripheral coalfields" of Scotland~ the 
north east of England, the North West and South Wales. Pit closures 
meant that miners had 1 i ttl e . choice but to transfer to neighbouring 
pits or move to the "central coalfields" under the NCB's pit transfer 
schemes, or to leave the industry altogether. This led to the break up 
of numerous mining communities, social dislocation, and pockets of 
unemployment in areas where closures were concentrated and few job 
alternatives were available (see House and Knight, 1967). 
The scale and pattern of pit closures, and indeed plant closures 
in other nationalised industries, reveals an important aspect of state 
ownership in practice. Not only were governments unwilling to 
intervene in fuel markets to slow down the contraction of the deep 
mining industry, there was no effort to use the big nationalised 
employers as instruments of regional policy. There was little attempt 
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by successive governments to influence the NCB's rationalisation plans 
in a way that would reduce the intensity of cut-backs in particular 
localities. Rather9 there seemed to be a tacit acceptance in 
Parliament~ except amongst a few MPs from mining constituenciesg that 
pit closures were the price to pay for cheaper fuel to serve the 
national economy~ and that contraction in older traditional industries 
like coal was somehow a necessary and inevitable part of a wider 
process of structural change in the national economy. In other words~ 
coal mining's demise was necessary to raise national competitiveness 
and to create a modernized and more diversified industrial base. Even 
the national executive 
inevitability of it all. 
of the NUM seemed to accept the sad 
Instead of opposing and questioning the logic 
of the pit closure programme, the NUM leaders sought to negotiate the 
pace and timing of closures (Hudson, 1986:169-214). 
The impact of the NCB's closure programme is evident if one 
considers specific coalfields. One of the areas most hard hit by 
closures was the Durham and Northumberland coalfield. Between 1956-74 
it lost two-thirds of its manpower, three-quarters of its pits and half 
its output. 73,000 mining jobs were shed and the number of working 
collieries was reduced from 109 to 34. Miners were transferred from 
closed pits in the west of County Durham to the east of the county and 
others moved to Yorkshire and Nottinghamshire. In Northumberland there 
was an attempt to regroup mining populations in the county council New 
Towns of Cramlington and Killingworth (House, 1969:111). 
From the late 1950s onwards the NCB was one of the major 
contributors to the deindustrialisation of the region and to the 
structure of employment within the north east's economy. As Hudson and 
- 147 -
Sadler (1986) have noted~ the decline in coal mining~ iron and steel 
(since 1967)~ and shipbuilding (since 1977)9 accounted for no less than 
80 per cent of the total net employment decline ·in mining and 
manufacture - i.e. over 200~000 jobs lost. Many of the new jobs 
created by branch plants attracted to the region were not for displaced 
males9 but were mainly low paid9 non-unionised jobs for women. The 
very scale of losses of predominantly male jobs created a local 
economic imbalance within the north east that proved to be a long-term 
problem. The problem was further compounded in the 1970s and 1980s as 
governments continued to allow massive capacity cuts in the 
nationalised industries as a means of achieving competitiveness. There 
was a definite conflict of interests between the macro-economic 
policies of the state and the national plans of state owned 
corporations9 and the interests of many coalfield communities. As 
Beynon et.al. (1986:28) observed, 
•conceived at one time as a way of furthering 
working-class interests, nationalisation has in 
practice become a mechanism to destroy jobs and 
communities•. 
4.4 Post-1974 
1974 marked another 11 SWitch back 11 for the coal industry due mainly 
to the 1973/4 oil price rises (Berkovitch~ 1977). The Plan for Coal in 
1974 was a tripartite arrangement between the NCB~ NUM and government. 
It set a target of 135 mt for 1985, of which 120 mt was to come from 
deep mined output. It was estimated that 40 mt additional capacity 
would be created at a cost of some £600 million. This would be on top 
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of an annual expenditure of some £70 to 80 millions which meant a total 
investment of £1 9 400 million over the decade to 1985 at 1974 prices. 
Of the new capacity to be createds some nine million tonnes was to come 
from extending the life of existing pitss another 13 mt from major 
improvement schemess whilst an additional 20 mt was scheduled from new 
mine developmentss including the Selby "super pit 11 complex (NCBs 1974). 
Following the 1974 Plan~ coal production increased steadily with 
modest increases in productivity between 1973/4 and 1980/1. It is 
important to stress that the Plan's predictions of coal output growth 
would only be feasible if the state was prepared to actively intervene 
in energy markets to ensure that the long-term proposals outlined in 
the Plan would be successfully carried out. The Plan was a plan "in 
name only" unless there was a measure of coordination between it and 
the other fuel industries. 
During the l 970s, the NCB found i tse 1 f in a position whereby it 
was able to invest in new productivity increasing capacity. The 
problem was that the productivity increases and new capacity would not 
show through until the eighties. The Plan's capital expenditure 
programme also added substantially to the NCB's cumulative debt burden. 
The programme was financed mostly by long-term fixed interest loans 
from the government. Interest payments amounted to ten per cent of the 
industry's capital liabilities and seven per cent of its turnover 
(O'Donnells 1987:72) (see Table 4:2). 
In the energy sector as a whole the Labour Governments of 1974-9 
continued to commit £billions to the nuclear programme. Permission was 
granted to build two new AGR stations and for a new reprocessing plant 
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at Windscale (see Hall~ 1986). Coal was facing increasing competition 
from natural gas~ which had increased its share of the energy market 
from five per cent in 1960 to 27 per cent in 1980. Labour also sought 
to expand North Sea oil production under 11 pub1 ic control". It embarked 
on policies designed both to increase state participation in industry~ 
and to collect a higher proportion of oil revenues as tax. A new 
national oil company- British National Oil Company (BNOC) - was set up 
in 1976 which would by 1981 have had a controlling stake in more than 
half the oil production in the UK fields. According to Porter et.al. 
(1986:65), this measure not only increased state control over the 
production of valuable non-renewable resources, it also opened the door 
for a sensible long-term depletion policy and for better use of the 
profits from oil. It is ironic that the main benefits of the 
substantial investment in the North Sea, both public and private, came 
after the defeat of the Labour Government in 1979. 
Coal demand was also hit by two more changes in the wider economy 
beyond the NCB•s control. As Robinson (1988) observed, the trend 
towards greater energy conservation and the introduction of 
energy-saving technologies increased following the OPEC oil price rises 
of 1973/4. More significantly in Britain, the rapid decline in 
Britain•s heavy industries and manufacturing base at the end of the 
seventies and early eighties led to a considerable decline in coal 
demand. But the second major period of coal closures in the NCB•s 
history was only partially due to changes in energy demand. Of more 
importance in the post-1979 context were the political and financial 
constraints imposed on the coal industry and within the energy sector 
by the Thatcher governments. 
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4.5 11 Market Forces'' and Energy Policy in the Eighties 
The purpose of this section is not to elaborate on the dynamics of 
the changing UK energy market~ as important as these are. Rather, it 
is to illustrate the importance of understanding how external 
government policies and direct interference in the nationalised 
industries have influenced coal industry restructuring in the 1980s. 
Never before has a government's broader political and economic 
priorities impinged so much on the running of a nationalised industry 
or on inter-public sector relations. Although successive Thatcher 
governments have been dogmatic in their adherence to a "free market" 
non-interventionist philosophy. they have interfered more in the 
organisation. control and performance of the coal industry than any 
previous government. 
The Thatcher governments have almost prided themselves on having 
no stated national energy policy (FT. 16-11-84:6). They have preferred 
supply oriented approaches based on a preoccupation with short term 
costs and end-of-year financial results. With the exception of a high 
degree of state protection for the nuclear programme all the 
non-renewable energy industries have had some degree of privatisation. 
In the late 1980s. only the electricity supply industry and the Coal 
Board remain in the public domain. And indeed. many of the government 
measures affecting the British energy sector in the eighties have been 
the result of preparation for or actual privatisation. or concerned 
with public sector borrowing and Treasury finance. 
Whilst the government has no stated national energy its whole 
economic programme was based on indigenous North Sea oil revenues. The 
- 151 -
liberalisation of the oil tax regime in 1983 was a deliberate attempt 
to encourage oil companies to exploit new oil fields in the North Sea 
and hence to step up production levels (and government dividends) (1). 
The government was fortunate that the main phase in capital expenditure 
on exploration and new oil platforms took place immediately after the 
OPEC oil price rises of 1973/4 before it came to office. In the period 
1980-85 there was a dramatic increase in oil production from UK•s 
continental shelf of some 60 per cenL By March 1985 the UK had 
overtaken Saudi Arabia as the fourth largest oil producer in the world 
behind the USA~ the USSR and Mexico. Unlike the OPEC producers, whose 
policies are based on notions of long-term profit maximization through 
conservation of their non-renewable reserves, Britain adopted a policy 
of maximum economic exploitation in the short-term to provide the 
Treasury with funds for macro-economic policies (Friends of the Earth, 
1985:13-14). Oil and gas receipts provided between 6-8 per cent of 
total government revenues between 1984-88. Nevertheless, the 
extraction rates encouraged by the government have restricted the 
period the UK will be self-sufficient in oil and gas by running down 
reserves today at the expense of tomorrow. 
The government has also privatised large parts of the oil and gas 
industry. In November 1982, the BNOC was split into two parts9 the 
production arm (BRITOIL), and a 51 per cent holding was floated on the 
stock exchange, comp 1 ete with its North Sea reserves. In June 1984, 
the British Gas Corporation•s North Sea holdings were converted into a 
private company, Enterprise Oil 9 and sold off, with Rio Tinto Zinc 
(RTZ) buying up a large share. In 1985, BNoc•s remaining 49 per cent 
stake in BRITOIL was privatised. In 1987, the government insisted on 
going ahead with the planned sale of its remaining 31.5 per cent stake 
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in British Petroleum (BP) despite the collapse of the share price in 
the wake of the stock market crash. As a result the government was 
embarassed by the fact that the Kuwait Investment Office (KlO) acquired 
a major shareholding of 21.68 per cent in BP (see Chapter Eight). 
It is useful at this stage to raise fundamental problems with 
Conservative government policy in the energy sector. In the first 
place7 the government•s belief in the superiority of private enterprise 
has led to privatisation policies that have increased the role of 
multinational companies (both UK-based and foreign owned) and overseas 
governments in national energy affairs. This ultimately restricts the 
ability of the British government to dictate national energy policy in 
future or indeed to ensure security of long term supply. Secondly, by 
allowing private companies to pursue their own interests, regardless of 
how short term or sectional they are7 the long-term development of the 
national energy sector may be hindered (see Chapter Eight). As the 
Coalfield Communities Campaign (CCC) (1986:349) put it, 
'This (government) policy has overlooked the fact 
that within the energy sector different companies 
have different interests and that in pursuing these 
interests the overall interests of the UK may not 
be served. The UK will rapidly run out of oil and 
gas and will sterilise its reserves of coal, on its 
current course 7 leaving it dependent on nuclear 
power stations and imports of fossil fuels'. 
4.6 Relations between the Coal Board and other 
Nationalised Industries 
11 Market forces•• and price competition between fuels in the UK 
energy market have always been important determinants of both economic 
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performance in the UK energy sector and of re 1 ati ons between pub 1 i c 
sector energy industries. But the Conservative governments since 1979 
have sought to instill the language of the market place more and more 
into the business priorities of the nationalised industries. This has 
been part of their financial objective of reducing public sector 
borrowing (and spending), and its more ideological one of extending 
private enterprise~ including private business management methods, into 
the state sector. 
As a direct consequence of government policies, the NCB (British 
Coa 1 s i nee 1986), has found its major pub 1 i c sector cus tamers, the 
British Steel Corporation (BSC) and the electricity boards, to be very 
tough in price negotiations. The policies of these customers have been 
contrary and very damaging to those pursued by the coal industry. 
Relations between the BSC and NCB in the north east of England 
were analysed by Beynon et.al. (1986) and Sadler (1986). Following the 
Plan for Coal (1974) the NCB began a capital expenditure programme for 
Durham • s coasta 1 pits producing high grade coking coa 1. The Co a 1 
Board•s long-term thinking was in line with Bsc•s expansion plans, 
particularly for its Redcar Works. But in October 1979 BSC suddenly 
changed its purchasing policy and it started to import foreign coking 
coal in preference to locally produced supplies. This reversal in 
purchasing policy is only logical if seen in the light of the 
government•s instructions to the BSC Board that the industry should 
break even financially by the Spring of 1980. This led BSC to seek 
ways to reduce its variable costs and to close down plants. In 1979 
the BSC management claimed the corporation was losing £135 million a 
year by buying coking coal from the NCB instead of importing it. As a 
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result of British Steel•s coal importation policy several coking coal 
collieries were closed in the UK~ and it was an important reason behind 
the decline in deep coal output in the north east from 14.1 million 
tonnes in 1980 to 11.9 mt in 1984~ and 10.2 mt in 1987. 
Undoubtedly the biggest worry for British Coal•s management in the 
late 1980s has been the future of its power station market for steam 
coal 9 which accounts for almost 80 per cent of total output. This was 
highlighted in the first half of 1988 by the public row between the 
British Coal Corporation and the South of Scotland Electricity Board 
(SSEB). As with BSC in the early eighties, the SSEB argued that it 
could buy coal from foreign sources up to 40 per cent cheaper than coal 
supplied locally by BC. The SSEB argued that it would tender outside 
the UK for its coal needs unless BC could match international spot 
prices for coal. The decision put the future viability of three of the 
four working deep mines left in Scotland and provoked an angry response 
from unions who claimed the SSEB were using "macho management•• 
techniques to force BC to lower its prices to increase SSEB revenues in 
the run up to privatisation (2). This was subsequently denied by the 
Secretary of State for Energy 9 Cecil Parkinson, who argued that it was 
perfectly legitimate for the SSEB to seek the most competitive sources 
for its coal (The IndeEendent, 8-3-88:5). 
In order to put the BC-SSEB arguments in perspective it is useful 
to consider how the relations between the two nationalised bodies has 
changed over the years. In the early sixties the SSEB took only one 
fifth of all Scottish coal output. This proportion increased as 
steelworks, shipyards and other heavy industries closed operations in 
Scotland, and more people moved away from using coal fires to gas and 
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electricity. In the late seventies the SSEB took three out of every 
four tonnes of Scottish coal produced. In 1977s the Labour Government 
formalised the relationship in a five year coal burn agreement. under 
which the state subsidised the SSEB for taking seven million tonnes of 
coal annually from local pits and agreeing on no imports. The 
Conservative Government sought to break up this cosy relationship 
between two state owned corporations. In 1982 it inspired an 
efficiency audit of the SSEB by Coopers & Lybrand, an accountancy firm, 
which concluded that the SSEB's relations were "potentially unhealthy" 
from a competitive perspective. The SSEB was advised to diversify its 
fue 1 sources. S i nee then the SSEB have won simi 1 a r tiered priced 
structures for BC coal to those won by the Central Electricity 
Generating Board (CEGB). 
The new aggressive style of the SSEB's management is a result of 
government policies. Firstlys the government has deliberately allowed 
major fuel using public sector industries to import coal or to use the 
threat of imported coal as a way of "disciplining" British Coal to 
become more competitive. Through the use of the international coal 
market the government has been able to keep a discreet political 
distance in the dispute between BC and the SSEB. The matter was 
treated as a purely commercial concern between two competitive 
corporations 9 and not as a concern affecting the future of the Scottish 
mining industry, its economy and long term energy security. 
Secondlys the nationalised industries involved were given 
conflicting goals by the government 9 which makes any lasting agreement 
over coal prices an uncertain prospect. On one side9 the electricity 
boards want the lowest possible fuel prices to boost their profits in 
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advance of market flotation. On the other side~ the Coal Board has a 
financial break even target and can not afford to charge coal prices 
too far belm'IJ cost. In the longer term~ BC 1 S management are preparing 
for privatisation which means they want long-term contracts to plan 
their capital expenditure programme into the 1990s with confidence. 
But the electricity utilities are unlikely to enter long-term 
commitments with BC until they have secured their own supply contracts 
with the 12 area boards that will distribute electricity to customers. 
Thirdly, the SSEB 1 s hard line position in 1988 is partly due to 
its own cost structure9 which like British Coa1 1 s, has been greatly 
affected by the nuclear programme. In 1986/7 the SSEB made £286 
million, but £240 million was gobbled up by interest charges. It made 
a bottom line profit on turnover of only 2.5 per cent. Furthermore, 
the SSEB spent over £2 bi 11 ion on the construction of the Torness 
Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR), and its big capital debts have added 
to its change in commercial policy. 
British Coal 1 s biggest problem in the early 1990s will be the 
price of foreign coal if the government continues to favour a 
completely 11 liberated 11 coal market. At the moment BC 1 s contract with 
the CEGB is the world 1 s biggest energy deal worth over £3 billion a 
year. But the CEGB is on record as saying that British port handling 
facilities could handle as much as 30 million tonnes of imported coal 
per annum by 1992/3 (FT, 22-02-88:8). New deep handling facilities on 
the major British estuaries, particularly the Thames and the Humber, 
would threaten the existence of the most profitable deep mines in the 
central coalfields. According to one study, by 1992 BC will produce 
between 73.5 mt and 80 mt of deep mined coal from no more than 48 
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collieries9 that is just over half the number of working collieries in 
mid-1988. Some 36 collieries and 519500 mining jobs could be lost as a 
direct result of electricity privatisation and around ten million 
tonnes of coal imports mainly through the Thames 9 Southhampton and 
South Wales (Dewhirst and Gladstone, 1988;46). Much would depend on 
international coal prices, BC productivity and prices, and the import 
handling capability of prices 9 as well as handling and inland costs. 
As Feickert (1987 9 para. 8.20:20) notes: 
•ro try to compete with dumped coal prices is like 
chasing a mirage. Recently ... South African steam 
coal has been selling in Europe at $28/tonne or 
around £0.69 a gigajoule. To allow highly unstable 
exchange rates to determine a production strategy 
is nonsensical •. 
Prior and McCloskey (1988) estimated that up to 40 pits could be 
closed by the early 1990s that would otherwise become internationally 
competitive if protected from foreign coal imports. Thi.s. would result 
from the realisation of anticipated productivity improvements in BC 
pits and the expected rise in world coal prices as European demand 
increases. As early as 1990 9 international spot coal prices may have 
risen to between $42 and $52 a tonne compared with $33.50 to $36.50 
paid by the CEGB on its spot tender in the summer of 1987. 
In the analysis of government-nationalised industry relations it 
is necessary to raise some fundamental issues affecting both the cost 
structure and competitiveness of the state owned industries, and to 
question the short term market forces approach. One obvious flaw with 
the use of international spot prices as a measure of British Coal•s 
competitiveness is that the international steam coal market accounts 
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for only about seven per cent of world consumption and it is not freely 
competitive (Labour Research9 1984; BC Press Release 9 07-03-88). Much 
of the global coal trade is controlled by big raw material 
conglomerates such as RTZ and by energy corporations like Shell 9 BP and 
Exxon~ whose coal fortunes are obscured by the overall business 
interests of the groups. Any expansion in imports increases the 
control of these MNCs over Britain•s energy supplies. It is also trueg 
that for a variety of political and economic motives some countries 9 
particularly South Africa, are willing to dump their coal at below the 
capital costs of production on the Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA) 
spot market (see Chapters Seven and Eight). 
As regards coal investment and production, there are long lead 
times before adequate financial and productivity returns are reaped on 
capital investments. The nature of deep mining means that it is 
extremely costly and technically difficult to reopen old mines. This 
has led McCloskey (1986:384) to argue that there is a need to take a 
long-term view when considering the profitability of BC pits. It may 
be much less expensive in the long run to subsidize pits to avoid 
closure now so that they will still be producing when world coal demand 
and coal prices increase 9 and when supplies of North Sea oil begin to 
fall off. There is nothing new in this argument. Schumacher said much 
the same in 1960~ but no government has ever taken action on such 
advice. Even though the Thatcher government does not believe in 
long-term, coordinated planning within the energy sector, it could save 
the life of numerous BC deep mines simply by restricting imports to 
coals for proven specialist needs, which would give BC time to improve 
productivity. 
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The disagreements over coal prices raises another important issue. 
Coal is the major raw material "cost" to the electricity boards and the 
prices paid by the boards is a source of 11 revenue" for BCo In turn the 
electricity boards get their revenues by generating electricity for 
consumers. The public sector enterprises are extremely interdependent 9 
but their cost structures and financial accounts are treated 
separately. This simple fact led Berry et.al. (1986:140) to raise the 
following point9 
•The accounts of enterprises in the energy sector 
can only be properly understood by taking account 
of their inter-dependencies (through a coherent 
energy po 1 icy) . Thus 9 reported accounting profit 
or losses do not reflect the economic performance 
of individual enterprises•. 
This has considerable implications for the coal industry where even 
interdependencies between pits are currently being ignored and each 
pit • s future depends increasingly upon short-term profi tabi 1 ity 
criteria. On a macro-scale it casts at least some doubt on the way the 
Treasury has allocated resources between state sector energy industries 
and their economic performance has been measured s i nee their 
nationalisation. 
4.7 Outside 11 Market Forces 11 - Nuclear Power 
It is ironic that the government•s own privatisation plans for the 
electricity supply industry (ESI) have exposed some basic flaws in its 
11 free market 11 philosophy. The most obvious of these is the proposed 
imposition of a statutory obligation on the privatised area 
distribution boards to maintain at least a fifth of their total 
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electricity fuel sources from nuclear power stations. Thus the British 
coal industry faces a double market squeeze from state protected 
nuclear power~ and from cheap fuel imports~ including oil, possibly gas 
from Norway, foreign coal~ and surplus electricity from the French 
nuclear power stations via the Cross Channel Link. 
One reason for "the necessity 11 of state protection for the nuclear 
industry is that it looks an unecon()mic prospect if left to the free 
market. The capital costs of the nuclear programme from construction 
to de-commissioning, reprocessing fuel, waste disposal~ and insurance 
costs, are too high for private operators to bear without substantial 
state subsidies. In the sixties, the enormous costs and losses 
sustained by the British Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR) programme 
were absorbed because of the existence of monopoly buyers and sellers 
within the state sector. In the United States the private sector would 
have been unable to cover the losses of the AGR programme either out of 
their equity capital or by loans. The debt would have had to be 
rescheduled and projects almost certainly abandoned (Sweet, 1983:26). 
The UK government have praised the virtues of the system of 
private power supply in the USA and have said that US capital would be 
welcome to invest in a privatised electricity industry in the UK, 
including private nuclear power stations. This position is in itself 
contradictory, for investor-owned electric utilities in the US have 
cancelled or abandoned 64 nuclear projects since the Three Mile Island 
reactor incident in March 1979. In fact, no new nuclear power plant 
has been ordered since 1978. Between 1980 and 1984, 53 nuclear power 
stations at 31 different sites were cancelled. The existing 125 
reactors - either operating, being tested, or being constructed - are 
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well below the 236 projected by utility companies in 1975 (OMNI, May 
1988:42, New Scientistg 7-4-88:24). 
Following the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power statio~ in 
1986 the costs from construction to decommissioning have risen sharply. 
The 11 Chernobyl factor 11 has heightened perceptions of economic risk and 
has also pushed up safety and insurance costs (FT 9 26-04-88:36). In 
November 1987, Coopers & Lybrand argued that concerns about financial 
risk and returns on capital would impede the growth of Britain•s 
nuclear capacity (FT, 18-11-87). The government would have to 
indemnify owners of nuclear power plant against any unfortunate 
eventuality. Furthermore, City of London advisers have informed senior 
~ 
cabinet ministers that the private sector would require at least,~.. ten 
per cent rate of return on capital from new nuclear projects because of 
the perceived risks involved. In early 1988 a nationalised industry 
ill 
was required to make onlykfive per cent real rate of return on capital 
on new projects after inflation. The CEGB 1 s own internal estimates for 
a proposed Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) at Hinkley would no more 
than break even (FT, 18-04-88:11). 
The Sizewell 1 B1 Public Inquiry took evidence before Chernobyl and 
the supposed economic benefits of a new PWR were based on assumptions 
about future energy demand based on rising oil and coal prices. These 
assumptions were wrong, and since then the International Coal 
Development Institute (1988) has argued that coal will be a more 
economic proposition for electricity generation than nuclear power for 
as long as coal costs are $65 per tonne or less at 1986 prices. Whilst 
the ICDI 1 s evidence, like that of the nuclear lobby, is bias in favour 
of the fuel the organisation•s members supply, it does not undermine a 
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basic truth Schumacher (1974:103) made about all future cost and energy 
demand predictions. To make guesses about the unknown 9 called 
assumptions 9 then "to derive estimates from them by subtle ca 1 cul at ion 
as if they are the result of scientific reasoning can only lead to the 
most colossal planning errors". 
It is revealing to note that the proposed privatisation of the ESI 
has not only led the government's financial gurus to cast doubts about 
the nuclear industry's market fitness, but raised alann within the 
industry itself. One view from within the labour movement was 
expressed by Jack Dromley, the national general-secretary of the 
Transport and General Workers Union (T & GWU), one of the assortment of 
unions with members within the nuclear industry. 
'Investment in the nuclear industry requires 
enormous up-front costs and long pay back times. 
An increasing reliance on the private sector and a 
decreasing strategic commitment on the part of 
government threatens the industry with disaster' 
(quoted in The Times, 06-04-88). 
John Collier 9 chairman of the UK Atomic Energy Association (UKAEA) was 
reported to be desperately anxious that a privatised electricity 
industry would greatly reduce investment in the nuclear industry and 
sacrifice it "on the altar of short term profit" (New Scientist, 
25-02-88:43). 
4.8 The State and the Nuclear Establishment 
Ever since Britain's civil nuclear power programme was launched 
after World War II it has been surrounded in secrecy and has 
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represented a powerful influence on British state affairs and on public 
policy (see Hallg 1986). It is not the place here to discuss in detail 
the state•s n1otives for maintaining an extremely costly nuclear 
programmeg except to point out that consideration of possible political 
motives is at least as important as the economic ones (Valentine, 
1985). Furthermore, some understanding of the relations between the 
British state and the nuclear industry is necessary to explain the 
reasons for exposing one public sector industry, British Coal, to 
competitive forces whilst protecting anotherg the nuclear component of 
the electricity supply industry, from them. 
It is useful to reiterate that the British state is not a neutral 
instrument, placing itself willingly at the service of whichever party 
is in power. In fact, it is a nebulous entity comprising a complex of 
institutions, political processes and relations, reflecting and 
legitimizing vested interests (see Miliband, 1973). The 11 nuclear 
establishment" is not synonymous with the state, but it is a powerful 
political-technical-co~nercial complex, which involves many 
institutions and actors within the state system, including the 
government, the Treasury, state departments, large public sector 
industries and powerful private sector corporations (see Figure 4:4). 
And as Sweet (1983:24) pointed out, 
1 The power of the nuclear-industrial complex in our 
society is not exerted through the formal organs of 
decision-making. But it is nonetheless powerful, 
more powerful than the government in most 
circumstances because it not only advises the 
government but it creates conditions where the 
government may have very little choice but to 
accede to that advice•. 
----------- -
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Governments are only one part of "the state system". The fact 
that they are formally invested with state power dues not mean that 
they control that power (Milibands 1973:47). Nevertheless~ the 
Conservative governments since 1979 have been strongly in favour of 
expanding Britain's nuclear commitment and they have actively sought to 
strengthen the pro-PWR camp within the various relevant institutions of 
the state. Whilst this policy has met with stiff opposition from those 
members of the British nuclear establishment committed to the 
alternative "British designed" AGR option, the government's pro-nuclear 
stance has the tacit support of numerous influential components of and 
decision-makers within the state system. 
The governments pro-nuclear programme is very relevant to any 
debate about the future of the British coa 1 industry. Not only does 
nuclear power take some of the electricity market away from British 
Coal, it also takes a disproportionate share of public money devoted to 
energy research and deve 1 opment ( R & D) away from foss i 1 fue 1 s and 
renewable energy sources. In 1986/7 the CEGB spent £162 million on R & 
D. Nuclear research took 68 per cent of that money while environmental 
work and the scrutiny of new sources of energy accounted for 16 per 
cent. The remainder supported research on conventional generation 
methods, and the technologies of transmission and control (see Figure 
4:5). In the same year, British Coal's net total R & D expenditure was 
£38 million. Perhaps the best illustration of the enormous costs of 
nuclear R & D is provided by the prototype fast reactor "experiment" at 
Dounreay in Scotland. Expenditure on the fast reactor programme has 
accumulated to around £2.5 billion, but in spite of a long gestation 
period for the technology, Dounreay is reported to be at least 15 years 
from being a commercial proposition (New Scientist, 07-04-88:25). 
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In spite of the £billions needed to support a new generation of 
PWR plants and the government's publicly stated commitment to reducing 
public expenditure~ there is little doubting the Thatcher government's 
enthusiasm for a "nuclear future". In December 1979~ the Secretary of 
State for Energy announced that PWRs were essential for the country's 
future prosperity and security. As Armstrong (1987:86-87) points out, 
• No one reading the Secretary of State • s speech 
could be unsure of the strength of the commitment 
to nuclear power in general and~ subject to 
licensing~ the PWR in particular. Furthermore~ 
both the scale of the programme announced ('at 
least one new nuclear power station a year in the 
decade from 1982') and the absence of any mention 
of how it might relate to other means of generating 
el ectri city strongly suggested that nuclear power 
had become synonymous with energy policy. No 
connections were made with the 1974 Plan for Coal~ 
the then current feasibility studies on the Severn 
tidal barrage or~ indeed, the British-designed ... 
AGR I. 
The Department of Energy has consistently failed to explain the 
government's view on the future role of the coal industry and coal's 
position in the total energy mix. This reflects the lack of coherent 
long term planning in the energy sector~ which is now worsened by the 
uncertainty over the future complexion of the ESI. 
The government's preference for nuclear power instead of coal is a 
part of its strategy to reduce the NUM's political leverage over the 
country's power supplies, which was demonstrated in the 1972 and 1974 
miners' strikes against the Heath government (see Beynon, 1985). The 
leaked Ridley Report of 1978 contained an outline of contingency 
measures in preparation for any future confrontation with the miners, 
including the building up of coal stocks~ introducing dual oil-and-coal 
firing at power stations, and establishing a large~ mobile police squad 
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to deal with pickets (Porter et.al. ~ 1986:83-84). Leaked cabinet 
minutes shortly after the government took office in 1979 stated that~ 
'a nuclear programme would have an advantage of 
removing a substantial portion of electricity 
production from the dangers of industrial action by 
coal miners or transport workers' (TUISU~ 1985:9). 
Another advantage of the nuclear industry from the government's 
perspective is that it is highly capital intensive, employing 
comparatively few workers for the £billions invested in it~ 
particularly compared to the deep mining industry (see Fothergill~ 
1986). The workforce is highly differentiated and fragmented and 
comprises mostly skilled white collar or technical workers represented 
by more compliant unions~ such as the electricians' union (EETPU) and 
the engineers' union (AEU). In particular~ the EETPU is recognised as 
the crusader for "new realism" within the labour movement~ based on an 
explicit rejection of class-based industrial conflict in favour of what 
the Financial Times describes as "mutually beneficial cooperation" and 
"enlightened productivity deals" (16-02-87:13). 
In any case, the very nature of nuclear technology and the way its 
plants are operated~ plus the application of the Official Secrets Act~ 
1 imits the scope for any worker dissention. Strict codes of conduct 
and disciplined working practices are followed ostensibly for safety 
reasons 9 but "ensure that disserting opinions are kept within the 
organisation" (Sweet, 1985:212). Such secrecy at all levels of the 
nuclear establishment may have much to do with the links between 
nuclear power and nuclear weapons~ although a major problem for 
researchers is 11 showing the extent of the marriage" (Blowers and 
Pepper~ 1987:33). 
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4.9 The language of the market place and financial controls on 
the coal industry 
The brief discussion above concerned the government•s paradoxical 
application of market forces in the energy sector except for nuclear 
power9 and the way in which other economic policies and ideological 
commitments that have little to do with energy planning~ such as 
privatisation~ have in fact greatly altered the parameters within which 
energy decisions are made. It is important to be aware of these wider 
political and economic constraints for they have directly affected 
internal decisions within each of the nationalised energy and 
energy-using 
deliberately 
industry. 
industries. Simultaneously, the government has 
imposed tighter financial disciplines on the coal 
The government•s objectives for the NCB were explicitly stated in 
the 1983 Coal Industry Act. The main ones were as follows: 
(1) Although coal is one of the uK•s major natural resources~ in the 
Government•s view the justification for coal production, like that 
for any other business (author•s emphasis), lies in the ability of 
those engaged in it to earn a satisfactory return on capital while 
competing in the market place. The basic objective for the NCB, 
therefore, must be to earn a satisfactory return on its assets in 
real terms, after payments of social grants. 
(2) The NCB should aim to maximise its long-term profitability by 
securing those sales which are profitable on a continuing basis, 
in competition with other fuels. It should plan its marketing, 
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production and capital investment accordingly and bring productive 
capacity into line with its continuing share of the market. 
(3) The Board•s objective should be to ensure that over the following 
five years its operating costs 9 including depreciation and capital 
charges 9 but excluding interest 9 per tonne of deep-mined coa 1 
produced9 are reduced in real terms for deep mined and open cast 
production separately. 
The purpose in outlining these objectives is to highlight a fundamental 
change in the role of nationalisation with regard to coal production. 
The government emphasized the fact that the industry should behave like 
any private business. Whilst the need to maximise 1 ong-tenn 
profitability was mentioned, the government expected the industry to 
reduce its operating costs. Following the 1984/5 coal dispute 9 the 
government introduced a financial break even target for the whole of 
the corporation•s business operations. It also imposed tighter 
external financial limits (EFLs) on the NCB. Through direct 
intervention in Coal Board finances the government was attempting to 
impose 11 business discipline•• on the corporation•s thinking. It was 
also making an arbitrary financial break even deadline the top priority 
for management. To a large extent it ~ucceeded, as the corporation•s 
Financial Director, Michael Butler, stated 
•British Coal consider that in the longer term 
(i.e. after 1989), it is essential to improve on 
break even and to achieve a progressive ability to 
finance capital expenditure from their own internal 
resources (Colliery Guardian Supplement, January 
1987:14). 
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In an effort to meet the financial targets set by the government 
and based not on the massive capital expenditure programme initiated in 
1974 by the Plan for Coal~ the Coal Board have been forced to close 
many pits purely on the basis of short term cost criteria. Short-term 
financial goals and accounting methods have affected decision-making 
parameters and have provided a 11 Vocabulary of motive" for further 
capacity cuts (see Cooper et.al. ~ 1986). The externally determined 
financial controls on the industry have influenced management 
definitions of what is 11 economic 11 and what is 11 uneconomic" capacity 
within the industry. As O'Donnell (1987:62) argued~ it is logical to 
view pit closures as British Coal management's 
'best way of reconciling the often conflicting 
external constraints placed on the industry by 
government'. 
Precisely how financial controls have resulted in pit closures can 
only be understood in relation to the accounting practices of the Coal 
Board (BC) and its criteria for determining pit level performance (see 
Berry et.al., 1985 and 1986). Pits have increasingly been judged on 
their individual merit and treated as business centres rather than 
production units. This sort of decentralisation may make it easier to 
ultimately privatise parts of the industry, but in the short-term it 
has led to many pit closures on the basis of pit level performance 
criteria. As Berry et.al. (1986) suggests, this may be a misguided 
practice, for pits (like the energy sector as a whole) are 
interdependent and it can be 
'seriously misleading to use the "bottom line" 
(whether it be cost per tonne or net profit or 
loss) to explain or otherwise justify a decision 
taken either to invest in (or close) a pit'. 
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The creation of multi-colliery complexes around single coal preparation 
plants has increased pit interdependencies rather than decreased them. 
The closure of one pit in a particular area affects the cost structure 
and viability of all the other pits and of the preparation plant 
itself. Furthermore~ taking a short-term view~ say end-of-financial 
-year results~ can be highly misleading owing to the long lead times 
involved in colliery development and complex geological and technical 
problems. 
Nevertheless~ British Coal have adopted short term cost per tonne 
measures as a basis for deciding how much and where to invest. Some of 
their aims and performance measures were outlines in a five year 
Business Plan introduced shortly after the 1984/5 coal dispute without 
consultation with the NUM. These were~ 
(1) Concentration of production at low cost collieries and from coal 
reserves with the potential for low cost output. Pit performance 
was to be judged against the operating cost measure of £1.65 per 
Gigajoule (Gj - the measure of the energy content of coal). Only 
at pits producing at less than £1.65 per Gj would investment in 
them be considered viable. In the longer term, £1.50 per Gj (i.e. 
about £35.50 per tonne) became a standard measure of efficiency. 
(2) Concentration of operations at the "best reserves 11 , i.e. seams 
that are relatively unfaulted and offer the best prospects of high 
productivity utilizing the latest heavy-duty mining technology. 
(3) Continued investment in 11 super pit 11 developments, such as Selby, 
and Asfordby in Leicestershire. 
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The following chapter will discuss the implications of short term 
performance criteria and tight financial controls on the technological 
decisions made by BC ~ and on changes in the 1 abour process. The 
important point is that the internal relations of production and 
reorganisation at the point of production can not be understood without 
constant reference to external constraints, whether they be changes in 
market conditions or deliberate measures of the government. 
Finally9 it is necessary to point out 11 the productivity trap 11 
British Coal has got itself into mainly as a result of the financial 
constraints on it. In 1981/2~ 141 collieries out of a total of 198 
made a financial loss, although around 90 per cent of the NCB's total 
loss were accounted for by only 30 pits. Since 1981/2 some 106 
colli~ries have closed (see Table 4:3). As Sir Robert Haslam~ BC's 
Chairman has described it, this is a degree of restructuring 11Without 
parallel in recent times in any other British industry11 (BC, 
1987/88:1). Both the government and senior British Coal managers have 
described many of the pit closures as necessary in order to improve 
11 the market fitness 11 of the industry through the elimination of 
uneconomic capacity. The problem is that the pressures of attempting 
financial break even with no equity capital and huge interest charges 
at high rates of interest, plus the demands 11 more competitive prices 11 
from the electricity boards, mean that no matter how many pits are 
closed for 11 economic 11 reasons BC's 11 high cost tail'' will remain. 
An important aspect of the cost structure of the industry has so 
far been ignored, and this is the cost to coalfield communities of pit 
closures. There have been a number of very important studies of the 
social costs of colliery closures in specific localities (see WERU~ 
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1985; Hudson~ Peck and Sadler~ 1984). As Rees (1986:333) points out, 
unless the state 11 intcrvenes to preserve existing employment in the 
coal industry or to ensure the creation of alternative jobs 11 further 
closures would only serve to increase unemployment in coalfields with 
all the adverse 11 secondary effects 11 that entails. Certainly there is a 
need for the state and British Coal to bear greater responsibility for 
the wider social costs associated with pit closures~ and for some 
allowance of these to be included in public accounting procedures which 
form the basis of management decisions (Hudson & Sadler» 1987). 
The purpose of this chapter has been to highlight the role, and 
indeed the responsibility, of the state in the long run contraction of 
the coal industry since nationalisation. In the context of this 
thesis» the analysis is necessary to understand both changes in the 
mining labour process (and internal relations of production) and 
changes in the industry's relations with its engineering suppliers. 
These are the issues concerning the following chapters. 
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FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES 
(1) North Sea production is, of course, carried out by private 
oil companies~ but within the legal and fiscal framework laid 
down by the British state. The government controls the issue 
of licences, decides on the allocation of areas for 
exploration and production, lays down the tax regime, and 
influences the marketing arrangements. 
(2) BC has spent approximately £70 million on the Longannet 
complex which is served by a 4,000 tonne capacity exchange 
bunker to the local power station. Before the arguments over 
prices BC had reckoned on supplying some 3.9 million tonnes 
from all the Scottish pits to the SSEB, including 1.5 mt a 
year to Cockenzie power station until 1992, and 2 mt to 
Longannet until 1995, with the rest going to the small 
Kincardine power station on the Firth of Forth. The SSEB 
started to import small shipments of 25,000 tonnes for 
Kincardine, and has subsequently invited big energy groups to 
tender for a maximum of 500,000 tonnes each of import 
contracts. 
TABLE 4:1 
NCB Basic Statistics, 1947-80 
Output Inland Export Stocks Output per 
Collieries mi 11 ion Deep mined consumption mill ion million Employment manshift 
Open (1) tons (2) output mi 11 ion tons tons tons •ooo men (3} ( cwt.) 
1947 958 197 186 185 5 18 704 2L5 
1951 896 222 209 208 11 18 693 24.5 
1955 850 222 211 215 14 20 699 24.7 
_, 
1959 737 206 193 189 4 50 658 26.9 ....... ~ 
1963 611 198 189 193 5 32 544 31.7 
1967 438 173 165 170 3 35 419 36.6 
1971 292 142 133 148 3 20 287 44.1 
1974 (4) 259 105 97 129 18 252 42.3 
1975 246 125 115 N.A. N.A. N.A. 246 45.0 
1980 219 123 109 128 5 38 230 47.0 
L Year end (Dec. or March) 
2. Inc. open cast AV 1947-59 p.a. 11 m tons 1960-74 8 m tons 
3. Average through year 
4. Output, consumption and productivity depressed by coal strike and overtime ban 
N.A. Not available 
Source : NCB Annual Report•s 
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TABLE 4:2 
Capital Structure of the Coal Board 5 £ milliona 
1974-76 1980-82 
Loans outstandingb 
Interest paymentsb 
547 
39 
1,233 
101 
2,674 
320 
Notes: a 1987 prices 
b annual average 
Source : NCB Reports and Accounts, 1974-86 
Taken from : o•oonnell (1987) 
1983-86 
4,033 
475 
Number of Collieries 
at year end 
Employees on 
Colliery books 
(I 000) 
TABLE 4:3 
Total Annual Number of Collieries and Colliery Employees, 
1979/80 - 1987/8 
1979/80 1980/1 1981/2 1982/3 1983/4 1984/5 1985/6 1986/7 1987/8 
219 211 200 191 170 169 133 no 94 
232.5 229.8 218.5 207.6 191.5 175.4 154.6 125.4 104.4 
Source : British Coal 
Report and Accounts 1987/8 
_. 
-....,J 
(j) 
I 
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Some of the external constraints operating on the coal industry 
r-------------Macro~Economic 
Policies9 Taxation9 
Indirect Controls 
'~!<> 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
Oil 9 Gas 9 
Renewables 
Int. Coal 
Market and 
Private UK 
Coal Operators 
CE:'ITRAL 1---------Direct GOV E~~IMENI Macro~ 
Macro~ Economic and Po 1 it i 
Political Policies 
~--~---: 
I THE· TREASURY 
I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~c j 
I Financial 
I 
' ""----------.! 
I 
Statutory 
Financial 
and 
Controls 
-------. Cont:ol s • 
Economic Policies 
cal Policies 
oJp 
I 
PUBLl C SC:CTOR 
Elec:ricity 
Boards: 
CE·~a (30.2) 
SSE3 (Power 
Station 
market) 
.... , Pricing .#-'Q."l "" ~ $1111~ ...... I Controls c.ofl> ..... .... .... Market 
Constraints 
: Price ... 
~='o==r-~ .... Negotiations 
~ .... 
.... 
.... 
COAL 
BOARD. 
and Contracts 
~ ... Ct~q/ .1. 
\ - ...... 4pp;.-
\ - ........ '(?J' 
---~~~ \ -
Internal 
Decisions 
Production 
Prices 
Pit 
Closures 
~ 
Market 
Constraints 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
' 
b- ~-~,--~-~.,1 E:<PORTS (2.2) I I 
j 
I 
RELATIONS WITH 
OUTSIDE SUPPLIERS 
Note Figures in brackets British Coal sales 
(million tonnes) 1987/8 
Nuclear 
Industry 
OTHE~ COAL 
MARKETS 
Industry (8.8) 
Coke 
Ovens (4.2) 
Domestic (5.5) 
Northern 
Ireland 
Markets(2.7) 
Ill 
300 
250 
!00 
50 
- 178 -
FIGURE 4:2 
UK Coal Production since 1900 
(million tonncs) 
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FIGURE 4:3 
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FIGURE 4:4 
The nuclear-industrial complex 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
STATE OWNERSHIP~ EXT~R~AL AND INTERNAL 
RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION~ AND THE CHANGING 
GEOGRAPHY OF DEEP COAL MINING IN THE UK 
'Old MacGregor had a plan 
Hee I, hee I, ho. 
Under this plan pits would go 
Hee I~ hee I, ho. 
With a boo, boo here 
And a boo, boo there 
Here boo, there boo, everywhere a boo, boo?' 
A different version of "Old MacGregor ... 11 by Dean 
Selway, 11, of Wales, written at the time of the 
1984/5 miners • strike. This version is a prates t 
against the Corporation's plans for pit closures 
under Ian MacGregor, who was then Coal Board 
Chairman. Published in Striking Miners' Childrens 
1985, ~ore Valuable than Gold Blackrose Press: 
London. 
This chapter has several aims. In the first place it seeks to 
examine how nationalisation altered both external and internal 
re·lations of production. Did it bring about radical changes in the 
capitalist mode of production? Did state ownership alter the way in 
which capital investment and expenditure decisions were made within the 
' 
industry? What role has the state played in influencing restructuring 
processes, particularly technical change, within the industry? In 
turn, such questions require a basic understanding of power relations 
in the coal industry. Who makes the important capital investment 
decisions and why? 
Section 5.1 examines some of the major changes in capital and 
labour relations in the mining industry brought about by state 
ownership. It does so mostly through a broad analysis of technical 
- 183 -
change since 1947. The analysis concentrates on the major periods of 
nationalisation in the industry since the late 1950s. It examines the 
role of technical change in employment change~ job losses and pit 
closures9 and in turn~ upon the changing geography of coal production. 
An important argument throughout is that there can be no understanding 
of the economic~ social and spatial restructuring within the coal 
industry without reference to wider social and political relations and 
mechanisms. The analysis points to a number of similarities between 
the organisation of and objectives underlying the production process in 
a state capitalist enterprise and private enterprises. The main 
difference is that the state exerts more direct control over the 
finances and pricing structures of the former~ which in turn influences 
the technological choices9 decision-making criteria and direction of 
change taken by the nationalised industry. 
Section 5. 2 briefly examines how the process of preparing for 
privatisation has influenced management attitudes and decisions9 and is 
affecting the structure of ownership and control within the deep mining 
industry. In particular it examines the significance of changing 
working practices 9 the introduction of US mining methods into British 
Coal mines, and the growth of sub-contracting for mine work. 
Section 5.3 then turns to the changing relations between state 
capital and private capital in the mining industry. Mining suppliers 
have played a crucial role in the whole technical change process by 
making the capital goods for the mining production process. Hitherto9 
most analyses of the mining labour process have ignored the suppliers 
completely. The transformation of British Coal mining from a 
labour-intensive into a capital-intensive industry has been one of the 
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major influences upon the development of the UK mining engineering 
industry. But the story is not simply one of growth and harmonious 
relations. The major periods of nationalisation and technical change 
in the coal industry have produced numerous changes in the industrial 
structure of the supply industry. The Coal Board has played a central 
role in shaping the size and product market structure of its UK 
engineering suppliers. This section focusses on the main historical 
phases in public=private sector relations since nationalisation, and 
Chapter Six examines developments in the •eighties. 
Finally, section 5.4 is a speculative examination of possible 
t.he 
alternative concepts of and attitudes towards~ technical-cum-
organisational changesin the UK mining industry. It reassesses some of 
the primary objectives underlying the production reorganisations and 
capacity cuts in the UK coal industry. In so doing, further questions 
are raised about the need for privatisation and about the nature of 
nationalisation in Britain. 
5.1 What about the workers? State ownership and the mining 
labour process 
The state has played a pivotal role in changes that have and are 
taking place within the British mining industry. The policies and 
constraints imposed by the state on the coa 1 industry have 
fundamentally affected relations between the nationalised industry and 
private capital (see Section 5.3). But before analysing how and why 
relations between public and private capital have changed it is useful 
to consider how state ownership altered capital-labour relations within 
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the industry~ ie internal relations of production. An understanding of 
underlying social processes is necessary for an analysis of the reasons 
for and the ways in which major production and investment decisions 
have been made and implemented in the mining industry. 
The whole edifice of nationalisation was based upon notions of 
cooperation between capita 1 and 1 abour in the economy as a whole for 
the ambiguous purpose of raising national competitiveness. State 
ownership was an essential element of post war consensus politics. 
Consensus between the state~ management and labour organisations was to 
be the formula for both raising productivity and for maintaining 
harmonious industrial relations and the wider economy. The coal 
industry was a centra 1 testing ground for the new consensus as the 
first industry to be nationalised by the Attlee government and one with 
a history of bitter industrial strife. 
Whilst it is true that the Labour Party could claim to have 
formally acceded to working class demands for public ownership, in 
actuality the substance of those demands were never fulfilled. It is 
true that there were material benefits of nationalisation that would 
not have come so quickly, if at all, had the coal industry been left 
under private ownership. Mine workers won improved wages, longer 
holidays, better welfare and pension schemes, pit head baths, canteens 
on site. Against these gains is the fact that state ownership did not 
result in any fundamental shift in power relations between "the 
managers 11 and "the managed". Any form of genuine workers' control was 
never seriously on Labour's political agenda. Rather than transform 
the capitalist mode of production by handing over control to the 
workers, the architects of British nationalisation sought to adopt 
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existing capitalist control mechanisms to raise productive efficiency 
within the industries concerned. Although the nationalised industries 
were distinct from private firms by 11 the absence of profitability as a 
direct mechanism of control"s other ''quasi-competitive 10 restraints were 
placed on the industry, such as the need to earn a satisfactory return 
on capital over a period of years, and more recently to achieve 
financial break even by a set date. 
Herbert Morrison clearly intended the public corporations to, 
•make possible organisation of a more efficient 
indus try, rendering 
because of its 
productivity enabled 
its workers • (quoted 
more public services and 
efficiency and increased 
to do progressively better for 
in Dahl, 1947:899). 
Nationalisation transferred the locus of responsibility away from the 
coal barons to the state, but it did not lead to any great changes in 
the way work was organised and managed. There was no radical 
restructuring of the organisation of work to allow producers a say in 
the day-to-day decision making processes, let alone in the long term 
planning of the industry. In fact, the National Coal Board adopted a 
top-down hierarchical administrative structure incorporating many of 
the traditional distinctions between managerial responsibilities and 
prerogatives on the one hand, and trade union functions and workers• 
tasks on the other. 
f\'lany of the state appointed bosses at colliery 1 evel were 
precisely the same "old faces .. who had been in command under private 
ownership. People were appointed in managerial positions on the basis 
of 'proven leadership qualities', and they included numerous mining 
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engineers and people with previous business or administrative 
experience, particularly at area and colliery levels. The NUM 
continued to negotiate with the employers on wages, hours, conditions, 
health and safety, but was remote from the key decisions shaping the 
direction and future of the industry. Capital investment, production 
planning, where to invest, which pits to close, resource allocation, 
sales and marketing, were all management functions just as in private 
businesses. 
In place of workers' control the workers got conciliation and 
consultation. At area and pit levels local management-union committees 
became 11 Wrangling grounds about reasons for lost output" (Hall, 
1981:104). These committees became preoccupied with production 
targets, output per manshift (OMS), absenteeism and labour turnover. 
They acted as a channel of communication from the managers to the pit, 
but rarely were miners consulted before an important decision was made. 
As one South Yorkshire Area Director put it, the problem with 
consultation from the management perspective was that 
'many members of the committees did not fully 
realise that they had no executive powers' (The 
Mining Eng·ineer, December 1986:388). -
The elaborate consultative network set up by the NCB, with its plethora 
of committees, became a one-sided communication channel. Management 
received information which helped in formulating decisions, but the 
local union representatives on the committees had no real power. 
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Technical change and control over the labour process 
The concept of contra 1 is important when ex ami ni ng the techni ca 1 
transformation of the British deep mining industry from its •pick and 
shovel• days into one of the most highly mechanised and automated 
mining industries in the world. It is very easy to view the technical 
changes in the mines of Britain as a unilinear technological 
progression that has been necessary for the industry•s economic 
survival. Many of the senior decision-makers in British Coal would 
probably support this uncritical view of technical change. Viewed at 
from the perspective of the majority of miners, there fami 1 i es and 
communities, and the places where they live, there is much to criticize 
in the way technology has been used and the industry restructured since 
the 1 ate 1950s. 
Before examining some of the ways in which technology was and is 
being used it is useful to consider some of the basic features of 
technical change in the nationalised coal industry. Firstly, the 
parameters within which the capital investment decisions take place are 
set by macroeconomic and market constraints; energy policies; and the 
operational, financial and pricing controls imposed upon the industry 
by the state (see Chapter Four, Section 4.9). Any change in the 
objectives governing the design, development and application of mining 
technologies can only be effective if they are sanctioned by the state, 
and if appropriate national policies are applied by the government. 
Secondly, technical change is a complex, interactive process 
involving numerous vested interests, groups and individuals. In the UK 
coal mining industry these include senior Board personnel, management, 
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scientists, engineers. designers. craftspeople. various trade unions 
and mineworkers. Mining machinery manufacturers should also be 
included, for they have played a considerable role in the technical 
changes affecting the industry. It is necessary to reiterate the fact 
that fundamental to the understanding of technical change in the 
nationalised industry is the fundamental division between capital and 
labour. State owned industries did little to alter the capitalist mode 
of production. rather they adopted it for the purposes of raising 
output and productivity. In this respect the nationalised industries 
differ little from their private counterparts. As Allen (1981:103) 
observed, the Coal Board became preoccupied with the variable costs of 
production, particularly 1 abour and in ways to increase productivity, 
output per manshift (OMS), and reduce production costs. especially 
labour costs. In other words, the NCB sought to extract a greater 
surplus value from the workers in "the public interest". In addition, 
state owned industries also took on the limitations of large 
rule-bound, bureaucratic structures, which as Krieger (1984:26) 
suggests, involves: 
•a relationship of domination and chronic struggle, 
... a "dialectic of control", a fluid struggle for 
control between administration and the 
administered •. 
However, within the Coal Board management hierarchy there were 
certainly divisions between different levels of management. as well as 
between central, district, area and colliery managers. Similarly 
divisio~s existed between moderates and militants within unions, 
between different coalfield communities. and between unions. As 
Krieger (1984:26) noted, power relations are complicated by intra- as 
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well as inter-class struggles~ and in the coal industry by the 
"regionally specifics locally differentiated and experienced fragments'1 
which militate against a "unified national enterprise". 
Thirdly~ as with private capital one of the principal motivating 
forces for new innovations and the adoption of new technology was to 
increase productivity. Nevertheless~ state ownership did alter 
attitudes towards capital investments. Under private ownership the 
coal barons and coal combines based their investments and production 
policies on short-term profits and dividends from shareholders. Under 
state ownership the NCB was able to take a longer term view than the 
private owners provided state support was given, although 
quasi-competitive constraints were placed upon the industry. The major 
constraints acting u~on the NCB's capital investment plans and 
forecasts were the wider macroeconomics market and fuel policies of the 
state. Changes in international fuel prices, particularly of oil, gas 
and coals could literally reverse the Coal Board's entire investment 
strategy. So too could political and financial pressure on the 
industry from the government of the day. 
Fourthly, for any nationalised industry the politics of the state 
are inextricably linked with the politics of production. If anything 
this is especially so in the 1980s as the public sector industries are 
being prepared for privatisation. In the coal industry this has meant 
a deepening of inter- and intra-class rivalries and tensionss and a 
direct use of financial and economic controls upon the industry for 
ideological purposes (see Section 5.2). Technology has been a means to 
po 1 it i ca 1 ends in the coa 1 industry, a 1 though the techni ca 1 change 
process is often explained in terms of economic rationality, for 
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instance~ as a means to raise productivity and efficiency. It is 
important to be clear about definitions and perspectives when 
discussing technical change, for as Wilkinson (1983) observed: 
'Economic rationales can serve to conceal the 
political processes and social choices that lie 
behind innovative efforts and the manner in which 
new technology is introduced'. 
British Coal (formerly the NCB) has justified many of its actions 
as necessary elements in the drive to improve competitiveness and 
economic efficiency. As noted in Chapter three~ the term 11 efficiency" 
is open to many interpretations which are often coloured by the 
political perspectives of the interpreter. Higher productivity is 
often used as a measure of efficiency. Time and time again new 
technology is said to be necessary in order to raise productivity 
levelsg to compete and to survive in a competitive industrial 
environment or market, but as in the coal industry, the same technology 
may also be used to centralise and strengthen managerial control over 
production processes and/or to wrest control from the shop floor or 
pit. 
'In sum, arguments about 11 efficiency" can be used 
as a legitimating device for politically informed 
decisions on the technical and social organisation 
of work' (Wilkinson, 1985:448). 
a. Mechanisation - the politics of production and the geography of 
change 
Technical change in the coal industry has had fundamental 
consequences both for the internal organisation of production and the 
- 192 -
mining labour process9 and for the spatial organisation of production. 
But technical change should not be viewed as an isolated process for it 
is one of several restructuring processes affecting the organisation of 
work and employment. In their analysis of the geography of job loss, 
Massey and Meegan (1982) identified three distinct forms of production 
reorganisation work intensification; rationalization; and 
investment and technical change. Job loss is only inevitable with 
rationalization~ i.e. disinvestment and cutbacks in capacity. As they 
stress: 
•Neither intensification nor technical change in 
themselves involve closure of capacity or cutbacks 
in production. Both of them~ by lowering costs~ by 
increasing labour productivity and, for technical 
change9 by changing the product are simply means of 
increasing or maintaining competitiveness, of 
carrying on accumulating• (Massey and Meegan, 
1985:124). 
In the coal mining industry all three forms of production 
reorganisation have led to job losses. The aim here is to concentrate 
on technical change, although it should be stressed that within any 
industry 9 particularly within a big multi-site operation like the 
nationalised coal industry, there will be two or more restructuring 
processes occurring simultaneously. The crucial point to remember is 
that a nationalised industry is no different from a private capitalist 
one in that "the geography of job loss is related to the 
requirements of production for profit 11 (Massey and Meegan, 1985:125). 
In a state capitalist enterprise like the NCB the process of production 
for profit is obscured by wider economic and po 1 i ti ca 1 goa 1 s and the 
financial controls of the state. Even so, it is clear from a study of 
the coal industry that the basic objectives underlying the organisation 
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of production were related to the need to increase industrial 
competitiveness in the market place by reducing costs and increasing 
productivity as in private industries~ and due to political concerns 
( see be 1 uw) . 
Nationalisation did not lead to new ways of organising production 
so that employment in disadvantaged regions or localities would be 
maintained. In practice~ the Coal Board has introduced many measures 
that have proved economically and socially destructive to many 
localities~ and they have contributed to socio-economic inequalities 
between different parts of the UK. This is well illustrated by the 
uneven capital investment strategies of the Board since the late 1950s. 
As Burns et al (1985:104) notes: 
1 The first major structural change in the 
nationalised industry came with the competition 
from cheap oi 1 after Suez. S 1 urn c 1 ea ranee, the 
1956 Clean Air Act~ the move to diesel and electric 
rail traction, the contraction of the steel 
industry, and the increased thermal efficiency of 
steam raising plant all contributed to the collapse 
of coal demand between 1958 and 1970. The shearer 
loader and longwall working were developed in order 
to reduce the price of coal relative to oil. The 
technical choice of the shearer loader as the main 
piece of coal-getting machinery meant that even at 
that stage the coalfields of Wales and Scotland 
were put at risk, because the shearer is best 
suited to the conditions of the Nottinghamshire and 
Yorkshire • . 
The Coal Board attempted to make mines as much like factories as 
their often unpredictable environments would allow. A number of 
innovations - armoured face conveyors in the early 1950~; the Anderton 
Shearer Loader during the 1950s; and powered roof supports during the 
late l950s-early 1960s, plus the introduction of better tunnelling 
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machines; tracked roadheaders; and electro-rail haulage, meant that 
rapid strides in the mechanisation of collieries could be made. These 
innovations a 1 so meant that previously separate functions - cutting, 
ripping9 and filling -were integrated (see Chapter Two). The shearer 
incorporated a drum with cutting bits which rotated along the longwall 
face shearing coal from the seam. Coal hewn from the seam fell into 
the armoured conveyor belt and was transported away from the face. The 
introduction of 11 self advancing" roof supports cut the hard physical 
effort involved in the manual haulage of conventional wooden or steel 
props. 
Figure 5.1 indicates the rapid adoption of mechanised mining 
methods from the mid-1950s 9 which reached a peak at the end of the 
'sixties. By the mid-1960s production on mechanised faces was some 76 
per cent higher than on non-mechanised faces (see Kelly9 1969). In 
1969, some 92 per cent of all output was produced by power-loaders and 
74 per cent of coal faces were using powered roof supports (see 
Towm>~nd, 19&0). The results in terms of productivity increases at the 
coal face and output per manshift (OMS) were impressive, although 
elsewhere below ground productivity rises were less (see Townsend, 
1976). Figure 5.2 shows some of the major changes reflecting the 
triple impact of closures of uneconomic pits, increasing mechanisation, 
and concentration on high-producing faces (Townsend 9 1980:145). The 
average number of mechanised faces per co 11 i ery dropped from 5. 2 in 
1960 to 3.4 in 1971, while OMS increased from 28.9 cwt in 1960/1 to 
46.0 cwt in 1974/5. 
The displacement of manual and partially mechanised methods came 
in a piecemeal fashion. The enormous diversity of coal face 
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conditionsp seam thicknesses~ geology, the friability of coals 
faulting~ presence of water~ all made mechanisation easier in some 
places than others. The crucial point is that for the NcB•s 
mechanisation strategy~ combined with its pit closures 9 meant that 
capital investment in mines was very selective. The Coal Board could 
have adopted a different investment approach based on technology 
designed for a variety of pit conditions (see Section 5.4). Mining 
suppliers were capable of producing equipment for different mine 
conditions. But the NCB centralised its research and development 
facilities and developed longwall machinery best suited to collieries 
in the central coalfields. Townsend (1976:21) summed up the NCB 1 s 
economic objectives behind this investment strategy: 
the full range of machinery to those faces on 
which potential output, geological conditions and 
pit organisation indicated that a high level of 
machine output per manshift could be obtained with 
the minimum interference from natural or unexpected 
causes•. 
The concentration of capital investment and output condemned many 
pits excluded from the NCB 1 s mechanisation plans to an early death in 
the absence of markets for their coal. From 1963 onwards the NCB 
designated certain collieries and 11 spearhead faces 11 to use for 
practical demonstrations of what was technically feasible using modern 
machine mining methods. Many pits in Scotland, northern England and 
South Wales were closed in spite of being in receipt of considerable 
investment during the 1950s. Some of the 11 losing 11 pits were in the 
West Durham coalfield, which was all but destroyed in the •sixties. 
According to the NcB•s own estimates only 127 million tons of the 
available 592 m.t. under that part of the county was extracted by 1962. 
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The closure of West Durham pits meant that some 400 m.t. of coal were 
sterilized by the NCB (Durham NUM, 1987). 
In 1967 the 11 50 pit scheme" was launched. 
•rhe plan was to increase their combined output 
from 35 mi 11 ion to 60 mi 11 ion tons a year. The 
pits were chosen because of their potential, which 
meant not only their physical reserves, but also 
the quality and cooperativeness of the manpower. 
This was essential because we would need to pour a 
lot of capital into them• (author•s emphasis) 
(Robens, 1972:103). 
This quotation is revealing because it shows that economic and 
technical criteria were not the only ones influencing the capital 
investment decisions of the Board. There was a clear ••political" 
content, for some pits were chosen for investment if they were 
considered to have "moderate" or "cooperative" workers and local union 
representatives. Nonetheless, it was not until after the national 
miners• strikes of 1972 and 1974 that politics became a major element 
in the technical choices of the NCB. 
The major consequences of new technology for miners who were 
either transferred to or worked within mechanized pits were in pit 
organisation and working practices. Machines were helping to change 
power relations within the industry, and initially at least, not 
entirely in ways beneficial to the state or senior NCB managers. 
Mechanized mining linked together formerly separate tasks at the 
coal-face. Power loading reduced the extreme division of labour 
associated with the old three shift system, and manual hand-filling was 
virtually eliminated. According to Burns et al (1983:12): 
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'Guiding a shearer along the face~ keeping it out 
of the roof and floor dirt9 and maintaining an even 
cut requires considerable skill. Powerloading 
changed the ski 11 s associated with face work but 
the machine incorporated none of the miners' 
knowledge. Machine skills~ increased productive 
power9 and more unified face teams increase the 
miners' control under power loading'. 
Miners sti 11 retained a 1 arge degree of control over the production 
process and mastery over the new machinery which was becoming the main 
regulator of productivityg rather than worker effort. 
'Machine running time was, year by year, replacing 
worker effort as the determinant of the pace of 
productivity. Wage drift through anarchic 
procedures of spot bargaining was increasingly 
incompatible with the technological char·acter of 
the industry, destructive of EMS/OMS efficiency 
(the earnings to output per manshift ratio), and at 
odds with the centralizing mandate of management of 
a state-owned industry' (Krieger, 1984:79). 
Mine mechanisation thus encouraged the NCB-NUM to introduce the 
national day wage struc~ure with the National Power Loading Agreement 
(NPLA). Before the NPLA there was little chance of either national 
restraint or of coordinated and concerted action between NUM members in 
different parts of the UK and in different pits. National wage 
bargaining was a dominant factor in writing the union, and so in giving 
it greater political strength. An important strand of the NCB's 
investment plans after the 1974 Plan for Coal was the deliberate 
attempt to reduce the political unity and power of the NUM. 
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b. Automation Phase - Political Choices and Technical Decisions 
The 1974 11 Plan 11 marked a turning point in the post-war history of 
the British mining industry. As in the early 1950s the government 
sought to raise total coal output~ only this time it was to reduce the 
uK•s reliance on imported oil9 which was largely the legacy of previous 
governments• efforts to produce a multi-fuel economy too quickly and to 
increase national competitiveness by capitalising on cheap oil 
supplies. Thus, the NCB was given financial resources to expand 
production. As one part of its corporate strategy the NCB sought to 
add 42 million tonnes of new capacity in a market for coal expected to 
be around 135 mt by 1985. The mining complex at Selby was part of the 
NcB•s plans and by the mid-eighties the Selby complex had received 
around £1.4 billion of Coal Board investment. The Coal Board had also 
decided that it had advanced almost as far as it wanted to go with 
mechanical innovations 9 and that the next major steps could be made in 
machine automation. The introduction of microelectronics into industry 
during the •seventies enabled the NCB to increase its research and 
development resources allocated to 11 remote control 11 mining. All these 
developments had enormous economic, social and spatial implications on 
the industry, especially during the •eighties. 
The main technological and organisational changes since the 
mid-1970s were determined by small technocratic and managerial elites 
headed by influential members of the Board. Burns et al (1985:94) 
describe the functions of a Central Planning Unit (CPU) in the NCB, 
which was established alongside the Board•s Operational Research 
Executive (ORE): 
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'The main function of the CPU has been to determine 
a 20 year strategic plan for coal~ based on the 
question ''where can we invest in new capacity''.' 
The CPU used concepts of systems engineering and constructed models 
giving cost versus tonnage data for pits, regions or areas» although 
"political considerations" also played a part. The CPU effectively 
determined criteria for shaping the nature and pattern of techni ca 1 
change associated with the Board's preferred system of automation - the 
Mine Operating System (MINOS). The various subsystems of MINOS» their 
applications and consequences for labour are well documented elsewhere 
(see Burns et al, 1983 and 1985; Winterton, 1985 a and b; Feickert, 
1979). The objectives underlying the implementation can be summarized 
as the increasing of labour and capital productivity and increasing the 
flow of information to management. 
Three of the perceived constraints to raising productivity were: 
(1) the need to improve coal clearance systems and elsewhere below 
ground productivity; (2) the need to improve machine running time; 
(3) the need to break the militancy and political influence of the NUM. 
To some extent technology could be designed and implemented in ways to 
achieve all three objectives. With regard to the political objective, 
there is evidence to suggest that the NCB were influenced by the ideas 
of Wilfred Miron, Chairman of the East Midlands NCB and Board member. 
These ideas were expressed in a private correspondence to NCB chairman 
Derek Ezra, which was eventually leaked to the NUM (see Appendices). 
Miron had been involved in the NCB's experiments in the first remotely 
operated longwall faces (ROLFs) at Ormonde and Newstead collieries in 
the East Midlands in the 'sixties. He suggested a number of lessons 
had been learnt in those early trials that could be applied in the 
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1970s and 1980s. He recommended a whole package of measures vJhich 
could be implemented in ways to neutralize the influence of militants 
within the NUM and the tota 1 power of the NUM i tse 1 f. A number of 
these were and are being tried by the Coal Board~ including ways of 
using mining technology and automation to minimize the number of miners 
in the industry as we 11 as the proportion of emp 1 oyees in non~coa 1 
mining trade unions. Miron recommended the reintroduction of 
decentralized pay bargaining and productivity agreements as a way of 
breaking the miners' material basis for national unity enshrined in the 
NPLA. The Coal Board were aided by the Area Incentive Scheme of 1978 9 
which has paved the way for a further decentralisation of pay 
negotiations and wider earnings differentials in the 'eighties. 
During the 'eighties 9 particularly since the 1984/5 miners' 
strike, the so-called 11 Miron Factor" has become more prominent in the 
Coal Board's plans (see Feickert, 1987). It is difficult to summarize 
all the separate strands of the Board's plans9 but some attempt at this 
is made in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, which are drawn from articles that have 
appeared in The Mining Engineer. One of the "prophets'' of the Coal 
Board is Moses who outlined the Board's "new approach'' in 1986: 
it is clear that to survive the industry needs 
urgently to reduce costs by eliminating grossly 
uneconomic capacity, maximising low cost coal 
production and fully exploiting and utilising its 
capital assets' (The Mining Engineer9 September 
1986:185). 
Probably the most influential proposals were put by Wheeler (1986) in 
his "Frontiers and Forward •.. '1 address to the Institution of Mining 
Engineers. In it he outlined suggestions for a "model 11 colliery with 
~ 201 ~ 
an overall OMS of six tonnes (see Table 5.3). According to the NUM 
this has become a standard for all collieries to follow. The essence 
of Wheelers' suggestions are that large productivity increases can be 
secured from no additional investment by making better use of existing 
resources. Wheeler proposed several changes in working practices, such 
as three nine-hour shifts per day over a six day week~ which have now 
become part of British Coal's "flexibility" proposals (see Table 5.4). 
Wheeler suggested output increases of over 20% per week are possible 
simply by increasing the number of days worked by one a week. But as 
Prior and McCloskey (1988:28) observed: 
'Wheeler's proposals have something of a flavour of 
a conjuring trick; to achieve so much extra output 
without any individual investment is surely a 
little more difficult. Buried in his appraisal are 
a lot of unproven assumptions about the ability of 
existing plant to function continuously for longer 
at the drop of a hat .•.• ' 
In spite of some doubts about the potential for productivity 
increases from the introduction of the Coal Board's concept of 
11 flexible working", Wheeler's ideas were taken a step further by 
Northard (1987 a and b) (see Table 5.2). According to Northard no new 
technology was required by British Coal, only the more widespread 
application of that which is available within a more effective 
organi sati ona 1 framework. Northard stresses the commercial 1 ogic of 
getting more output over longer periods of working time from the 
capital already invested at collieries. Among the suggestions he put 
forward were: (1) utilising the installed capital more intensively; 
(2) extending the working week of the plant to 18 production shifts; 
( 3) reorganising co 11 i ery shutdown peri ads so that more days in the 
year are worked by the plant. The emphasis is increasingly on 
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improving capital productivity owing to the capital intensity of modern 
mining methods. Actual average wage costs are approximately 30% of 
total costs in the late-l980s compared with over 65% in the 1950s. 
All the Board•s plans for the mining industry and the 
restructuring of the 1980s should be viewed within the broader 
political and economic constraints on the industry, and in the context 
of much lower demand for coal than was predicted in 1974. The effects 
of ideology and government pressures shall be considered more fully in 
the following section. Here it is necessary to reiterate some of the 
main consequences of the Coal Board•s investment strategy over the past 
fifteen or so years. 
In virtually all the articles to appear in The Mining Engineer in 
recent years there has been 1 ittle mention of the human costs of 
British Coal policies. Productivity indices are discussed without 
mentioning the scale of the industry•s contraction in terms of the 
numbers of jobs lost; coal reserves lost; premature colliery 
closures; direct and indirect social costs; the redundancy payments 
burden; and written off fixed costs. When the labour reducing 
consequences of pit closuress colliery mergers, and automation are 
mentioned they are treated as 11 impressive achievements". Figures 5.3 
and 5.4 show the productivity increases and reductions in operating 
costs achieved by the corporation since 1985. Table 5.5 lists some of 
the relevant statistics underlying this •business transformation•. As 
~lassey and Meegan (1982) point out, job loss and capacity cuts are 
sometimes good for capital, but always bad for labour. 
~ 203 ~ 
According to the NUM (1987) ~ productivity increases were almost 
entirely due to the application of new technology since the miners' 
strikes although this is disputed elsewhere (see Prior and McCloskey~ 
1988; Northard, 1987b). What is certa"irt is that the differential 
capital investment strategy of the Board has increased the rate of 
closures in the peripheral coalfields. This was stressed in Winterton's 
(1985) study of the NCB's applications of MINOS in the coalfields. In 
1985. Scotland, Durham, South Wales and Kent comprised 35% of NCB 
collieries but only 12% of MINOS applications. Overall capital 
investment figures reveal similar geographical disparities (see Table 
5.6). In March 1984, investments in the North Yorkshire pits were over 
£ one billions which included the Selby complex. There had also been 
massive capital expenditures on pits in the Doncaster, Barnsley and 
South Yorkshire areas. whereas capital investment in South Wales was 
only £20 million distributed between 28 pits~ producing about seven 
million tonnes a year. In the Barnsley area £327 million was spent on 
16 pits producing eight million tonnes a year (Computing The Magazine, 
ll-04-85: 9) 0 
To a certain extent the question of where to invest is determined 
by the initial design and development of the technology itself. The 
specific technical choice of the Coal Board have their own technical 
limits. Certain machines only work well under specific conditions. As 
with the ASL in the 'sixties. retreat mining methods, heavy-duty 
machinery and shield supports cannot be uniformly applied to all seams 
and pits. But the technology has not determined the direction the 
industry has gone in. In fact, it has always been possible for the 
coal industry to develop a more regionally-balanced capital investment 
strategy and to design different technology or tu apply the same 
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technology in different ways (see section 5.4). But as Winterton 
(1985) explained~ the NCB chose a restructuring strategy based on 
massive job losses derived from three main processes: 
(1) New capacity being introduced from the development and 
reorganisation of existing pits. This includes the linking of 
collieries into colliery complexes~ usually around single main 
shafts and preparation plants on the surface; 
(2) The elimination of human activity through automation; 
(3) As a result of increased productivity more pits then become 
classified as 11 surplus capacity 11 , or if they have not reached the 
tonnage-cost expectations of the corporation, as uuneconomic 
capacity '1• 
Additional "uneconomic capacity" was created by the continued 
development of Selby in the eighties at a time when coal demand in the 
UK was falling. Extra capacity at other developments, such as 
Asfordby, and arising from the introduction of more 11 flexible 11 working 
practices in the 1990s are likely to increase pressures to close down 
more pits. The number of working collieries in peripheral coalfields 
is now very small, and so it is likely that more pits from the central 
coalfields will join the ''high cost tail". At the start of 1989, there 
were 17 working pits in Nottinghamshire compared with 36 in the late 
1960s. Eight pits had closed since the miners' strike in spite of its 
being the heartland of the breakaway Union of Democratic Mineworkers 
(UDM). British Coal's plans to continue capacity reductions into the 
1990s may result in a further six or seven Notts' pits closing down. 
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Even more pits in the central coalfields will be threatened if oil and 
coal importing facilities ar·e expanded on the River Humber. Some 40 
per cent of the output of the Notti nghamsh ire pits goes to the four 
power stations nearest the Immingham terminal site. Together with the 
other proposed port, at ~Jurth Killingholme~ Immingham could import ten 
mi 11 ion tonnes of co a 1 a year ( FT, 10-02-89: 7). 
British Coal have tendtd to concentrate investment in new 
collieries and on major reconstruction schemes within the central 
coalfields of the Midlands and Yorkshire, but as O'Donnell (1988) 
observed from her study of the North Yorkshire coalfield, there are big 
intra-regional variations in capital investment. A turning point in 
corporate strategy toward pits in the North Yorkshire coalfield came 
after the 1984/5 miners' strike. Prior to the dispute closures in the 
coalfield were averaging one a year, but in the first fifteen months 
after the end of the dispute six collieries were closed and a further 
five were closed up to the Spring of 1988. In Yorkshire, as elsewhere, 
short-term fi nanci a 1 returns have taken precedence over other 
considerations, such as the extent and accessibility of coal reserves; 
past performance; future pit viability and market conditions (see 
concluding Chapter). The North Yorkshire Area was praised by British 
Coal management for breaking output and productivity records. The Area 
reduced operating costs from .£1.86 per Gigajoule to £1.59 per Gj by 
early 1988. To achieve this target, the Area management had to close 
down marginal capacity which was operating above the targets set for 
the industry as a whole, and to switch production to the lowest cost 
pits (O'Donnell, 1988:15). In so doing decisions were made which may 
actually increase the operating costs of surviving pits. This is 
particularly so where a group of pits share the capital and running 
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costs of single preparation plants and coal despatch facilities. 
Closure or contraction of one pit in the group lrJi 11 increase the 
financial pressures on the rest. Furthermore, the transfer of some of 
the miners from closed pits to surviving ones in the coalfield leads to 
rises in operating costs which places them in danger of exceeding the 
performance targets set by British Coal. As o•oonnell (1988:16) put 
it9 there exists 
•an in-built dynamic to the process of restructuring 
..• where the economic and financial fortunes of a 
number of collieries are closely intertwined•. 
By basing its restructuring on end-of-year financial targets and 
stringent accountancy measures to please the government, potential 
investors and financial institutions in the City 9 possible adverse 
long-term consequences are being ignored. As o•oonnell implies 9 there 
are possible long-term diseconomies as a result of ignoring some of the 
economic interdependencies between pits sharing resources within 
individual coalfields. It is worth noting that not all colliery 
managers have favoured British Coal•s closure policies since the 
strike. In 1986, the British Association of Colliery ~lanagement 
criticised the Board•s market-based operating philosophy in evidence to 
the House of Commons Select Committee on Energy. Referring to the 
Board•s plans for further closures, they pointed out that: 
•we are concerned that if this new strategy is 
implemented too literally the effect will be to 
increase unjustifiably the rate of closure• (FT, 
06-03-86:8). --
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They argued that methods other than pit closure should be implemented 
to remove surplus capacity in the longer term interests of both the 
industry and the United Kingdom. In spite of their objections~ British 
Coa 1 has continued to push through its pit closure strategy. The 
following section examines some of the political and ideological 
motives underlying the corporate restructuring processes~ and the 
changes in business philosophy during the period since the 1984/5 
strike. 
5.2 "Wooing the Collier Capitalist" 
The title of this section is taken from a headline in The Daily 
Telegraph (25-01-1989) and it is indicative of current attempts by 
British Coal to persuade miners to become shareowners in the industry. 
Underpinning virtually every part of British Coal•s restructuring in 
the •eighties, particularly since the end of the 1984/5 miners• strike, 
is the preparation of a nationalised industry for its eventual 
privatisation. As Whitfield (1985:14) explained during the strike: 
the current struggle in the mines is not just 
about pit closure, its about the future of the 
National Union of Mineworkers, the future of the 
mining industry, and ultimately about whether the 
labour movement is able to defend public ownership 
against the ideological and economic attacks of 
current Tory policy•. 
After the strike the Coal Board were able to implement a range of 
policies which have, in the words of a Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission (1989) report, helped to transform the industry 11 from an 
institution into a business 11 • 
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A crucial element of the transformation of the coal industry into 
a business was the application of tight public expenditure limits on it 
by the state. As Cooper et al (1986:136) argued, financial management 
and accounting statements are mechanisms by which the state can 
unobtrusively manage the activities of its enterprises. Through such 
mechanisms the state is able to influence the nationalised industries 
opportunities for investment and the possibilities for capital 
accumulation (see Chapter Four). In turn, the state•s use of financial 
controls, together with the ideological commitment of successive 
Thatcher governments to roll back the boundaries of state ownership, 
have actively moulded the language and the objectives of the management 
of state-owned enterprises. Virtually all the changes have been 
heavily loaded in favour of capital. Cooper et al (1986) examined how 
financial and accounting practices were used alongside technical and 
bureaucratic controls to reduce or remove the gains made by labour in 
its control of the labour process since nationalisation. 
The Thatcher governments have sought to 11 restore management•s 
right to manage 11 in all sectors of the economy via a range of policies 
including trade union reforms. Massive state resources were used 
against the miners, their communities and supporters during the 1984/5 
strike. Nevertheless, it is misleading to view the process of change 
purely in terms of a dichotomy between capital and labour. Whilst the 
miners• strike did polarise relations between the Coal Board and the 
majority of mineworkers, it also exposed divisions within capital and 
within labour. Indeed it took an 11 outsider••, Ian MacGregor to 11 shake 
up 11 the Board, and the hard line subsequently taken by the NCB against 
miners was not supported whole heartedly by many managers who had spent 
most of their working lives in the industry (see Beynon, 1985). 
- 209 -
During the MacGregor years as chairman the attitudes of senior 
managers hardened. The miners' strike had changed many previously 
taken for granted views of the world amongst managers and mineworkers. 
The return to work in the Spring of 1985 marked the beginning of 
another round of pit closures. The reduction in the number of miners 
and the introduction of labour-saving technology in working pits was 
one way of reducing the numeri ca 1 strength of the NUM (see Section 
5.1). Since the strike the government set arbitrary financial break 
even targets, and stringent accountancy controls were applied by 
British Coa 1. Management attitudes were influenced so much so that 
Cooper et al (1986:126) were able to report that: 
'All the managers we talked to in the NCB believed 
that the "bottom line" of the industry was profit; 
not safety, contribution to society, employment, 
satisfying work or any other measure of 
performance. As one manager saw it: "I don't want 
to work in a b 1 oody charity". A 1 though miners and 
most mining engineers and general managers in the 
NCB tended to avoid using fi nanci a 1 information, 
they had i nterna 1 i sed the 1 og i c that profit and 
loss were the absolute measures of performance, the 
bottom line'. 
The implications for the deep mining industry of the change in 
commercial attitude and organisational approach were outlined by 
Northard, British Coal's Operations Director, in 1987. He argued that 
the Corporation's policies had 
'opened the minds of management and men to break 
with their traditional outlook whereby hopeless 
collieries and difficult coalfaces had become a 
profession a 1 cha 11 enge and a formu 1 a for working 
with more capacity than necessary, employing 
correspondingly more resources and consequently 
operating at a higher cost of production' (Collier 
Guardian, Commerative Supplement, January 1987:38 . 
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As part of the process of "opening up the minds 11 of NCB personnel 9 
MacGregor sent senior managers and mining engineers on study trips to 
the USA as part of a deli berate move towards a more 11 business-minded 
approach" to running a state-owned industry (FT 9 06-03-86:8). The 
attempts to fuse British mining technology and American working 
practices have continued since MacGregor's departure. In spite of the 
fact that geological and mining conditions are very different from 
those in most UK underground mines9 and the opinions of some senim· 
mining engineers who visited the US that "much of the American scene is 
not transferable"9 the Corporation has adopted numerous US ideas to 
raise productivity levels (see Feickert 9 1987}. Indeed many elements 
of 'the Wheeler Plan' incorporate changes in shift patterns and working 
practices similar to what is already established in the US coal mining 
industry. 
During 1987 and 1988 several guest speakers of the Institute of 
Mining Engineers presented papers comparing and contrasting "free 
enterprise" mining in the USA with "state monolith 11 mining in the UK. 
Probably the most illuminating address as far as current British Coal 
policies are concerned was by Bill Carr9 the President of Jim Walter 
Resources Incorporated (Mining Division). In his early career Carr was 
a pit lad employed by the NCB. In his address Carr stated five areas 
of operations which have produced higher productivity in the US 
compared to British mines. These were: 
1. Surface Labour Density 
In the US all jobs are cost-justified. Workers are trained to do 
several jobs and develop multi-skills. The elimination of jobs through 
automation "is a real goal unhindered by union resistance". 
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2. Working Time at the Production Point 
Fast Systems of transport are used to get people from the surface to 
their workplace. Longer working shifts ensure that the productive time 
spent at the coalface is greater. 
3. Roof Bolting Systems 
Costs of materials such as steel arches and pit props can be reduced by 
the mechanical insertion of roof bolts, which are also used as 
auxi1liary supports in longwall moves. 
4. Heavy Duty Equipment 
Great emphasis is placed on machine reliability and repeatability of 
performance. All the main items of longwall equipment used by Jim 
Walter Resources have their origin in the UK. 
5. Worker Flexibility 
In the USA, employment levels at mines can be varied as the demand for 
coal changes. In times of hard competition, costs can also be cut by 
laying off personnel and eliminating jobs in less essential areas. 
Management can reduce or increase the number of days worked in any 
particular week, dependent upon inventory levels and market 
considerations (The Mining Engineer, February 1987:539-548). 
In his concluding remarks, Carr denounced nationalisation 
1The coal business, like any other business, should 
acquire its capital at least cost, on prevailing 
risk/reward terms, and must employ this capital in 
the most productive, innovative and responsible way 
it can devise. The discipline which is exerted to 
see that this happens is through the marketplace. 
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If the capital is used wiselys the industry will 
prosper; if unwisely9 the industry will go out of 
business. The very real accountability through the 
operation uf the marketplace does not apply in a 
nati ana 1 i sed~ state-owned enterprises where there 
is always the virtual certainty that government, 
for all kinds of reasons, will bailout the 
commercially bankrupt entity. 
The protection offered by government in this 
instance does not solve the problem, and in fact 
creates a climate counterproductive to good 
management ... 
Corporations are the economic agents of the 
people, just as governments are their political 
agents. The failure to preserve this distinction 
between the proper ro 1 es of economic agents and 
political authorities, threatens to politicise all 
economic decision-making. To the extent that this 
occurs - and the British coal industry is a classic 
example - it will impair fundamentally the ability 
of the business system to provide jobs, raise 
productivity and create wealth .•. 
The experiment with nationalisation has 
failed; it must be replaced with an industrial 
management philosophy that recognises the 
fundamentals of the laws of supply and demand and 
invigorates the initiatives and entrepreneurial 
spirit of risk-taking managers.• 
The reason for quoting Carr at length here is that his speech 
reflects 11 the business philosophy .. being promoted by state policies. 
One of the tenets of Thatcherism is that true business efficiency can 
only occur in the private sector. The fact that none of the mining 
engineers present at the meeting questioned Carr•s free enterprise 
rhetoric is perhaps indicative of the extent to which Thatcherism has 
pervaded through the Coal Board and organisation as a whole. Private 
ownership is seen as the only solution to the industry•s problems, 
which are interpretted entirely in terms of short term profitsg costs 
and financial criteria. As Moses observed with regard to new 
investment, 
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•Perhaps the most import~nt thing to be achieved is 
a revolution on thinking ~ that is 9 despite all the 
pressures~ new mines must pay•. 
Many of the technical-cum-organisational ideas suggested by Carr 
to raise productivity in British Mines have in fact been put into 
action in many working collieries. Whilst the NUM continues to resist 
the Corporation•s notions of "worker flexibility 11 9 British Coal has 
successfully exploited the new industrial order since the strike in 
1984/5 to its advantage. British Coal has used the threat of pit 
closures or the cancellation of capital investment proposals as 
bargaining levers (some would say blackmail) to persuade local NUfvi 
officials into new working practice agreements. For instance 9 the 
proposed £80 million Margam project in South Wales was postponed 
because it is being made conditional upon the South Wales NUM signing a 
flexible working agreement 9 which would involve six-day working and 
longer shifts. IVIargam would create at least 850 local jobs and the 
South Wales NUM argue that if they miss the deal the work may go either 
to contracted labour or the UDM9 or alternatively Margam may never be 
developed. 
British Coal has been able to introduce piecemeal privatisation 
into areas controlled by the UDM 9 particularly Notti nghamshi re and 
South Derbyshire. The UDM has already experimented with its own 
11 mining company .. to compete for contract work in the coal industry. 
British Coal has increasingly turned to private contractors to develop 
coalfaces, build tunnels and other projects outside the nonnal 
production process. The Corporation•s use of sub-contractors is being 
introduced outside the NUM•s negotiating procedures and the practice 
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has spread to more and more mining functions, especially work 
traditionally undertaken by craftsmen. As the NUM (1987) noted, there 
are 
'instances reported of craftsmen being made 
redundant on the Friday and returning to work the 
following Monday at the same colliery in the 
employment of a contractor.• 
Such instances have become commonplace even in NUM strongholds such as 
South Yorkshire. Nevertheless, it is the UDM which has taken most 
advantage of the offer of ad hoc contracts. 
Shortly after taking up the post of Board Chairman, Haslam 
recognized the value of the UDM to the Board's plans. 
'The UDM is younger, it is ready to embrace new 
ideas. It moves more quickly to support our 
objectives, and appears more progressive• (FT, 
7-10-86). --
By rnid-1988 the UDM had won almost 2,000 contracts, some of which were 
worth £80,000. In Nottinghamshire, teams of miners worked three shifts 
a day for seven days a week to win big bonuses for colliery development 
work. At one pit weekend workers were paid bonuses of £1,500 for 
developing a new coalface in only 16 weeks, compared with the six 
months management had expected. 
The real significance of sub-contracting and the formation of 
teams of miners to compete against outside contractors for development 
work at pits was noted by Kim Howells, Labour MP and former research 
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officer for the South Wales NUM. Howells pointed out that if the 
sub-contracting system continues to spread~ 
'the Coal Board will simply become a leasing 
operation and the whole thing will be privatised 
through the back door' (quoted in FT9 13-05=88:8). 
Numerous bureaucratic reorganisations recently implemented by the Board 
are designed to ease the privatisation of the industry, if not as a 
whole then in parts. The reintroduction of decentralised pay 
bargaining and local incentive schemes increase the possibility of 
introducing share-ownership and contract mining arrangements because 
there is no longer any degree of national solidarity over wages. The 
encouragement of competition between miners and pits through the use of 
differential benefits and losses has undermined the unity of the NUM. 
Furthermore, the corporation has introduced fundamental changes to its 
administrative structure. It has sold off the separate area 
headquarters of South Wales, Scotland, the Western Area and the North 
East, and grouped them together as "peri ph era l" groups under centra 1 
control. The Head of Group Operations is none other than Albert 
Wheeler~ author of "the Wheeler Plan" and champion of six day working. 
The changes in the geography of administrative control and the 
distinction between the central blocks - the Yorkshire and Midlands 
coalfields - and peripheral groups makes it easier for parts of the 
industry to be "packaged" and divided for eventual privatisation. 
The forms that privatisation can take are manifold. Robinson and 
Sykes (1987) suggested that the corporation be sold off firstly on an 
area-by-area basis, but then further structural changes could take 
place by: 
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(1) management/worker buy-outs; 
(2) private sector mining and engineering firms in the UK buying into 
the industry (see chapter seven); 
(3) groups of miners wishing to work in mining cooperatives; 
(4) big multinational companies and mining houses buying up shares of 
the industry (see chapter seven). 
Like former Coal Board boss MacGregor~ they argue that groups of 
workers~ acting as companies or cooperatives~ ought to be given the 
opportunity to mine coa 1 at those pits British Co a 1 is considering 
closing down~ that is the so-called 11 uneconomic'1 pits. 
Another strand of privatisation is the introduction of 
share-ownership schemes. This is clearly on the government's agenda. 
In a speech made by Cecil Parkinson~ the Secretary of State for Energy~ 
in October 1988~ the notion of collier capitalists was enthusiastically 
spelled out: 
•Just think, miners will be shareholders with a 
stake in their own industry. Mr. Scargill - if 
he's not in Cuba - will be sitting down to 
negotiate with the managers of private companies .•• 
From the day when the miners' leaders thought they 
owned the Government . o o to the day when every 
miner owns part of his own mine' (quoted in The 
Daily Telegraph, 13-10-88:l)o 
Miners at Kellingley colliery, near Wakefield in West Yorkshire, one of 
the most productive pits in Britain, have already been approached by a 
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London-based market research company seeking their views about the 
possibility of share-holding if the industry was floated as a public 
company (Yorkshire Post~ 24-01-1989). The research was commissioned by 
British Coal and clearly indicates the Board•s intentions. Furthermore 9 
the Corporation has already laid down plans for a series of small 
pithead power stations jointly owned by British Coal 9 private 
contractors and local electricity distribution companies. Bilsthorpe 
and Rufford collieries in Nottinghamshire have been offered as possible 
sites for the first prototype power station capable of supplying up to 
200 MW of power to the East Midlands Electricity Board (EMEB). The 
scheme would involve share ownership for miners in the consortium that 
would run the plant. Crucially the scheme would need the equivalent of 
a no-strike agreement to guarantee a regular supply of fuel to the 
EMEB. If the UDM agrees to these proposals the door will be opened for 
similar joint ventures and share ownership schemes between other 
collieries and the electricity supply industry. 
The issue of share ownership raises the question of who will 
actually own and control the coal industry in the future if it is not 
to be a nationalised industry? Share ownership does not mean power 
sharing. Undoubtedly the major beneficiaries of any privatisation of 
the coal industry are likely to be the senior managers, private sector 
institutions and companies involved (see Chapters Seven and Eight). 
The notion of there being a very diversified coal industry largely 
owned and operated by small worker cooperatives is extremely unlikely. 
The rationalisation of the industry, the concentration of resources in 
a few colliery complexes 9 and the administrative reorganisation of 
British Coal all suggest the preparation of an industry for division 
into three 9 four or five major private sector groupings. Large 
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institutional shareholders and big private investors are likely to have 
most say in the running of the industry. Share ownership for miners 
under such an industrial structure is a very long way from 11 the mines 
for the mineworkers 11 ideal fought for by the syndicalists and militant 
miners in the early 1900s (see Coates 9 1974). 
It is also argued by the government that a diversified, 
competitive and private coal industry will produce greater 
opportunities for increased pay and for profit sharing as the industry 
takes advantage of market opportunities. A centre for Policy Studies 
report argued: 
'The result should be greater job security, which 
would be both genuine and deserved because it would 
be based upon improved efficiency rather than the 
illusion of security created by taxpayer subsidies 
and union militancy' (see Robinson and Sykes, 
1987:9). 
Nevertheless, the gains will almost certainly be shared between fewer 
workers. It is also necessary to examine precisely what advantages the 
remaining workers will get under a system of private ownership. 
In the United States coal mining industry the major source of 
"flexibility" in response to market changes is the ability of companies 
to hire and fire at will. As Carr (1987:547) put it: 
'The flexibility in managing the business that 
varying the manpower level gives to management 
better ensures survivability in hard times and the 
ability to rehire as the difficulties of the 
business cycle recede. This is the norm rather 
than the exception in the majority of businesses. 
It is only in the nationalised system that manning 
levels are resistant to variations of this nature.' 
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~1ining companies also operate 11 core'' and "periphery'' employment 
practices9 whereby a hard core of very skilled workers are kept on even 
during lean business periods~ but other workers are laid off during 
those times. Carr described the practice with Jim Walter Resources. 
'In our case the protection offered to the worker 
who is temporarily dismissed because of the 
requirements of the business is that he or she is 
on recall on a seniority basis9 and during the 
layoff period the workperson involved retains 
medical and health insurance coverage for up to bne 
year.' 
The fact is that an industry driven by money rather than tonnes of coal 
produced is likely to have many people employed on a temporary or 
short-term basis 9 particularly if the British tnergy market is also to 
be opened up to unrestricted fuel imports (see Chapter Seven and the 
concluding Chapter). Flexibility may mean that more workers have to 
accept lower wages or spells of unemployment during times of low 
profi tabi 1 ity for their employers (see GAITS, 1986). This form of 
"numerical flexibility" creates a fear of unemployment amongst managers 
and workers in the US mining companies. Since 1979. over 60 9000 jobs 
have been lost in American mines, despite the rise in coal production 
levels. 
The NUM have opposed British Coal's flexibility proposals on 
grounds of safety and employment security. Virtually all the proposals 
are designed to cut costs and improve productivity, and many require 
revisions to existing mines' health and safety legislation. Incentive 
bonus schemes, longer production shifts, contract development work are 
all ways of increasing the intensity and productivity of the mining 
labour process. The NUM argue that they reduce attention to safety 
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procedures and may increase the potential for accidents or injuries at 
~vork. In addition~ the introduction of heavy-duty machines and di ese1 
powered vehicles underground has increased dust and fume levels. There 
is also debate about the support reliability of cheaper roof bolts 
compared with steel arches and pit props. 
Crucially the main area of contention with the Corporation's 
flexibility plans are the effects of more continuous production and six 
or seven day working weeks on employment levels. A 20 per cent 
increase in total output from existing collieries would result in more 
pit closures. According to the NUM's Research and Industrial Relations 
Department (1987:35): 
'a six day week arrangement would result in a 
minimum of 31 pit closures and full implementation 
of British Coal's proposals would axe 55 pits with 
a loss of jobs of over 409000'. 
If state ownership is to be defended there is a need to develop 
alternative objectives and ways of organising production that will 
defend jobs in the industry. Hitherto, the Labour Party and the right 
wing factions in the trade union movement have tried to water down 
existing public ownership policies. They have developed a broad 
concept of "social ownership" encompassing a wide variety of ideas9 
including share ownership 9 worker cooperatives, joint public-private 
ventures, and greater state regulation in the free market. Some 
left-wing trade unions want the Labour Party to promise to 
re-nationalise all the industries that have been privatised by the 
Thatcher governments. As this study has suggested there is a need to 
reevaluate the form that the nationalisation of the coal industry has 
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taken. Section 5.4 looks at possible directions the coal industry 
could go in~ which would help to secure employment~ without taking the 
industry out of the public sector. 
5.3 Public-private sector relations and the technical change 
process 
Any account of the restructuring processes affecting the British 
coa 1 industry should take into account the inter-dependencies and 
relations between the state monopoly buyer and private suppliers of 
capital goods. Private manufacturers have played a leading part in the 
technical transformation of the nationalised coal industry. Equally~ 
the National Coal Board has greatly influenced the whole technical 
innovation process in what was described as a close 11 complimentary, 
interactive" technical relationship with major suppliers (see Townsend~ 
1976). As a result, the fortunes of the mining machinery makers are 
tied to the ups and downs of the UK coal mining industry (see Chapter 
Six). 
The rapid contraction of coal output~ particularly of the numbers 
of collieries, has produced tensions in relations between the Coal 
Board and its suppliers in the 'eighties. Furthermore, the 
encouragement of a more business-minded approach by the nationalised 
industry has led to a greater emphasis on short-term lowest cost 
criteria as a basis for purchasing materials, machines and components. 
Formerly cosy relations between state monopoly and private 
manufacturers have been broken by the decline in overall business and 
by new state management philosophies geared much more towards profits 
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rather than production. The consequences of these changes on the UK 
mining machinery industry are discussed in Chapter Six. The following 
details trace the evolution of public-private sector relations with 
reference to particular product markets. 
In the early years the NCB had to import many of its equipment 
needs (see Chapter Two). The Coal Board continued its technical 
liaison with mining machinery firms started with the formation of the 
Technical Advisory Committee during wartime. The coal industry 
purchased a wide variety of equipment of all kinds. For example, 
amongst the various coal-cutters it purchased were Mavor & Coulson • s 
'Samson Stripper•, the 'Huwood Slicer•, AB Meco-Moores, and 
Joy-Sullivan's •Gloster Getter•. It also purchased the 'Dosco Miner•, 
a longwall version of the Joy Continuous Miner, and several room and 
pi 11 ar machines from the United States. UK producers turned out an 
average of 850 standard coa 1 cutters a year between 1946-51 (see 
Lansdown and Wood, 1957) (see Table 5.7). 
From the outset the NCB realized that general progress in 
mechanisation could come only through machinery either designed for or 
specially adapted to British mining conditions. The NCB's efforts 
centred on the longwall method of mining. The Reid Report (1945) had 
recognised that the major impediment to raising productivity at the 
coal face was the three shift system of mining. It envisaged a new 
generation of face technology that would integrate the various 
functions into a mining system with coal getting on every shift (see 
references to Meco-Moore machines in Chapter Two). The system included 
flexible power loaders to be mounted onto special face conveyors which 
could be moved bodily sideways by mechanical means several times during 
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the course of a shift without dismantling. In turn~ this would mean 
"prop free faces •• with no need for props between the conveyor and the 
new line of the face. 
In the late 1940s the Coal Board imported armoured face conveyors 
(AFCs) from West Germany~ and eventually 1 i cences were obtai ned by 
several UK manufacturers to produce them. The major breakthrough in 
power loading came with the development of the Anderton Shearer Loader 
(ASL) by a small NCB team in the early 1950s~ which quickly became 
•the backbone of the Ncs•s drive to improve output 
per manshift' (see Townsend~ 1976). 
The 'fifties were record years for colliery investment and they were 
also prosperous years for the UK mining machinery suppliers~ especially 
those primary suppliers (and their sub-contractors) which developed 
close technical relations with the NCB~ especially for suppliers of 
longwall items. Other types of equipment were needed, such as coal 
haulage and handling machinery, flameproof items, surface washery 
machinery, coal crushers and preparation plant. By the mid-1950s there 
was negligible import penetration and the UK mining suppliers were able 
to meet most NCB demands. Some overseas manufacturers had been 
encouraged to set up production plants in the UK, such as UMM and EIMCO 
in the North East of England. 
By the mid-fifties the Coal Board had established its own central 
engineering establishments and developed very close working relations 
with suppliers. Townsend (1976; 1980) studies the relations between 
the NCB's formal research and development facility at Bretby, near 
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Burton-on-Trent and the main private manufacturers with licences to 
make the ASL - Anderson Boyes, British Jeffrey Diamond (BJD), and 
Eickhoff of West Germany. Most of the technical representatives or 
service engineers employed by the manufacturers were former employees 
of the NCB. Townsend {1980:154) pointed out that the boards, including 
the chairman and managing directors, of the two principal UK-based coal 
cutter makers, were ex-NCB, as were 11 75 per cent of upper and middle 
management". Ties between state monopoly buyer and private suppliers 
were further strengthened by the fact that many NCB staff members, 
including some Board members, held shareholdings in several mining 
machinery firms (1). The close, often personal ties between private 
and public sector have continued into the 1980s. Several managers in 
the mining machinery industry were employed either as mining engineers 
or other staff within the NCB. 
The influence of the NCB 1 s monopoly purchasing power on the 
structure, development and industrial restructuring of the supply 
industry can best be seen with reference to specific product markets. 
Of these, the powered roof support market is a useful example, if only 
because it involves a relatively small group of primary suppliers. The 
earliest achievements in the research, design and development of 
hydraulic powered roof supports were dominated by three important 
manufacturers - Dowty, Gullick Limited and W.E. & F. Dobson. 
Dowty had entered into the mining markets after the second world 
war as an engineering group with experience in manufacturing hydraulics 
in the aircraft industry. After a member of the Dowty board had 
visited an underground mine and saw 11 a forest of creaking wooden pit 
props doing a most indifferent job 11 • Dowty investigated the possibility 
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of supporting mine roofs by hydraulic support (Rolt9 1972:Vol. 1). The 
first advancing roof support in the form of a chock was produced at 
Aschurch in 1949 but this was temporarily shelved in favour of the 
11 Dowty Roofmaster"9 the world's first semi-automatic system of roof 
support. Initially most of the corporation's production for the NCB 
was carried out by Dowty Au to Units. But owing to the profi tab 1 e 
potential of the mine roof support business and the expansionary plans 
of the Coal Board, it was decided in 1954 to make Dowty Mining 
Equipment an autonomous unit responsible for its own production. At 
the end of August 1954, Dowty Auto Units was renamed Dowty Hydraulic 
Units and a large new factory was built at Aschurch, near Tewkesbury in 
Gloucestershire, close to the corporate headquarters in Cheltenham. 
Dowty Mining Equipment was left in full possession of a former Ministry 
of Supply building, which was redesigned in the interior for the mass 
production of pit props. 
'This was the first Dowty effort in this field9 but 
with its automatic multi-welding machines and other 
ingenious devices it was a most impressive example 
of modern flow production technique. The 
production line was started in December 1956 and 
thereafter the facts speak for themselves. The 
plant consumes fifteen miles of steel tube each 
week, the mi 11 i onth Dowty pit prop came off the 
line in April 1957 ... ' (Rolt, 1972:Vol 19 63). 
The rapid growth in business experienced by Dowty Mining Equipment 
Limited in the 1950s was echoed elsewhere in various product markets. 
The NCB was planning to expand output and to mechanise its operating 
collieries, which meant full order books and forward contracts well in 
advance for most primary suppliers. Another roof support manufacturer 
to benefit was Gullick Limited, which was a small company with no mass 
production facilities. Unlike Dowty, Gullicks had supplied private 
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coal companies with equipment before the second world war (see Chapter 
Two). Gullick sub-contracted much work to other firms. It relied for 
most of its fabrication work on other companies - A.J. Muschamp & Co. 
Ltd.~ Butterley and Cotterill~ which later became part of the Park Web 
Group. To capitalize on the rapid growth in demand for roof supports~ 
both at home and abroad~ it was necessary for Gullick Limited to 
acquire better manufacturing facilities. This was achieved in 1957 by 
a merger in which William Park & Co. Forgemasters Limited purchased the 
whole of the capital of Gullick. 
One other company held NCB powered roof support approved 
certificates prior to 1960 - WE & F Dobson (a Dobson Hardwick Group 
company). The company supplied the NCB with frame supports. The first 
of these were installed at Newstead Colliery in the East Midlands 
Division in 1958. In the mid-sixties, Dobson introduced rigid based 
supports with the addition of a safety fixture called 11 the deadman's 
handle 11 • These were introduced at several collieries but they never 
reached the popularity enjoyed by Gullick's 'Seaman• articulated 
supports (Purdy, 1982:527). 
Through the innovative efforts of both the suppliers and the NCB 
the British companies were able to secure a market niche in longwall 
technology, which included a wide range of products such as roof 
supports, shearers~ conveyors, tunnelling machines, through to 
complimentary flameproof and intrinsically-safe items for underground 
use. In the roof support markets of the world, British firms developed 
a market lead in hydraulic props. Continental manufacturers and mining 
engineers during the same period concentrated on mechanical, friction 
type props, unsuitable for the developments in the powered supports 
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field. By the late 1950s both Gullick and Dowty were exporting their 
roof supports to mining markets in various parts of the world~ although 
it was not until the late 1970s that mechanised longwall mining found 
ready markets in major coal producing countries outside of the UK and 
West Germany (see Chapter Seven). Dowty was particularly active 
overseas. In 1958 the company had formed sa 1 es subs i diaries in North 
America9 whilst licences to make Dowty props were granted to firms in 
Germany. France and Japan. In West Germany Dowty teamed up with 
Salzgitter Maschinen AG9 which had the most modern large-scale pit prop 
production plant outside the UK. 
The success of companies like Dowty and Gullick in the roof 
support business encouraged other mining machinery suppliers to 
diversify into the business. The Coal Board actively supported these 
moves. The most important thing for suppliers to the NCB was that 
mechanisation at surviving collieries would enable them to reap 
profits, even though the number of working pits was being cut down very 
rapidly. So in the early and mid •sixties several product markets were 
proving profitable and demand for new equipment actually expanded at a 
time of deep mining contraction. In the roof support business five 
more companies were granted certificates by the Coal Board to supply 
roof supports. In chronological order these were Wild in 1960; 
Underground Mining Machinery in 1964; Fletcher Stewart in 1965; 
Bonser and Huwood in 1966. Prior to 1964 most roof support 
installations were in the East Midlands Division~ but after that date 
virtually every working colliery in the land installed roof supports9 
reflecting the universal acceptance of powered supports as an aid to 
more economic production and improved safety. Output from powered 
support faces increased from 22 per cent to 91 per cent in just eight 
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years - between 1964 and 1972. Purchases reached a peak between 
1966-68. According to the NCB: 
1 Even during the period of peak purchases it was 
apparent from forward projections of production 
that there would be a marked reduction in 
requirements and that a relatively level demand for 
replacement9 as opposed to additional9 faces would 
would ensue from about 1968 1 (Evidence to the 
Select Committee on Nationalised Industries~ 
1974-5, Appendix One, para. 38). 
Drastic cut-backs in colliery capacity, and more significantly 9 
the fall in overall NCB investment, which by 1968/9 was in real terms 
running at less than half the expenditure of the 1950s, did little to 
adversely affect the profits of the major suppliers. In fact, the 
Select Committee for Nationalised Industries had to investigate serious 
allegations of excess profiteering by the major roof support 
manufacturers in the sixties (The Select Committee, 1974/5). 
Between 1966-68 there were eight roof support suppliers to the 
NCB. There was considerable over capacity in the market by 1968 and 
each supplier realized that the NCB 1 s level of demand could not be 
sustained at the peaks of the previous two years. In spite of its 
rapid programme of mechanisation the NCB had reduced total capital 
expenditure since 1957. The Board had also reduced its investments on 
1 major schemes 1 from £50 million per annum in 1958/9 to £11 million in 
1968/9. It would not be long before the primary suppliers of 
mechanized longwall equipment would be hit by a reduction in NCB 
demand. Furthermore, the outlook for the following decades was bleak 
with regard to the coal industry. The 1967 White Paper on the industry 
predicted large coal capacity cuts in the 1 seventies as cheap oil and 
gas (and nuclear power) continued to undercut traditional coal markets. 
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No matter how false the government's official predictions proved 
to be~ there was a widely-held view that the coal industry would 
continue its decline. It was this view that persuaded the government 
to take steps to rationalise and reorganise the mining machinery supply 
industry~ which was part of a much broader economic strategy to 
encourage mergers and industrial concentration in important 
manufacturing industries. The Industrial Reorganisation Corporation 
(IRC) was established by the Labour government in 1966 to promote or 
assist the reorganisation or development of any industry~ or of any 
industrial enterprise. The economic rationale behind the creation of 
the IRC was the emphasis on 
'the need for more concentration and 
rationalisation to promote the greater efficiency 
and international competitiveness of British 
industry• (IRC, 1968). 
In August 1968 the NCB were approached by the IRC with a 
suggestion that they should examine the structure of the mining 
machinery industry. It was agreed that the IRC should: 
•undertake a review of the present structure of the 
mining machinery industry to ascertain what, if 
any, changes are needed to meet the ongoing 
situation at home and in markets overseas• (The 
Select Committee on the Nationalised Industries, 
1974:5; Appendix One, para. 43). 
According to the NCB, the IRC took into consideration the following set 
of considerations regarding the powered roof support suppliers: 
(1) That future orders would be insufficient to meet the existing 
production capacity of the manufacturers; 
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(2) That this may lead to ua protracted period of debilitating 
competition" between the suppliers~ which "might not necessarily 
leave the pattern of manufacture best suited to the Board's 
long-term requirements''. 
(3) That some reorganisation was necessary in order "to maximise 
exports of mining machinery 11 , particularly of complete face 
systems packages to compete with those available from other 
sources, such as \~est Germany. 
As a result of the IRC/NCB negotiations with roof support 
manufacturers three main groups of mergers took place (see Table 5.8). 
As an incentive to the suppliers to merge into the new groups the NCB 
gave them assurances of a minimum level of orders for new supports for 
a transitional period ending on the 31st March, 1972, subject to the 
acceptability of price, quality and service (The Select Committee, 
1974/5, page x, para. 9). By 1970 there were effectively three 
dominant suppliers of supports to the NCB. Owing to the fact that the 
NCB had successfully introduced full-face mechanisation at all the 
existing collieries and faces it was technically feasible to do so, the 
Board then embarked on a period of standardization of face machinery, 
reducing the number of machine varieties. From 1st April 1972 it was 
agreed with the manufacturers to place a two year freeze on the design 
of main face line supports, although not of supports used for other 
purposes. The Board also sought to buy the best design of each major 
sub-assembly, such as the legs, valves and rams, as an NCB standard to 
be purchased by competitive tender. 
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The roof support market was not the only one to undergo industrial 
concentration during this period. Other important mergers took place 
independently of the IRC. For instance, in April 1968, the Dowty Group 
acquired Higgins Boughton Industries whose main subsidiary was the 
~1ining Engineering Company (Meco) Limited of ~Jorcester, renowned for 
its conveyors and cutter-loader machines (see Chapter Two). Thus, 
Dowty Me co was formed as part of a strategy by the 1 arger group to 
coordinate the design and integrate the production of the three 
elements of coal-getting. Conveying, roof supporting and coal-cutting 
were coordinated almost as parts of one machine, so it was logical that 
Dowty should attempt to become a single source for the complete package 
of 1 ongwa 11 face machinery. Dowty had a 1 so taken over the mining 
interests of Bonser Engineering Limited, which manufactured various 
products, including roof supports at a factory at Hucknall, 
Notti nghamshi re. In the process Dowty transferred Bonser's service 
depot from Clay Cross to Hucknall. 
So having got a substantial share of the roof support business and 
entered the market for conveyors Dowty then sought to acquire Anderson 
Mavor under the aegis of the IRC (MMC, 1982, para. 4.5). Success would 
have made Dowty a major supplier to the NCB in the power loader and 
roadheader markets. Anderson Mavor refused to become a part of the 
Dowty Group and managed to keep its independence. Only three years 
earlier in 1966, Anderson Boyes, the principal supplier of the Anderton 
Shearer Loader, merged with Mavor and Cou 1 son, another Glasgow-based 
company, to become Anderson Mavor, which later (in 1974) became 
Anderson Strathclyde. In the 1950s, Mavor and Coulson had acquired 
Austin Hoy of High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, and its associate Hoy 
Carbides, to provide a source of hard metal cutting elements, cutting 
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chains and picks for its own mining machinery. Thus Anderson Mavor was 
vertically integrated with subsidiary companies making some of the main 
components in shearer and roadheader manufacture. 
By 1970 the UK mining machinery industry had undergone its major 
phase of restructuring in response to the NCB 1 s needs for fewer 
specialist suppliers of the main items of longwall equipment following 
the peak of the industry 1 s mechanisation phase in the 1960s. An 
important consideration for the manufacturers at the time of merger 
activity and in the early years of their merged operations was the 
demand for British produced coal~ and the NCB 1 s consequential 
production and equipment purchasing policies. Forecasts in the late 
1 Sixties were favouring the continuation of cheap oil supplies from the 
Middle East. These forecasts proved to be completely wrong9 as did 
other assumptions in the Labour Government 1 s energy strategy, such as 
the promise of cheap nuclear power. The dramatic t\>Jist in coal 1 s 
position in the total energy mix as a result of the OPEC oil price 
increase of 1973:4, meant that the NCB embarked upon ambitious capital 
projects and suppliers received orders in excess of what had been 
predicted at the time of the IRC negotiations. Thus, the period from 
1974 to 1979 was a prosperous one for most mining machinery makers, but 
there were occasional bottlenecks in supply due to under capacity. 
A number of significant points about public-private sector 
relations arise out of an examination of the period up to 1974. 
Firstly, the influence of government policies is great on both the 
shaping of NCB strategies and private sector responses. After 1957 
successive governments sought a multi-fuel economy, even if it meant 
high dependency on imports. The Coal Board insisted on an energy 
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policy that took into account the loss of money already invested into 
the mines; the bad effects fuel imports would have on the country's 
balance of payments; the permanent loss of a national asset; and the 
dubious wisdom of relying for fuel supplies on oil-rich countries in a 
politically unstable part of the world (Schumacher. 1960; Robens. 
1972; Hall, 1981). Governments put pressure Clln the Coal Board to 
become cheaper by cutting capacity and becoming more mechanised. 
Whilst some manufacturers of items such as coal face equipment made 
large profits from the NCB's mechanisation measures it was not a 
prosperous period for all suppliers. 
'Between 1957 and 1966 the industry lost over 40% 
of its producing collieries. This had a tremendous 
effect on the mining supply industry and reduced 
demand for equipment drastically, causing some 
manufacturers to disappear' (Fenton. 1987:52). 
The government also played a key role in the mergers of the late 
'sixties, which several companies strongly resented. 
According to one analysis of the period, 
'The reorganisation left the supply industry better 
able to supply the smaller NCB and compete abroad' 
(Fenton, 1987:52). 
Nevertheless, the mergers failed to produce a fully integrated supplier 
of complete face packages, which it could be argued, put Britain at a 
disadvantage against some foreign manufacturers in export markets in 
the 'seventies. because British firms had little experience of 
cooperating together to form export packages of a whole range of mine 
machinery (NEDO, 1985). 
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Secondly, the Coal Board, as a monopsonistic purchasing power, 
played a very active part in the development of new machinery, even 
though it did not manufacture it, Mining machinery manufacturers geared 
up their production processes to producing equipment mostly for the 
longwall mining method. This was in part a handicap in export markets 
because ·longwalling was not widely adopted in coal producing countries 9 
and in part, an advantage owing to the comparative advantage British 
manufacturers enjoyed in this specialist market niche (see Chapter 
Seven). To a large extent UK mining suppliers have adapted their own 
design and development direction to meet the wishes of the Coal Board. 
As Townsend (1976, col. 37) noted in the shearer market of the 1960s: 
overall NCB requirements made all attempts to 
preserve • brand 1 oya lty • imposs i b 1 e and the 
productive capacity of the British suppliers was 
fully stretched to satisfy a demand well over the 
most optimistic of estimates'. 
The manufacturers have taken advantage of the Coal Board's 
technical support and its research and development facilities, which 
were better than any a private corporation could support. As Harold 
Rhodes, the former director general of the Association of British 
Mining Equipment Companies (ABMEC) put it: 
'Without question the UK is leading in the world in 
mining technology, because the NCB has developed 
the majority of UK • s systems through its research 
and development facilities and has encouraged their 
use outside the NCB' (Computing The Magazine, 
11-04-85: 12). 
The mining technology Rhodes is referring to are microprocessor 
controlled longwall machines, which have become a speciality of the 
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British mining engineering industry since the mid-l970s when the NCB 
began to develop MINOS. Sophisticated microprocessor control systems 
were applied to virtually all the main items of equipment from coal 
cuttersg roof supports and road-headers to pumps and fans 9 conveyors, 
maintenance systems and coal preparation plants on the surface. This 
necessitated changes not only in the products but in the production 
processes of many mining manufacturers. 
Most of the leading primary suppliers - Dowty~ Gullick~ Anderson 
Strathclyde, the subsidiaries of Hawker Siddeley - were able to adjust 
quickly to the new demands of the Coal Board for not just mechanical, 
hydraulic and electrical equipment, but for micro-electronics. The 
companies which were subsidaries of larger engineering groups had the 
resources and in house electronics expertise to draw on to set up their 
own software and hardware facilities. Other companies relied on 
specialist suppliers to provide the software packages. A number of 
mining machinery firms also reorganised production within their 
manufacturing plants. Dowty and Anderson Stratclyde introduced 
flexible manufacturing systems (FMS) into parts of their factories in 
order to speed up production and response to NCB demands. This 
necessitated some redundancies and the re-training of some of their 
workers. 
It is easy to exaggerate the scale and rapidity of the technical 
changes taking place. A large number of smaller suppliers and 
sub-contractors to the mining industry were unable to invest the 
capital resources required to modernize their plants. Part of the work 
of the National Economic Development Committee's (NEDO) Working Party 
set up to look at the development of the mining machinery industry was 
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to encourage the adoption of new manufacturing technology. As one 
convener at a traditional mechanical engineering supplier in Barnsley 
recalled: 
•we had a chap from NEDO come round. He showed us 
videos on new technology. It was laughable ... I 
asked him~ 11 When did you last come here? 11 He said, 
twenty years ago. I said, 11 Well it hasn't changed 
a bit'11 (Interview: Michael Allen, July 1986). 
The most important force for change in the industrial structure 
and employment levels of the UK mining machinery industry have not been 
the application of new technology by the Coal Board and manufacturers, 
but the overall decline in mining activity (see Chapter Six). Even so, 
it is necessary to point out the fact that the particular technical 
choices made by the Coal Board and the way in which technology has been 
applied in the mining industry has accelerated the pace of pit 
closures. In one sense it can be argued that the manufacturers have 
supplied the technical means for reducing their home business with the 
coal industry. 
There is nothing inevitable about the particular investment 
strategy the Coal Board has followed. The potential has always existed 
in the mining engineering industry to make equipment for different 
mining conditions - thick, medium, thin seams; level or inclined and 
uneven faces and floors; and even heavy faulting. Several 
manufacturers have exported such technology abroad, whilst mines in 
Britain have been closed as "unprofitable 11 or "uneconomic" partly as a 
result of inappropriate or insufficient capital investment. The 
following section develops these arguments further. 
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5.4 The Limitations and inflexibilities of the Coal Board's 
capital investment approach and ideas for alternative 
approaches 
As noted in section 5.1 ~ the NCB chose a technological route 
familiar to many industries~ both public and private 9 guided by 
managerial philosophies which centred on winning control over the 
mining labour process and placing control increasingly in the hands of 
senior management and a small technological elite. During the 1950s 
and 1960s the NCB developed and implemented mechanised longwall 
technology designed to optimise output from particular coal mines and 
faces deemed to be the most 11 economic" in terms of productivity indices 
and returns on investment. It was in the 'sixties that the Coal Board 
was able to mechanise collieries and cut capacity. The pit closure 
programme was aided by the availability of innovations such as the 
Anderton Shearer Loader and 11 Walking 11 roof supports which enabled big 
increases in production at the coal face. If a colliery was not on the 
list for investment in mechanised mining then it was usually put on to 
the list of pits due for closure. The NCB's selective capital 
investment strategy 9 made even more selective by government fuel 
policies and the availability of cheap oil9 had important social and 
spatial consequences for it forced the pace of pit closures in the 
coalfields of Scotland, North East England, the North West, South Wales 
and Kent. 
Broadly speaking, the early •seventies marked a different phase in 
the economic, social and technical restructuring of the coal industry, 
although the social and spatial implications were a continuation of the 
trends set in the 'sixties. The availability of cheap microelectronics 
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by the mid-•seventies enabled the NCB to enter its •automation phase•. 
From the start there were underlying political motivations influencing 
both the way in whicll technology was designed and implemented. Major 
capita 1 investment decisions were made from Hobart House and sma 11 
teams of researchers worked on the Mine Operating System (MINOS) at 
Bretby. As in private corporations 9 the Coa 1 Board • s preoccupations 
tended to be controlling the production process 9 raising labour 
productivity and output from fewer workers 9 and lowering production 
costs9 especially wage labour costs. The NCB deliberately chose 
specific designs of engineering systems and applications of 
microprocessor controls and monitoring devices to maximise managerial 
control over the labour process. After 19799 automation became part of 
the Coal Board•s armoury in its drive to rationalise and maximise 
output from surviving pits. All the coalfields were hit by some pit 
closures and reductions in the numbers of miners9 but the proportionate 
changes were greatest in the peripheral coalfields. So much so, in the 
late •eighties, the imminent extinction of all public sector deep coal 
mining in Scotland, and other coalfields by the mid-1990s9 is a 
distinct possibility (see chapter four). 
It is useful to highlight some limitations and inflexibilities of 
the technological strategies adopted by the Coal Board (British Coal) 
before discussing possible alternative courses of action. In practice, 
the Coal Board has chosen a narrow perception of advanced mining 
technology based primarily upon output-raising, labour saving 
applications of new innovations. In terms of increasing output per 
manshift (OMS) and wresting control over the labour process from the 
majority of workers the Board has proved successful. But there has 
been a very high price to pay in that 11 success 11 • The very fact that 
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the industry has developed super pits and implemented new technology to 
maximise productivity during periods of stagnant or falling UK coal 
demand has greatly added to pit closures and the consequent direct and 
indirect socio-economic costs (see chapter six). Looked at from the 
perspective of coalfield communities~ miners and workers in 
mining-related industries. such an investment strategy is most 
definitely a failure. 
The choice of mechanised and automated mining systems that can 
only operate optimally under what mining engineers term as the best 
conditions available is a self-restricting exercise. As Hirschorn 
(1984:4) observed: 
'Technology alone cannot determine work and 
organisational design, which are also shaped by 
social and political interests. But technology 
can set the limits within which design decisions 
are made.' 
The Coal Board's centrally-imposed. hierarchically organised. and 
unilinear technological path has had numerous drawbacks in addition to 
creating hundreds of thousands of job losses. Firstly, the industry's 
capital investment priorities can be criticized for the way in which 
they have facilitated the sterilization of coal reserves through 
4
' economic'' pit closures and for the way they have encouraged 
exploitation, rather than the conservation, of coal reserves in working 
pits. Extraction rates of co a 1 ''in seam" in modern ''high-tech" pits 
utilising heavy-duty equipment are often lower than 40 per cent (NUM, 
1987:22). The NUM has called for a strategy which seeks to raise coal 
out-take from workable faces based upon wider definitions of what coal 
is 11 economically recoverable" from the ones currently in use. Millions 
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of tonnes of existing reserves wi 11 continue to be 1 ost unless more 
flexible production technologies are designed and implemented to 
increase extraction rates and not simply the rate of output from coal 
faces. 
British Coal is trying to make the most use of powerful heavy duty 
machinery in virtually all its existing mines. Such machinery can only 
be applied for continuous production in unfaulted9 level and stable 
mining conditions. Pits with very thin 9 faulted or disturbed seams are 
unsuitable for the specific types of capital goods British Coal has 
adopted. The highly selective capital expenditure criteria chosen by 
the Corporation is partly set by the limits of the technologies it has 
chosen. Where the machines will not work efficiently the pits are 
likely to be catagorised as "uneconomic" propositions. This is 
effectively a continuation of the ''spearhead faces" investment strategy 
started in the late 1960s (see Section 5.1). 
Another criticism of the Coal Board's approach since the early 
• seventies is the way in which the majority of employees in the 
industry were deliberately excluded from the major decisions affecting 
the direction of technical change and work organisation. As noted 
above, many technological innovations in the coal industry were applied 
in such a way as to greatly reduce the numbel~ of workers and working 
pits in the industry. Automation has merely accelerated the trend (see 
Winterton 9 1985 and Burns et al., 1985). In addition, the various 
IVHNOS sub-systems (FIDO; MIDAS; IMPACT) have greatly enhanced 
managerial control by increasing the flow of information on all aspects 
of the production process. 
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Engineers working in numerous industries have developed complex 
engineering systems and computer-integrated production processes. The 
coal industry is no exception. Difficult underground environments have 
become "coal factories .. with completely integrated coal cutting~ 
loadingg carrying and processing. MINOS installations are available at 
all working pits although very few have all the MINOS applications in 
use. The next step is artificial intelligence for existing machinery 
and mining robotics. British Coal has already introduced experimental 
two-miner co a 1 faces g and the day can not be far away when it is 
possible to have unmanned coal-faces, remotely controlled from surface 
stations (New Technology, 04-02-83:9; Tregelles, 1986). 
Advocates of automation argue that it frees human beings from soul 
destroying, routine and back-breaking tasks. In fact, what has 
happened in the coa 1 industry is that many thousands of workers were 
11 freed 11 by redundancy, partly as a result of technical changes. In the 
long run, redundancy can become far more demoralizing and alienating a 
condition than pit work ever could be. This is a strong argument for 
objecting to a corporate strategy that seeks to increase productivity 
and maintain output from a minimum number of workers, especially given 
the lack of alternative job opportunities in mining districts (see 
Hudson, Peck and Sadler, 1984). 
There are also inflexibilities in the way the Coal Board has 
concentrated design decisions in the hands of small groups of mining 
engineers and scientists. As pointed out in section 5.1, technical 
change is a complexg interactive process. If a large proportion of the 
people who are going to be directly affected by new technology are 
excluded from the design and planning phases, many options and choices 
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are immediately closed. The mining systems developed by British Coal 
do not make the best use of miners' skills and tacit knowledge. As far 
as it is technically possible to do so human skills have been 
incorporated into the machinery. The closed loop control systems 
adopted by the industry set out to increase the flow of information 
from various parts of the mine9 from the coal face to surface plant 9 so 
that managers can closely monitor the whole production process. Whilst 
miners have not entirely relinquished control over the labour process 
to surface managers 9 they have conceded a 1 at of ground 9 and many 
mining jobs have become push button operations. This is not an 
inevitable outcome of increased computerisation. There are ways of 
utilising new technology in ways that make computers into worker aids 
whereby the worker still retains control over his/her job and continues 
to make key decisions helped by the additional information provided by 
computers (see Wilkinsong 1983; Feickertg 1979; Burns et al. 9 1985). 
One indication of the way in which technical change has combined 
with rationalisation measures to produce a net loss of skills in the 
industry 9 is the reduction in the proportion of skilled miners and the 
lowering of the average age of miners. This has not necessarily made 
the workforce more compliant 9 although as a rule9 a smallerg less 
experienced workforce may be easier for management to control and 
manipulate. As one miner of the 'eighties observed: 
'Already a large number of older miners have taken 
redundancy. ~lhen I started in the mines9 there 
were some miners who had taken part in the 1926 
General Strike and could remember it as if it were 
yesterday. They would always guide the younger 
workers. Now they're more than happy to take early 
retirement 9 with the best redundancy terms anywhere 
in the industry. It was first offered at age 609 
then 55 9 then 509 then thrown completely open to 
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any miner. These men are not being replaced. The 
average age and ski 11 has gone down 
accordingly. It was a political decision to get 
rid of the old-timers. In fact, the new people are 
having to learn from the older ones how to do the 
job' (quoted in Bohen and Wroughtons 1988:99). 
It is important to reiterate the fact that deski 11 ing and job 
not 
losses are~inevitable outcomes of technical change. Braverman (1974) 
considered deskilling to be a manifest feature of capitalist 
exploitation and accumulation. Others have argued that the 
introduction of new technologies on the factory-floor may lead to 
production reorganisation and a redistribution and redefinition of 
ski 11 s rather than a 11 Uni 1 ateral de ski 11 i ng strategy 11 (see Senker, 
1984; Jones, 1982) ( 2) . 
In the nationalised coal industry the major decisions in the 
design and planning of new technology and work organisation became 
increasingly centra 1 i sed and the prerogatives of senior managers and 
engineers. Another dimension of the problem may be in the shared 
attitudes, assumptions and be'liefs within the mining engineering 
profession. Rosenbrock (1981) has questioned what he has termed the 
dominant engineering paradigms of industrial societies (both capitalist 
and socialist), which place a premium on designing and using highly 
sophisticated systems for raising productivity that end up in 
dehumanising and in trivialising work. 
•what is remarkable is that engineers and 
technologists have not produced any methodology for 
using to the full the abilities and skills of human 
beings• (Rosenbrock, 1981:3). 
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As he has also observed: 
'When one visits the research and development 
1 a bora tori es in which new techno 1 ogy is conceived 
and brought forth 9 one finds a climate of 
technological endeavour in which the effect of 
technolo9y upon people is ignored' (Rosenbrock, 
1985:341). 
Such observations are clearly applicable to the coal industry, 
especially since the mid-1970s. MINOS and its sub-systems were 
introduced into British collieries in a piecemeal fashion which 
obscured the avera 11 management strategy from the Nation a 1 Union of 
Mineworkers. There was no consultation with the miners' union or work 
people during the planning and design phases of MINOS. Furthermore, 
the differential geographical impact of colliery investments and new 
technology combined with the reintroduction of decentralised pay 
bargaining to inhibit the development of an industry-wide strategy by 
the NUM in response to NCB decisions (Burns et al., 1985:93 and NUM, 
1987 a & b). 
In the 'eighties the politics of Thatcherism has filtered down 
into the management and organisation of the nationalised industries. 
The pressures of the imminent privatisation of the electricity supply 
industry; of an increase in coal imports; of tight financial 
constraints on the industry; combined with the new machismo of British 
Coa 1' s management, who have successfully extended their frontier of 
control in spite of resistance from the NUM, mean that the changes 
affecting the industry are likely to be even more rapid in the early 
1990s. If any case is to be made for the nationalised coal industry in 
such a hostile political climate there is clearly a need to develop 
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alternative approaches to the organisation and control of production~ 
and to technical change 7 than have hitherto been tried. 
It can be argued that alternatives are needed on economic and 
social grounds. In addition to the massive direct and indirect 
socio-economic costs of redundancies7 plant closures~ under-utilised 
fixed capital investments and the sterilization of millions of tonnes 
of coal~ there are built-in inflexibilities in the modern mines. Some 
of these inflexibilities have been mentioned. Over reliance on 
capital-intensive~ computer-integrated production with minimal human 
''interferenceu is vulnerable if failures occur in parts of the system. 
Long production delays may result if only a few highly trained people 
are available to rectify the problem. In mining, a delay in one part 
of a mine will create bottlenecks elsewhere. As British Coal engineers 
have argued, the increase in capital costs relative to labour costs in 
most collieries means that machines have to be worked continuously in 
order to reap adequate returns on investment (see Moses, 1988; 
Northard~ 1987). Mining systems based upon greater human operator 
control and upon maximising the skills and knowledge of workers at all 
levels of the production process would ensure a flexibility of response 
to mechanical and electronic breakdowns. 
Different ways of utilising existing mining technology have 
already been suggested. The NUM (1987) outlined proposals for using 
technology in ways that would benefit the maximum number of people 
working in the industry, rather than the lucky few who keep their jobs. 
Instead of adopting technology in labour-saving ways the same 
technology could be used to employ more people less intensively, whilst 
simultaneously maintaining machine running time and output. This is 
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partly why the NUM national executive has staunchly resisted six-day 
working and favoured reductions in daily working hours and the working 
week per employee. British Coal•s proposals for flexible working and 
continuous six or seven day production may increase employment at some 
collieries, but they will also raise productivity which would create, 
under current political and market constraints on demand for British 
coal~ further pit closures (see Section 5.2). 
Of course, alternative ways of using technology and organising the 
jobs that people do require very different objectives to those 
currently underlying the coal industry•s capital investment and 
production strategy. These objectives need to be incorporated into the 
design of engineering systems and into job design. 
the particular design depends upon the 
specification of objectives : systems engineering 
can be used for radical economic planning and 
control and can incorporate objectives such as 
democracy into design• (Burns et al.~ 1985:95). 
In turn, a change in direction would need a more imaginative approach 
to developing human skills and technology on the part of mining 
engineers. But as Rosenbrock (1981:4) observed: 
1 The engineering paradigm is not explicit, and it 
prevails not by a conscious choice~ but by 
suppressing the ability to see an alternative.• 
He suggested an "alternative paradigm 11 whereby engineers attempt to 
develop technology which is matched to human ability, and which fosters 
skill and makes it more productive. 
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Senior Board members~ managers and mining engineers have played a 
greater role in the direction and shaping of changes in work 
organisation since the mid-1970s9 but this was not always the case. 
Some indication of this is given by the NCB 1 s system of offering cash 
incentives for innovative technical ideas during the 1960s. The Awards 
Scheme, as it was called 9 was an effort to tap the largely 
uncoordinated expertise connected with mining and processing coal at 
different 1 evel s within the industry. The scheme attracted as many 
innovations from non-professional NCB personnel (ie miners~ fitters 9 
electriciansp deputies, overmen, machine operators) as from 
professional personnel (ie mechanical and mining engineers, electrical 
engineers, geologists, chemists, colliery managers, under-managers, 
etc.). The number of awards rose rapidly throughout the mechanisation 
phase in spite of the sharp decline in numbers employed, and the 
increasing contribution from the NCB 1 s professional research and 
development establishments. As Townsend 1 s (1980:153) study of 
innovations associated with shearer-loaders noted: 
1 ln coal mining, as in many other industries, local 
non-patentable adaptations of machinery and 
equipment are an extremely important part of the 
exploitation of innovations. Taking into account 
the variations in seams and coalface conditions 
throughout the British coalfields, the awards 
scheme gives a fair indication of the scale and 
importance of this local adaptive learning 
process. 1 
The significance of local adaptations and innovations in the 
overall technical change process was also stressed in Saville and 
Kerevan 1 s (1987) study of Scottish engineering workshops (also refer to 
chapter three), They argue that the Coal Board has moved in entirely 
the wrong direction by centralizing formal R & D within the technical 
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headquarters at Bretby~ which literally drained all the good ideas and 
capital resources away from the central workshops. According to 
Saville and Kerevan's analysis9 had the workshops been given a more 
autonomous managerial role 9 adequate capital investment and 
responsibility to design and manufacture some of the equipment needs of 
local colliers, technical solutions would probably have been found to 
production difficulties at so-called 'marginal' collieries. Put 
another way9 a more decentralised technical change process involving 
workshop facilities in the research, design and development of 
technology~ would have helped raise production in pits sited in the 
peripheral coalfields and lessened the likelihood of pit closures. 
Since 1983 British Coal has followed the recommendations of the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission by reducing the number of workshops 
and by reorganising their activities. Each workshop has become 
specialised in specific items of equipment such as shearers, 
roadheaders, conveyors or roof supports (see chapter three, table 3.6). 
This means that area workshops are now serving the whole industry and 
doing less work specifically related to their own coalfields and nearby 
collieries. The decline in the number of pits and faces has led to 
further cuts in workshop numbers. 
The reorganisation of workshop functions coupled with the 
restructuring within the British Coal industry has renewed pressures on 
existing workshops, particularly those in the peripheral coalfields. 
An example is Ashington workshop in the North East of England. In 1988 
the workshop was doing repairs on roof supports, roadheaders~ 
underground locomotives, diesel engines, cages and skips, for local and 
other coalfields. During the 1988/9 financial year British Coal has 
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reduced the volume of repair work at some workshops, and it has decided 
to transfer all Ashington's roof support repair work to Duckmanton in 
Derbyshire. This effectively makes Duckmanton the only national repair 
facility for roof supports other than the private manufacturers 
themselves. According to British Coal, the reduction in the 
corporation's annual orders for new supports from some 10~000 items a 
few years ago to only 6,000 supports in 1988 justifies the 
concentration of support work at Duckmanton. The action has provoked 
strike action by Ashington's 470-strong workforce~ of whom some 146 
were involved in work on roof supports and face redundancy (Newcastle 
Journal, 17-01-89:5). In many ways the reorganisation of workshop 
production is in line with British Coal's technical changes, capital 
investment strategy and area reorganisation, which have concentrated 
productive resources in the central coalfields. 
It can be argued that British Coal has adopted a minimalist 
approach to technical change and has not made full use of the skills, 
expertise, resources and infrastructure available to it. Investments 
have increased spatial divisions in the industry by favouring the best 
seams of the central coalfields. Centralising formal R & D facilities 
reduced the scope for decentra 1 i sed innovations designed to meet the 
needs of collieries outside the central coalfields. Nevertheless, 
British Coa·l's approach is certainly not the only one. Efforts could 
still be made to adapt, modify or change existing technology for use in 
seams of varying thickness, including very thin seams, faulted seams, 
or on steep gradients. Wherever it is technically and economically 
prohibitive to apply heavy duty machinery, conventional equipment could 
be modified to meet the particular conditions of the colliery. 
Employers at all levels and engineering workshops could be involved 
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much more in the innovation processp and in the organisation of work. 
Of course, much would depend upon the underlying objectives and the 
economic criteria used to influence the technical change process. As 
far as the author is aware~ there has never been any serious attempt in 
the industry to design and develop technology and organise production 
using concepts such as long-term non-renewable resource conservation; 
raising coal extraction rates from existing work·ing collieries; upon 
making the best use of human skills and expertise; and upon 
stabilising and maintaining employment within the industry. Some 
guidelines for such an approach could be: 
(1) The development of the concept of pit or coalfield appropriate 
tE:chnologies; 
(2) A more even investment programme based on making the best use of 
coal reserves and human skills in each coalfield, and not just the 
best collieries mostly within the central coalfields; 
(3) Wider definitions of economic (and social) costs and benefits of 
capital investment/disinvestment decisions. These should include 
at least the costs of job losses and redundancy payments in mining 
and related industries (see Hudson, Peck and Sadler, 1984; 
Coalfield Communities Campaign, 1986; and chapter six on linked 
industries). 
(4) Productivity criteria would need to be based as much on notions of 
improving coal extraction rates as upon raising standard indices 
of productivity, such as output per manshift. 
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(5) Capital investment decisions should be based on considerations of 
long~term coal conservation and employment» and not simply on 
short term financial and market criteria. Pits~ unlike factories 9 
cannot be reopened which means that decisions based upon short 
term criteria have major and long lasting implications for local 
economies (Schumacher, 1960). 
(6) The priority should be on making the best use of existing capacity 
\1/ithout the need to close pits unless their coal reserves are 
exhausted. The development of the Selby super pit has created 
additional capacity and raised productivity thresholds~ and so 
Selby has literally turned other pits into excess capacity 
(Winterton~ 1985). New mines should not be developed if they are 
going to lead to further premature pit closures. 
For any one of these guidelines to be implemented would virtually 
take a reversal of current state and corporate policies. It is not too 
late to change course» even though there are now only a few remaining 
pits in the peri phera 1 areas. If there was a po 1 i ti ca 1 commitment to 
base energy policy on what is available in terms of indigenous 
resources, employee skills and expertise, and upon the existing coal 
infrastructure, including engineering suppliers, there is no reason why 
the industry could not be maintained at current production levels 
without another round of pit closures and redundancies (see concluding 
chapter). 
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Conclusion - Only a Dream? 
At the National Union of Mineworkers 1 conference on 20 December 
1946~ Arthur Horner~ the Union 1 S General Secretary, rounded up his 
speech on an optimistic note: 
when the flags go over the pits for the 
National Coal Board - it does mean something 
different. It is a tremendous change ... It is not 
a change in name; it is a change that gives us the 
possibility of realising things we have only dared 
dream about for years and years and years 1 (NUM~ 
December 1946) . 
In reality nationalisation has failed to protect employment in mining 
communities and it has failed to produce new ways of organising work 
that gives workers more say in the day-to-day running of the industry. 
Lack of democratic control has influenced almost every aspect of the 
way in which the mining industry is organised, including the design and 
development of technology~ even though its manufacture was mostly in 
the private domain. Just one year after nationalisation Heinemann 
(1948:64) realized: 
1 There is a very rea 1 danger that under 
nationalisation much of the skill and organising 
ability of the men on the job will continue to be 
wasted because of the composition of control 
itself. Capitalist controls at the top are not the 
best recipe for producing a spirit of Socialist 
emulation at the bottom. 1 
Most of this chapter has focussed on the issue of technical 
change, which raises wider and more important issues. As Cooley 
(1980:537) argued: 
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•science and technology is not neutral, and we. must 
at all times expose its underlying assumptions. We 
can at the same time begin to indicate how science 
and technology might be applied in the interests of 
people as a whole rather than to maximise profits 
for the few. 
The choices are essentially political and 
ideological rather than technological. As we 
design technological systems 9 we are in fact 
designing sets of social relationships and as we 
question those social relationships and attempt to 
design systems differently, we are then beginning 
to challenge, in a political way, power structures 
in society. • 
Such considerations as those expressed by Cooley (1980) raise 
questions about the meaning and purpose of nationalisation in Britain. 
As noted in this chapter there was a deliberate centralisation and 
concentration of control over investment planning, economic and 
technical change in the industry. It has never been an objective of 
management to attempt new forms of work organisation based on concepts 
of on-the-job control and in the involvement of workers at every stage 
in the design and implementation of new technology. 
In a conference on 11 Industrial Democracy•' convened by the NUM in 
Harrogate, December 1977, Peter Heathfield, later to be NUM General 
Secretary, argued that the miners had limited themselves, alongside 
other sections of the British labour movement, "to the inept practice 
of an unsatisfactory concept : consultation", whereby workers were left 
with little say and no rights of veto over management decisions. 
Nationalisation should mean more than just a change of masters, it 
offers the opportunity to 
• formulate and fashion new systems of management 
that will enable the socialist cause to advance• 
(Workers• Control Bulletin, No. 37, 1978). 
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From time to time there have been various experiments with worker 
participation in both public and private sector enterprist::s~ such as 
"quality eire les 11 9 11 job enrichment•·~ 11 autonomous work groups 11 ~ 
.. consultative committees", and the like, The whole consultative 
framework set up by the National Coal Board was an attempt at 
increasing market participation (see Section 5.1), But the Coal Board 
became preoccupied with the variable costs of production especially 
labour, and in ways to increase productivity, and it introduced ne\'J 
technology in labour-saving ways. According to Nichols (1980:25): 
•as a matter of plain historical fact, very little 
control over the labour process has been 
relinquished voluntarily, and what element of 
control has been ••given 11 to workers has usually 
only been "given 11 when compensated for by increased 
or stabilised production.• 
It is reasonable to argue that whilst full workers• control within 
Britain•s nationalised industries cannot be achieved without wider 
social and political change, this does not excuse the development of 
highly centralised, top-down decision-making structures. It does not 
mean that social objectives have to give way always to short term 
commercial criteria in the running of these industries. In other 
words, there is nothing axiomatic in the view that nationalised 
industries should be market orientated to the detriment of broader 
social objectives and the majority of people working within those 
industries. As Coates (1978) observed: 
•It we can•t democratise the nationalised 
industries, they will remain authoritarian state 
capitalist enterprises. Why should anyone wish to 
swap a private capitalist boss for the state 
variety? If we cannot prove the superiority of 
nationalisation in practical democratic 
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experiments, how can we persuade workers to support 
its extension? ..• until workers want workers' 
control and industrial democracyg they won't even 
vote for change 9 leave alone rebel for it. The 
most powerful argument for change is to show that 
it works.' 
This section of the thesis has raised the issue of workers' 
control. The importance of the concept should not be understated. It 
is fundamental to any understanding of the failings of nationalisation 
in practice. State ownership offered unique opportunities for 
practi ca 1 democratic experiments in the organisation and contra 1 of 
work, which were missed. In the 'eighties there has been an expansion 
of private capital and of denationalisation. The government argues 
that workers will benefit from share ownership and greater 
participation in the private sector. If an alternative to private 
ownership of coal resources and production is to be found it is 
necessary to tackle the issue of industrial democracy. 
This final section has examined some areas where existing forms of 
control and organisation can be modified or changed to increase the 
social responsibility of the coal industry to maintain coal production 
and conserve reserves for future generations; to secure employment; and 
to introduce a more regionally-balanced investment strategy. Social 
objectives of this kind would greatly benefit coalfield communities, 
and in the longer term should produce benefits for the wider economy. 
This chapter has examined external relations of production between 
the state and the state-owned coa 1 industry, and between state owned 
and private capital. In order to bring about fundamental changes in 
the way production is organised, decisions are made and jobs are 
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designed within the nationalised coal industry~ it is necessary for the 
state to intervene and to encourage change. It could do so along lines 
suggested by Saville and Kerevan (1987) for the Cowdenbeath workshop~ 
whereby local authoritiess workshop managers and workers would have a 
greater· role to play in developing their own production strategies and 
in the innovation process. Personnel at local collieries should also 
be allowed more say in determining their own future. Decentralisation 
of power would have encouraged greater investment in peripheral 
coalfields and lessened the emphasis placed on big capacity raising 
projects like Selby. British Coal could have used its monopoly 
purchasing power in the home market to encourage the development of a 
range of mining technology designed to match different conditions~ as 
opposed to machines simply to maximise productivity on the best seams. 
Many of the arguments about nationalisation have polarised into 
pro or anti statements without really examining the internal weaknesses 
of individual nationalised industries and their relations with the 
state and with the wider economy. Privatisation will undoubtedly 
create new opportunities for some sections of private capital but as it 
is argued here~ will not produce more stable employment or more 
satisfying work for the majority of miners. These are issues that have 
to be met by the labour movement. As noted in this chapter, deliberate 
social and political choices have played a crucial part in determining 
the scale and rapidity of decline in the UK coal mining industry and in 
shaping the geography of that decline. The following chapters will 
focus much more on changes taking place in the engineering industries 
linked to British Coal. As shall be shown, not all sections of private 
industry will benefit from coal's privatisation. 
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FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES 
(1) The shareholdings NCB members have had in private mining 
engineering companies has not been without controversy. A 
series of articles in Private Eye during 1971 and 1972 
levelled a number of serious allegations against senior Coal 
Board personnel. It was alleged that NCB managers• 
shareholdings purchased when Bonser Engineering Limited went 
public in July, 19649 had an incluence on NCB purchases of 
Bonser roof supports in the period from 1965 to 1969. During 
that period Bonser supplied around six per cent of the total 
number of supports bought by the NCB, and at the peak of 
sales in 1967-8 Bonser contributed nine per cent of the total 
purchases. This was a relatively large contribution given 
the fact that Bonser only entered into the production of 
powered roof supports in 1964. There were also some 
complaints from colliery managers that the Bonser supports 
were inadequate compared with those supplied by other 
manufacturers. 
Among the shareholders in Bonser was Mr. Alfred Robens, 
son of Lord Robens, NCB Chairman. Alfred had married 
Patricia Bonser 9 the daughter of Mr. F. Bonser, Chairman of 
Bonser Engineering. The wife of Mr. M. V. Sheppard 9 then 
Director General of Production at the NCB, was another 
shareholder. In response to questions from the Select 
Committee on the Nationalised Industries, the Board•s 
accountants, Thomson McLintock argued that it was "quite 
natural 11 for Board personnel on the production side to spare 
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an investment for firms 11 Where they could keep an eye on how 
things ~'1/ere goi ng 11 • It was well known that the powered 
support revolution was underway and that the NCB would 
continue to invest heavily in coal face mechanisation. 
Furthermore, such investments by individual NCB members 
11 did not contravene any NCB staff rules 11 (Select Committee, 
1974/5, Appendix 3, para. 10;274). 
(2) There is no doubt that the application of microelectronics 
has changed the nature of work in many industries and blurred 
traditional job boundaries at all levels, from the point of 
production to top management, but this does not necessarily 
imply deski 11 i ng is taking place even though the numbers of 
traditional engineering jobs has rapidly declined. Where 
empirical studies do find evidence of deskilling it is 
important not to pin the blame on the technology. There is 
nothing 11 inherent 11 in the hardware that would allow for the 
deskilling and control and surveillance of production (and 
workers) by management. As in the coal mining industry, it 
is important to analyse who designs and controls the 
technology and their reasons for implementing it in 
particular ways. It is also necessary to examine broader 
political, economic, organisational and social constraints 
and processes. 
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TABLE 5:1 
Moses• Sugg~stions for Improved Competitiveness 
(1) All measures which reduce cost per tonne must be vigorously pursued; 
(2) Steps must be taken to improve the link between productivity and 
earnings. The aim must be to introduce more flexible working 
arrangements. 
(3) The priorities within the investment programme will be 1) 
•operational• capital to exploit fully the best existing capacity and 
reserves to improve underground infrastructure and reduce costs; 2) 
additional/replacement output at the existing best mines; 3) new 
prospects capable of earning the required rate of return. 
(4) The output at low cost collieries and opencast sites must be 
maximised to reduce average costs. 
(5) Collieries that do not have or appear not to have prospects of making 
an economic contribution will need to be examined under the Colliery 
Review Procedure. 
Note: Moses also noted four areas of cost reduction:- Introducing 
11 retreat•o mining; shield support faces; speeding up development 
drivages; improving machine reliability. Moses~ K. is Technical 
Director and member of the Board of British Coal. 
Source: Moses~ K. (1986) •The Need to Cut Costs• in The Mining Engineer, 
July 1986:11-12. 
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TABLE 5:2 
Northard's Suggestions for Improved Competitiveness 
(1) Concentration of production on fewer high capacity units. 
Heavier capacity and-heavier duty equipment. Changes in technology 
are not foreseen. 
Increase in the proportion of retreat faces. 
(2) Concentration in time by maximising production time of coalface 
equipment by: --
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
( 6) 
a) Cutting out delays through better layout and organisation; 
b) eliminating 11 in shift 11 breakdowns through better machinery 
design and maintenance systems; 
c) extending production time (currently reduced by ·j ncompl ete use 
of the time within the potential day and the week). 
Ensuring continuity of coal production by having new capacity 
available at the required time andoy-speedy transfer of coalface 
plant. 
- greater use of roof bolts; FSVs (free steer vehicles). 
More widespread use of modern roadway transport methods such as FSVs. 
FSVs ensure the continuity of coal production, drivage rates and 
transfer of face plant. 
By concentration of face capacity and better utilisation of existing 
coal conveying and winding instailations to cut out trans~or~ 
stoppages. 
- Total application of the MINOS systems. 
- Improved control of the underground environment through the more 
widespread application of proved computer monitoring and control 
of ventilation systems, methane dilution and drainage. 
Improvins organisation by reappraising needs for management and 
supervis1on. This is necessary to fit the needs of new production 
methods and technology, and within the requirements of existing 
legislation. 
According to Northard, no new technology is required, only the more 
widespread application of that which is available within a more 
effective organisational framework. 
Note: J.H. Northard was the Director of Operations for the British Coal 
Corporation. He is now Deputy Chairman of the Corporation. 
Source: Northard, J.H. (1987) 'Wind of Change -Management Response' in 
The Mining Engineer, September 1987:107-116. 
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TABLE 5:3 
Wheeler's 11 model" collie_rx 
The "Low Cost Option~ 
Output 
Manpower 
Production Days 
Shifts/Day 
1.75 m 
390 
6 
3 ext. 
Machine Shifts/Day 9 ext. 
Coal faces 3 
Cost/gigajoule £1.11 
Note: ext. means extended 
Wheeler argued that the lowest cost coal could be achieved at the "typical 
mine" by producing coal on six days per week with the men employed on a 
four day rosta working nine hour shifts. Further reductions could be made 
by reducing the working faces to three and making more effective use of 
the manpower augmented by outside contractors. 
A. Wheeler was Director of the Nottinghamshire Area for British Coal 
and is now Director of Group Operations for BC's peripheral administrative 
coalfields. 
Source: Wheeler9 A. (1986) 'Frontiers and Forward - Colliery Production 
and Productivity' in The Mining Engineer, September 1986:152-160. 
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TABLE 5:4 
Main elements of British Coal•s "flexibility 11 plans 
(1) Coal production over six days per week 
(2) 4 x 9 hour shifts per day underground on a continental shift basis 
(3) Winding shafts to work for 23 hours per day as full capacity 
(4) Heavy duty face technology to become standard on all major faces 
and concentration of production on fewer high producing faces 
(5) Wider use of automated techniques to improve machine reliability. 
reduce down time and cut the number of craftsmen•s jobs 
(6) To merge fitters and electricians into one multi-skilled 
electro-mechanic and transfer some maintenance tasks to machine 
operators 
(7) To cut the number of deputies and officials and change their role 
to that of supervisor 
(8) To revise the Mines Health and Safety Legislation to permit the 
use of new working practices and reduce the influence of the 
deputy 
(9) The introduction of a range of new incentive schemes intended to 
cover all groups of workers at a colliery and hasten the changes 
by replacing national level pay bargaining 
(10) To increase the use of roof bolts. trackless vehicles and other 
highly flexible production techniques used in the USA 
(11) To increase the use of outside contractors across a wide range of 
mining functions 
(12) To reduce jobs in every part of the mine both underground and on 
the surface 
Source NUM (1987). 
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TABLE 5:5 
Vital statistics underlying Britisb Coal 
productivity j~creases since 1982/3 
Percentage Change 
+ or -
Daily output per coalface 
Output per Manshift (OMS) 
Operating costs in £ (sterling) 
per gigajoule (the metric heat 
value of coal) 
+ 94% 
+ 85% 
- 25% 
Saleable coal output - 21% 
Number of coalfaces - 59% 
Colliery employment levels 
Number of pits 
- 58% 
- 51% 
Note: Since the end of the miners' strike in March 1985, British Coal 
have highlighted the following changes: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
Sources: 
Productivity increases at collieries by 75% (see Figure 5:3); 
Operating costs at collieries down 30% (see Figure 5:4); 
Workforce reductions by almost 50%; 
79 collieries closed or merged (up to September 1988); 
Price reductions to electricity suppliers by nearly 20% (in 
real terms); 
Capital investment totalling £29200 million and continuing at 
the rate of £2 million every working day. 
FT, 14-02-89:6 and British Coal Press Release, 10-10-88. 
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TABLE 5:6 
Capital expenditu_r_e on major capital equipment9 March 31 9 1984 
Total estimated 
Region costs (£million) 
Scotland 70 
North East 27 
North Yorkshire 19183 
Doncaster 491 
Barnsley 327 
South Yorkshire 185 
North Derbyshire 30 
North Nottinghamshire 84 
South Nottinghamshire 11 
South Midlands 24 
Western 153 
South Wales 20 
Source: NCB Report and Accounts, 1983-4. 
Number of operational 
calli eri es 
9 
16 
12 
10 
16 
15 
9 
14 
11 
14 
16 
28 
Q 
TABLES 5:7 
Pro~ortion of Total Out~ut (TOl Cut and Loaded b~ Various T~~es 
of Machines in British Coal Mineso 1954-1972 
Year Meco-Moore Shearers Ploughs Trepanner T.P.S.L. Others Tota 1 Tonnage 
% TO % TO 
1954 4.0 0.5 
1956 5.0 4.8 
1958 5.0 14. 1 
1960 3.9 17.7 
1962 1.5 24.7 
1964 0.5 30.7 
1966 - 41.1 
1968 - 60.7 
1970 - 72.5 
1972 - 67.6 
Source: NCB Statistics Department 
Adapted from Townsend (1976) 
% TO 
0.9 
1.4 
3. 1 
5.4 
6.9 
6.9 
6. 1 
3.3 
2.9 
2.9 
% TO % TO % TO 106 
- - 2.9 211 
0.2 - 4.9 207 
2.3 - 6.7 199 
8.2 
-
5.2 184 
15.8 1.7 7.7 188 
19.2 5.3 5.8 187 
20.6 8.3 4.3 174 
15.7 5.0 4.2 163 
15.4 2.6 4.4 140 
l7 0 7 1.6 2.6 109 
Mechanised 
% 
8.4 
16.4 
31.2 
41.6 
58.4 I N 
0"1 
U1 
68.4 
80.4 
90.0 
92.1 
92.7 
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TABLE 5:8 
Numbers of Roo(Support Suppliers to the NCB before and~fter 
industrial reo~anisation in 1969 
1959 3 suppliers 
1960 4 
1964 5 
1965 6 
1966-8 8 
1969 5 (3 account for over 
95% of NCB market) 
Note: In the mid-1960s the NCB was buying around 21 basic roof support 
designs with variations in heights weight, etc. 
In the mid-1970s there were 14 basic designs from three dominant 
suppliers. 
The IRC~sponsored mergers leading to the formation of three 
dominant suppliers after 1969. 
~~ : Dobson Hardwick and William Park : Dobson Park 
{Gullick Dobson is major company in Dobson Park Industries). 
Second merger: Fletcher & Steward, Richard Sutcliffe and A.G. Wild 
to form Fletcher, Sutcliffe, Wild (FSW), taken over by Dobson 
Park Industries in 1981. 
Third merger : Dowty Group and Bonser : Dowty. 
Note: In 1989, the Dowty Group is considering the sale of its mining 
supply business, which could leave Gullick Dobson as the dominant, 
if not monopoly, supplier to British Coal (see Concluding Chapter). 
Source: First Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries 
(1974/5). 
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FIGURE 5:2 
Increase in UK Output Per Manshift 
and the Pit Closure Programme 
50 
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45 
30 
Period of major 
rE'Corntruction 
I 
I 
Powered 
supports' 
eltceed 80'-
Power loaded 
e>l:tceeds 90% 
20~~~~--~~~~---=~~~~--~~~ 
4 7 50 52 58 62 64/5 70,'7 1 7Ji4 
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Source Paper prepared by T.R. Carr, Mining Research 
and Development Establishment, NCB. 
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FIGURE 5:3 
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FIGURE 5:4 
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FIGURE 5:5 
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This cartoon appeared in the Financial Times, 30-04-86, 
shortly after the Coal Board had decided to change its 
name to one reflecting a "business" rather than a 
"national institution". 
